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Abstract
The topic of executive compensation has recently emerged as a legitimate field
for academic study. The rapid growth in publications has almost been matched by the
well-publicised growth in CEO remuneration. From the time of the first utility
privatisation in the UK, right up to current day, the topic of board room pay has rarely
been out of the news headlines or the academic journals.
This thesis makes several new contributions to the executive compensation
literature, primarily by providing an in depth analysis of the executive option holdings
of directors in the UK. Data on this aspect of executive compensation has until
recently been unavailable and as such this thesis represents the first work in the UK to
fully incorporate this element of remuneration for a large sample of companies.
Executive options have become an increasingly significant component in
executive compensation, yet their valuation and the incentive effects they create are
relatively poorly understood. This thesis attempts to undo these shortcomings by
providing a thorough analysis of the determinants and consequences of the level of
option information disclosure. Furthermore, it develops the rational for granting
executive options and describes the creation and distribution of the pay for
performance sensitivities created by holdings of executive options. Finally, it deals
with valuation issues that are particular to executive options.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The topic of executive compensation has received widespread attention in
recent years, particularly in the US and UK, and not just from academics, but from the
media, the public and governments alike. Much of this attention derived from what
was described as "excessive" payments made to top company directors without due
regard to company performance. In the UK, headlines such as 'Fat Cats in the Dock"
and 'Executive Gluttony under Attack' 2 stoked the debate as to whether shareholders
were receiving value for money from their company directors.
While one can argue about the merit of large increases in executive
compensation one cannot argue about their existence. Median cash-compensation
paid to S&P-500 chief executive officers has doubled since 1970, adding in realised
gains from long term incentives such as options, the figure has quadrupled (Murphy,
1999). Compensation amongst the FTSE-100 company chief executive officers has
shown a similar dramatic rise (Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995, Conyon and Peck,
1998a). The UK government's response to this has been to set up successive
commissions (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel 1998) in an effort to
establish guidelines for the determination of executive pay. However, while many
such guidelines have now been introduced, as yet there seems to be little evidence of
them actually managing to restrict the growth in executive pay - if indeed this is the
desired objective of government policy.
Economist, 4th March 1995
2	 Times 26th/27th November 1994
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Academic interest in the subject ignited in the late 1980's. Prior to 1985,
executive compensation papers were limited to one or two per year, but by 1995, this
figure had hit sixty (Hallock and Murphy, 1999). Although undoubtedly fuelled by
the public interest, the growth in publications has been assisted on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. On a theoretical level, the widespread acceptance of agency
theory provided a solid foundation for research into optimal compensation contracts.
At the same time, increases in the levels of information disclosure have provided a
means by which such theories can be tested. This thesis contributes to that academic
literature by providing a fuller and richer understanding of UK chief executive officer
(CEO) compensation contracts than has hitherto been provided.
1.2 Pay And Performance
The focus of much of the executive compensation literature has been on the
link between executive pay and company performance. The large increases in CEO
pay both in the UK and US have largely coincided with huge increases in the stock
market performance, the question is, is this merely a coincidence or evidence of
efficiency?
Historically the link between pay and performance has been thought to be
small or non-existent (see Jensen & Murphy, 1990a,b; Conyon, Gregg & Machin,
1995). However, recent research using broader measures of pay have called these
findings into doubt (see Hall & Liebman, 1998). One of the main aims of this thesis
is to investigate this relationship using data previously unavailable to UK researchers.
3
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The main focus of this thesis then is an analysis of the mechanisms by which
executive directors, or in particular the CEO, are remunerated in the UK. More
specifically, the use of executive options as part of the overall compensation package
has become the norm rather than the exception, yet such instruments have rarely been
addressed by the UK compensation literature.
1.3 The UK Data
One of the main reasons for this lack of analysis has been the historically poor
levels of disclosure in the UK with respect to executive share options. Subsequent to
the implementation of the Greenbury reports' recommendations in 1995 however,
companies for the first time began disclosing full information on the movements in,
and holdings of, company share options held by all directors. This level of
information was previously unavailable in the UK3 , and the share option data now
presented in today's annual company reports is even more detailed than that currently
available in the US. The analysis undertaken in this thesis is among the first to utilise
this rich source of data, representing a key contribution to the UK executive
compensation literature. This is especially the case since the results from the thesis
are based on a large and economically significant set of UK listed companies.
1.4StructureAndAims Of The Thesis
The aim of the following chapter is to provide a foundation on which the
remainder of the thesis can be built. It begins with an explanation of the principal-
agent problem that underpins much of the pay-performance link, providing a
Other than from direct access to each company's Register of Directors' Interests
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theoretical example of a typical principal agent model. It continues, by reviewing the
empirical studies that have attempted to isolate the link between executive pay and
company performance. The early compensation literature managed only to establish a
weak link between pay and performance both in the US and the UK, while more
recent US works using broader measures of pay have demonstrated a much stronger
link. Subsequent chapters attempt to fill the gap in the literature by using similar
broader measures of pay in a UK setting.
The next section of Chapter Two summarises basic option theory and the
valuation of options using the Black-Scholes pricing formula. It also provides an
introduction to the option delta which is fundamental to the understanding of how
option holdings create incentive effects. The chapter concludes by introducing the
topics of disclosure and tournament theory which form the focus of Chapters Four and
Six respectively.
Chapter Three details the construction and content of the main data set of 510
UK quoted companies which supports the thesis. As mentioned above, the richness of
the data collected and used in this thesis represents a significant advance over similar
earlier work carried out in the UK. The data set described here is used primarily in
Chapter Five. The remaining two empirical chapters (Chapters Four and Six) use data
that are subsets of this main data set, with additional variables added where
appropriate. The relationship between the data sets is clearly set out in Section 3.1.
5
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The unique feature of the main data set is the identification of all details of
each and every tranche of options held by company CEOs. While still not possible for
every CEO, this data set identifies such information in over 80% of the cases where
the CEO has outstanding options at the end of the company's financial year. This
allows a more accurate determination of the value of the stock of options held by the
directors and the incentives provided by them, than has ever been possible before. In
addition to option holdings, all details on other elements of CEO remuneration are
collected along with company specific variables representing firm size and
performance in order to fully investigate the pay-performance link.
Chapter Four considers the empirical determinants of the quality of
information disclosed about directors' share options in a sample of nearly 300 large
UK companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the
recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of
director option information. This chapter makes two further contributions to the UK
empirical literature. Firstly, it documents the degree of option information disclosure
in the FTSE-350 companies immediately prior to the implementation of the
Greenbury recommendations. Secondly, it models option information disclosure as a
function of variables that are thought to influence corporate costs of disclosure in an
effort to explain why, when not yet required to do so, some companies choose to
voluntarily disclose information on directors' share option holdings while others did
not.
Chapter Five begins by providing a methodological framework for evaluating
the impact of changes in corporate performance on CEO wealth. The chapter
6
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continues by actually calculating rather than estimating the real values of directors'
share option holdings and the incentives provided by them. The main contribution of
Chapter Five is an analysis of the impact on the valuation of options and changes in
the pay-performance sensitivity created by differing levels of disclosure. The
Greenbury report outlined two distinct mechanisms for disclosing directors' share
option details in the UK, while current Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
regulations in the US provide a third alternative. The results presented here have
significant implications for US researchers with regard to the effect of the SEC
reporting regulations.
The implications of tournament theory are discussed in Chapter Six. The
chapter makes use of data on over 550 individual executives from 105 UK stock
market companies in the late 1990s. This work represents the first empirical test of
tournament theory using UK data on corporate executives. It is significant and unique
also in that it is the first to utilise a broader measure of pay which includes the value
of annual grants made under option schemes or other long term incentive plans. The
results of this chapter though, provide only some evidence consistent with the
operation of tournament mechanisms within a business context and question whether
tournaments are an appropriate explanation for executive pay outcomes in the UK.
The results are discussed in the context of other (mainly US) research that has
considered the empirical relevance of tournament models in a business (i.e. non-
sporting / laboratory) context.
Chapter Seven provides a comprehensive framework, for the understanding of
options as incentive tools. It seeks to provide a rational for the use of options as a
7
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preferred means of creating incentives (for example, relative to the use of equity).
These findings are then discussed in light of the "four-times" rule in the UK. Current
Association of British Insurers (ABI) guidelines recommend that the total aggregate
value of directors' option holdings should not exceed four times their basic salary.
The analysis presented here shows how the majority of UK firms adhere to this
recommendation and how, through the leverage effect of options, the pay-performance
link could be increased by its withdrawal.
The chapter continues by addressing the implication of CEO risk aversion on
the valuation of executive options. The Black-Scholes option pricing formula
assumes that the holder of the option is free to hedge the risk of his long position.
This arbitrage argument allows the utility preferences of individuals to be ignored
when pricing options. However, executive directors are effectively prohibited from
hedging their options, consequently the value placed on executive options must reflect
their risk aversion. By adopting a utility approach to the valuation of executive
option, the chapter provides a means to optimise the incentives created through
granting options. An understanding of the relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption
when examining the valuation and incentive effects from executive options is new to
the compensation literature. The analysis of the chapter, therefore, is novel in that it
shows some of the implications of incorporating the more realistic assumption of risk
averse CEOs into the analysis. The chapter concludes by offering a number of
recommendations for policy makers in the UK.
Finally, Chapter Eight draws the thesis together reviewing the main findings of
the preceding chapters. A full list of the 510 companies constituting the main data set
8
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can be found in Appendix One, while Appendix Two details the variables collected
for each of the companies included. The next chapter then introduces the main topics
covered by the thesis beginning with a review of agency theory and the principal-agent
model.
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Chapter Two
Modelling Executive
Compensation: A Survey
of Recent Literature
Chapter Two - Modelling Executive Compensation: A Survey of Recent Literature
2.1 Introduction
As highlighted in Chapter One, academic interest in the field of executive
compensation has soared in recent years. Fundamental to much of this research
has been the principal agent model which has become the preferred theoretical
framework, around which further results can be established. The pioneering study
of the conflict of interests between mangers and shareholders by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) formalised the problems associated with the 'separation of
ownership and control' identified by Berle and Means (1932) and initiated much
of the 'agency theory' literature.
The principal agent literature was developed contemporaneously to, but
largely independent of this agency theory literature. The principal agent literature,
including influential early works by Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1974, 1976)
Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) focused primarily on deriving
optimal incentive contracts for risk-averse agents.
Early empirical studies began by focusing on the relationship between
CEO (or the highest paid director) pay and company performance (Murphy, 1985;
Jensen and Murphy, 1990b; Abowd, 1990; Main, 1992) and generally concluded
that there was little pay performance sensitivity in executive compensation.
However, early studies, especially in the UK, focused almost entirely on cash
compensation measuring pay solely as the total of salary and bonus.
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The structure of executive compensation has changed greatly in recent
years with non-cash elements of remuneration becoming increasingly significant.
This along with recent improvements in the levels of disclosure, particularly in
relation to details of holdings of executive share options, both in the US and the
UK, have provided for the first time the opportunity to analyse a total
compensation measure that includes the values of long term incentives. These
advances have led recent studies (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Conyon and Murphy,
1999) to establish much larger pay performance sensitivities.
Agency theory is not, however, the only model put forward to explain
executive pay. Lazear and Rosen (1981) compared linear incentive contracts with
rank-order tournaments in which a predetermined prize is awarded to the manger
with the highest output. O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) further test whether
the level of CEO pay is better explained by tournament theory or by social
comparison theory.
The aim of this chapter then is threefold. Firstly, to provide a theoretical
framework for the work undertaken later in this thesis. This itself has two
elements, the understanding of the principal agent problem which lies at the heart
of most of the executive compensation literature and an introduction to the nature
and valuation of options, without which, a complete analysis of modern day
executive compensation can no longer be undertaken. Secondly, to provide a
review of the pay for performance literature. As mentioned in the Chapter One,
the number of executive compensation papers has soared in recent years and as
such, a review of the entire broad literature is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Instead this chapter will focus on the pay for performance literature over the past
two decades, highlighting the major findings along with the shortcomings of past
work. This is especially the case in the UK where the previous lack of
information in regards to share options means that an important element of CEO
pay was neglected from the research agenda. For an excellent review of the broad
compensation literature see Murphy (1999) and the collection of seminal works
presented by Hallock and Murphy (1999).
Finally, to provide an introduction to the remaining topics considered in
this thesis. Firstly, the level of information disclosure surrounding executive
compensation, in particular the amount of option information disclosure and the
incentives for firms to voluntarily reveal such information. Secondly, an overview
of tournament theory which this has been advanced theoretically as a means of
providing incentives for CEOs in a way that does not require pay to be explicitly
linked to performance. In this framework incentives are instead generated through
prizes (e.g. promotion) offered to tournament winners. These final subject areas
(disclosure and tournaments) are dealt with in more depth in the appropriate
chapters of this thesis (Chapters Four and Six respectively).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 deals with the
principal agent model and forms the general background to the thesis. It provides
an underlying rational of corporate governance within the agency paradigm. This
is followed by a theoretical exposition of the principal agent model. Section 2.3
considers more extensively the empirical literature on the relationship between
executive pay and company performance. These substantive sections form the
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background to the thesis as a whole since they deal with the main issue that has
characterised the managerial compensation literature, namely, executive incentives
in the face of moral hazard and the empirical relationship between compensation
and performance.
Section 2.4 deals with share options. The valuation procedure used here
provides the general background to Chapters Five (option incentives and reporting
style), Six (tournament theory) and Seven (incentives and CEO risk aversion).
The literature review will indicate that the majority of UK research on executive
compensation has ignored equity based compensation, such as stock options. - This
thesis explicitly addresses the role of options in executive contracts, accordingly
Section 2.4 provides a review and analytical framework for understanding such
options. The section considers the underlying theory of options, executive options
and the Black-Scholes formula and importantly the role of the so called option
delta. The option pricing formula and option delta are explicitly used in the
analysis contained in the above mentioned chapters.
Section 2.5 considers information disclosure relating to executive stock
options and forms the specific background to Chapter Four. Compared with the
literature on pay for performance and agency theory, the literature on executive
compensation disclosure is relatively small. Accordingly, Section 2.5 deals
mainly with the institutional reporting changes surrounding executive pay that
have occurred since the publication of the Greenbury report in 1995. The
theoretical determination of why companies choose to reveal information about
options voluntarily is left until Chapter Four.
14
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Section 2.6 deals with tournament theory and forms the specific
background to Chapter Six. Again, although a large theoretical literature exists,
applications to the managerial labour market (as distinct from sporting examples)
are less frequent. This section introduces the main ideas of tournament theory and
begins a review of the empirical literature. The literature is further considered
along with the theoretical model in the main body of Chapter Six.
2.2 The Principal Agent Model
Before outlining a theoretical principal agent model, the following section
details the conditions under which agency issues are significant, and identifies the
mechanisms used to overcome such issues when they are present.
2.2.1 Corporate Governance And The PrincipalAgent Model
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms by which companies are
controlled, directed and made accountable. The issue of corporate governance
arises when one departs from the owner-managed firm and introduces the concept
of a separation between ownership and control. Under this separation, ownership
confers the responsibility to hire management, determine their remuneration, the
bearing of the uninsurable risk but with the rights to all residual income after all
contractual obligations have been met. Management implies the direct control of
all the firm's resources (Hallock and Murphy, 1999).
The growing interest in the mechanisms by which companies are owned
and governed bears testimony to the fact that there is an increasing belief that the
15
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institutions of ownership and control can directly affect economic performance
(see Nickell, 1995). Many practical forms of governance exist and these are often
tailored to the demands of a particular company, institution, time period, culture or
country. The efficacy of these structures in the UK has recently been called into
question, be it by alleged financial irregularities e.g. Mirror Group and Barings or
through the perceived excessive compensation of top executives e.g. the privatised
utilities (Conyon, 1995).
This separation of ownership and control creates an example of an agency
relationship where one party - the principal, in this case the owners - delegate
work to another - the agent, represented here by managers. It is the classic agency
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tirole, 1988; Hart, 1995), characterised by
imperfect and asymmetric information. In particular, an informational advantage
lies with the agent, such that their behaviour or level of effort, creates the potential
for opportunistic behaviour. The theory attempts to explain this agency
relationship through the use of contracts, which specify the rights of each party.
The costs of such a contract are known as agency costs and include the cost
of monitoring the activities of the agent and the cost of losses incurred by the
principal when the agent fails to act in the principal's best interests.
In a situation where the principal has complete information over the
actions of an agent, a behaviour-based contract will be most efficient and
corporate governance is not an issue. In these circumstances, an outcome-based
contract would unnecessarily shift risk from the principal to the risk-averse agent
16
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since it would make the agent's payoff contingent on realised performance, which
is not completely under the agent's control. Consequently, as a reward for
carrying the higher level of risks, agents may demand increased remuneration.
A contract that makes the principal as well off as possible is one that pays
the threshold wage. A contract paying this wage is known as the first-best
efficient contract from the principal's point of view. However, this is largely
unattainable since it depends on the agent possessing no hidden information and
that all actions and outcomes are observable (Besanko et al., 1996). The optimal
solution to the moral hazard problem is thus only available where monitoring is
perfect and cost-less, clearly however, imperfect monitoring may provide gains on
the second best sharing rule (Zajac, 1990; Hart, 1995). As Holmstrom (1979)
shows, any signal of the individual action is of value if it possesses an association
with the observed payoff.
Hart (1995) provides a coherent analysis of the conditions under which
corporate governance issues are important. Two conditions must be met. First an
agency problem must exist between members of the organisation (e.g. owners and
managers). Secondly, transaction costs must be prohibitive, such that the agency
problem cannot be resolved by a well-defined contract.
These principal-agent considerations alone may be necessary but are not
sufficient to provide a role for governance structure (see Hart, 1995 p. 679). The
reason is that although agency issues suggest contracts that relate agent rewards to
observable profits rather than effort, these contracts are nevertheless incomplete.
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They are complete, though, in the sense that the contract specifies the parties'
obligations in possible future states of the world contingent on these obligations
being observable and verifiable. In a general model the contract would, as a
matter of detail, specify the conditions under which management should be
rewarded or replaced, the conditions for the adoption of new technologies, the
conditions under which workers are hired and fired, etc. The point is that agency
contingencies are governed by a contract and this is the lesson drawn from a
standard principal-agent solution. Hart (1995) remarks "in a comprehensive
contracting world, everything has been specified in advance, i.e. there are no
'residual' decisions". Governance structure in such a world is deemed irrelevant.
Governance structure however does matter in a world with transaction
costs and incomplete contracts. Given an agency problem, governance structures
can be seen as a mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in
the initial contract. Transactions costs in writing contracts may be considerable
and numerous. Hart (1995a) identifies three such costs; (i) the cost of specifying
all eventualities and their resolution during the lifetime of the contract; (ii) the
costs of negotiating with all the contract parties about the plans; (iii) the costs of
formally writing down the contract such that they can be enforced by a third party
in the event of a dispute arising.
Where prohibitive transaction costs are present, the parties are not able to
write a comprehensive contract. So, incomplete contracts, in conjunction with the
agency costs of incomplete and asymmetric information, provide a role for
governance mechanisms. Corporate governance, in this framework, is seen as a
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mechanism for enacting decisions about events that have not been specified in an
initial contract.
The preferred solution to the principal agent problem then is the use of
outcome-based contracts, which align the preferences of both principals and
agents. These can be efficient in curbing agent opportunism and thus the conflict
of self-interest. They are reinforced by governance systems such as boards, which
further restrict the self-serving behaviour of agents by allowing principals to better
monitor the behaviour of agents. Thus boards of directors can play a key role in
monitoring the opportunism of top executives (Fama and Jensen 1983) and indeed
in curbing it, by seeking to replace part or all of the management team (Jensen
1993).
2.2.2 A Theoretical Principal Agent Model
The previous section established the conditions under which corporate
governance is relevant. The analysis below presents a simple example of an
incentive scheme within a principal agent framework. The model links the agents'
payoff directly to the firms' output (i.e. performance), as will be seen in Section
2.3, it is an estimation of this pay performance sensitivity that has dominated the
empirical literature.
The principal's payoff is a function of output net of incentive pay to the
agent (i.e. they care about corporate value). The agent's payoff is a function of
their incentive pay net of the cost of effort or action (i.e. they care about private
rewards). The problem facing the principal is to design a contract, subject to the
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imposed constraints of the agent's optimising behaviour. The first issue is the
existence of a participation constraint (individual rationality) i.e. the pay-off must
be at least as great as those presented by outside opportunities. Secondly, there is
an incentive compatibility constraint, that is, given the incentive schedule the
agent should choose the best self-interested course of action.
The following basic model based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),
captures the main ideas in solving the moral hazard problem so that the agent
promotes the "best" (i.e. optimal) interests of the principal. Let a be the effort of
the agent and let x = a + E be the output observed by the principal where the
random variable c is Normally distributed: - N(O, t2). Let the principal's choice
of incentive scheme be linear so that the payoff to the agent is given by s(x) = 6 + y
x = 6 + ya + yc where 6 and y are to be determined by the principal. The term x,
may be thought of as shareholder wealth or profit while, 6 can be interpreted as the
fixed salary component of pay. Finally, y represents the pay performance
sensitivity and it is this term in particular, that Chapter Five, along with other
research, attempts to estimate.
The principal is assumed to be well diversified and hence risk neutral,
accordingly their utility can be represented by their payoff which is equivalent to
output net of incentive pay. The principal's expected wealth is thus given by;
E[x—s(x)]=E[a+-8—ya_y]=(l_y)a_5
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Suppose now that the agent by contrast is risk averse with a constant
absolute risk averse utility function given by U(w) = -e, where w is wealth and r
is the absolute risk aversion level of the agent. By definition:
E[U(w)1 = fu(w)f(w)dw
Wheref(w) is the probability density function of w. Thus, in this case:
E[U(w)] = J- ef(w)dw
If wealth is Normally distributed w -. N(W, a) then using the properties
of the Normal function this simplifies to give:
2
ra
- w
-r w--
2
E [U (w)] = -e
Given the properties of the exponential function, the same ordering will be
preserved by using
w---
2
as an equivalent utility measure. Furthermore, since x - N(a, 2) and s(x) = 8+ yx
then s(x) N(8+ ya, y2 o2), the agents utility of wealth is thus given by:
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ry
The problem for the agent is determine the level of effort (a) in order to
maximise this utility minus the cost of that effort c(a)
I
max(a): ö+ya----r—c(a)
2
The first order condition is simply c'(a) = y. The principal's problem is to
maximise his own utility by determining ö and y subject to the above first order
condition and a second constraint that the agent receives a reservation utility = u*.
Thus the problem becomes:
max(5,y,a): (1—y)a-8
subject to
S+ya_Y2 _c(a)^u*
and
c'(a)=y
Substituting and simplifying gives:
c'(a)2r 2
max (a): a -	 a - c(a)
2
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where the first order condition is simply
1— rc'(a)c"(a)a 2
 - c'(a) = 0
Solving for c'(a) = y, yields:
1
1+rc"(a)a2
This equation displays the essential properties of the solution to .the
principal agent problem. The solution relates the optimal pay for performance
term to three factors that condition its magnitude. The optimal pay for
performance sensitivity will be equal to one when output is certain (32 = 0) or
when the agent is risk neutral (r = 0). As the uncertainty in the firm value
increases, andlor the risk aversion of the agent increases, the resulting optimal pay
performance sensitivity declines. The intuition is clear, when output is known
with certainty and observed by the principal, then a one to one relation exists
between managerial actions and rewards. Similarly if the agent is risk neutral, in
effect he willingly assumes the riskiness embodied within the firms assets, hence a
pay performance parameter of one. This optimality condition is further discussed
in Murphy (1999).
Note, in this example the optimal y depends on agent risk aversion r, the
cost of effort function c"(a) and risk (2) Since each company has a different
CEO/agent, it is likely that there will be heterogeneity in each of these factors.
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Accordingly, it is most unlikely that circumstances will conspire to promote a
common y across all agents (see Garen, 1994). This point is important since (as
will be shown below) most researchers in the executive compensation literature
retrieve an average pay-performance term using econometric techniques. This
issue is addressed in Chapter Five where the distribution of the pay performance
term is considered by calculating y across all agents individually using non-
econometric methods. Indeed, the analysis will conclude that the pay-performance
term is not homogenous across agents and does display cross section
heterogeneity.
To summarise the model, the pay-off to a higher level of effort
stochastically dominates that to a lower level. This payoff, whose probability
distribution is affected by the unobservable effort, is verifiable however, and
provides an enforceable argument in the optimal (but second best) contract set by
the principal (see Hart, 1995). Subject to the constraints imposed by ensuring the
participation and the individual rationality of the agent, the argument focuses on
defining the optimal contract or sharing rule s(x)
Over recent years many studies have investigated the concept of agency
theory. Early research focused on the separation of ownership and control in
organisations. Amihud and Lev (1981) found that manager-controlled firms,
where no individual or institution owns in excess of 5% of the company stock,
engaged in significantly more conglomerate acquisitions and were more
diversified than owner-controlled firms. This is consistent with the existence of
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an agency problem since such activities are not generally in the interests of
shareholders, who can diversify directly through their own share portfolio.
Other studies have lent further support to agency theory. Examples include
the investigation into the use of the golden parachutes by Singh and Harianto
(1989), the analysis into the use of greenmail (Kosnik 1987) and the study into
managers' resistance to take-over bids by Walking and Long (1984). The diversity
of possible applications of agency theory has made its widespread acceptance
easier although it should be noted that it has not met with universal acceptance.
Perrow (1986) for example claims agency theory is trivial and addresses no clear
problems.
The focus of this research however is not agency theory in general, but
more specifically how it relates to the determination of executive compensation
and the pay performance sensitivity. To recap, agency theory proposes that the
aim of a behaviour-based contract is to use information systems to improve agent
monitoring.
The adoption of a remuneration committee is in line with this as it further
distances the link between decision management and decision control (Fama and
Jensen 1983). However recent studies have not always reported results in line
with those anticipated under agency theory. Conyon and Peck, (1998b) report that
remuneration committees comprising a higher proportion of outside directors are
actually associated with higher levels of top executive pay. Daily et a!. (1998)
further state that the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation
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committee does not lead to higher levels of CEO compensation. Core and Guay
(1999) however show that firms with weaker governance structures (measured by
board and ownership variables) do have greater agency problems. In particular, in
their cross section of US companies, CEO compensation is found to be higher in
companies with less effective governance structures.
Given the difficulties associated with directly observing a manager's effort
or behaviour, the use of outcome based contracts that align the interests of
principals and agents are more often used as a primary means of dealing with the
agency conflict.
Risk averse managers however will want their compensation structured so
that they bear less personal risk, i.e. they will prefer cash-compensation to an
equivalent value of equity based compensation and may engage in activities which
reduce the firms risk which may in turn reduce shareholder wealth. Previous
research however, suggests that tying managers compensation to firm performance
motivates them to overcome this conflict and pursue more value maximising
decisions (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Other researchers have shown more
formally that incentive compensation plans can motivate managers to take on
more risk (see Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992).
Thus in the absence of complete and symmetric information, shareholders
interests can be promoted by a second best contract that relates executive reward
to a variable that shareholders are interested in. It is this relationship that becomes
the central focus of the following section of this chapter.
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2.3 Pay And Performance
The principal agent model described above predicts an optimal solution for
the pay performance term dependent on the risk aversion of the agent, the
uncertainty of firm value and the function describing the cost of effort to the agent.
Empirical studies have thus attempted to estimate how sensitive executive
compensation actually is to measures of company performance. The usual way in
which such empirical models proceed is to estimate a simple reduced form
equation rather than the parameters of a specific principal-agent model (see
Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). A standard regression equation would model
the compensation of an individual director i at time t as:
Alog(Compensation) 1
 = c + I3APerformance 1t +	 (2.1)
where the term 13 is the reaction coefficient reflecting the sensitivity of director
compensation to corporate performance. The gntude o the coe cevt
interpreted as reflecting the operation of principal-agent type mechanisms with
higher values of 13 suggesting closer alignment of owner and management
interests. The value of 1 is thus an estimate of the ö term in the principal agent
model described in Section 2.2.3. An important feature of this modelling
procedure is that by estimating in first differences the 13 estimate is free from
company fixed effects bias (see Murphy, 1985). There has now been a certain
amount of UK research estimating such models but this contrasts to the much
more voluminous US literature (see Bruce and Buck, 1997). So, what estimates of
13 have been reported in the literature?
27
Chapter Two - Modellin g Executive compensation: A Sun'ev of Recent Literature
The US literature has frequently found the link between directors'
compensation and company performance to be small. In the widely cited analysis
of US executives, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) estimate that the pay performance
relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) is $3.25 for every
$1000 dollar change in shareholder wealth. They concluded that such a value for
pay performance term was too low to be consistent with principal-agent theory.
"We believe that our results are inconsistent with the implications of formal
agency models of optimal contracting" (p227).
Such a small pay-for-performance sensitivity might be a matter of concern
for shareholders and policy makers since the implied small private returns to
CEOs for significant changes in shareholder worth implicitly questions the
incentives for top management to pursue shareholder interests.
The early UK evidence, too, suggests that directors' compensation is only
weakly related to company performance i.e. that estimates of 13 are small or
insignificant (see Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). Before looking at the
evidence in detail however, it is important to stress some general features of the
early UK data.
Firstly, the measure of compensation typically used in UK studies is a time
series on the cash compensation i.e. salary and bonus, of the highest paid director.
This contrasts with the relevant unit of analysis, which is the individual executive.
This can cause problems for the estimated relationship between pay and
performance since the compensation time series may actually represent rewards to
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several different individuals. For instance, a large annual increase in the salary
and bonus of the highest paid director may reflect a recruitment payment (golden
handshake) for a new CEO and not a pay rise to the particular individual who was
the highest paid director in the previous year.
Secondly, there is the controversial area of how exactly to measure director
compensation. Until comparatively recently most UK studies have used only the
direct emoluments of the highest paid director which are available from the
company accounts. This measures only current compensation and excludes long
term compensation such as the estimated value of share options and other forms of
deferred compensation. Bruce and Buck (1997) argue that by excluding these
extra components of the directors' overall compensation the estimated relationship
between compensation and performance may be biased (see also Conyon, Gregg
and Machin, 1995).
The use of cash received as the sole measure of compensation does
however have an empirical grounding. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) reported
that cash compensation represented an excellent proxy for total compensation
(estimated as the sum of cash and the equivalent value of all deferred and
contingent compensation) and even provided superior results when regressed on
independent variables such as company size and profits. The structure of
compensation however has dramatically changed since the Lewellen and
Huntsman study. In the US non-cash elements of pay are now often larger than
the cash elements (Murphy, 1999) and executive compensation packages in the
UK are following a similar trend (Conyon and Murphy, 1999). A second and
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more fundamental reason as to why the wider compensation measures have
typically not used in the UK context is due to lack of available and consistent data.
Finally, there is the question of how to measure company performance.
Some empirical models use market-based measures of corporate performance such
as shareholder returns or shareholder wealth, whereas others use accounting-based
measures such as earnings per share or return on capital employed. It is not
immediately apparent which is the correct performance measure to use, however,
since principal-agent mechanisms stress returns to shareholders, a market based
measure reflecting share price appreciation and dividend yield (i.e. total
shareholder return) does seem more intuitive.
Table 2.1 extends that provided by Conyon and Peck (1998a) and reports
some recent UK evidence on the relationship between directors' pay and company
performance along with significant US studies. Some important general themes
emerge. First, estimates of the pay for performance relationship in the UK are
small. This suggests that incentives are not very strong. Second, the statistical
link between directors' pay and corporate performance in UK companies appeared
to have been decoupled in the period since 1989 (Gregg, Machin and Szymanski,
1993). By the early 1990s one could not detect any significant relationship
between the basic pay of UK executives and the stock market performance of their
companies. Even allowing for the changing nature of compensation packages (i.e.
towards more long-term performance pay in the form of stock options and other
deferred mechanisms), Gregg et al. (1993) found little change in the estimate of f3.
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Main, Bruce and Buck (1996), were the first to produce a UK study that
used a pay measure which incorporated the value of option grants. Their paper
identified the change in the Black-Scholes value of options over a given year and
added this to the cash compensation to yield total pay figure. Although their
sample was only of 60 large UK firms over the period 1983 to 1989, they did find
a much stronger relationship between pay and performance than had previously
been reported. However, some immediate observations with their approach are
noteworthy.
First is the measurement of the compensation variable. Two distinct
measures were used, one being the standard cash compensation measure of base
pay plus bonus. The second measure is termed "total remuneration" which they
define as "the sum of the emoluments and any change in value that year in the
Black and Scholes 'cash-equivalent' value of option holdings" these two measures
were applied to three categories of employee, the highest paid director, the CEO
and the total board. The total remuneration measure more accurately reflects the
change in firm specific wealth owned by the CEO. For instance, other authors
(e.g. Murphy 1999; Conyon and Murphy 1999; Yermack 1995) distinguish
between annual pay which includes the value of current grants of options and
wealth effects which refer to the change in value of the whole portfolio of options
held.
Second is their econometric method. In essence Main, Bruce and Buck
estimate a panel data econometric model equivalent in form to equation (2.1) in
Section 2.3 above. The compensation variable can be alternatively salary and
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bonus or total remuneration, yet they still estimate a single common, average pay
for performance term (f3). However, as indicated in Section 2.2 above, the pay for
performance term is likely to display cross-sectional, i.e. firm, heterogeneity. This
is due to the fact that the optimal f depends on the (second derivative) agent cost
of effort function, variability of firm wealth and agent risk aversion, all of which
are likely to vary over different agents and companies.
Thus, in common with much of the US and UK literature Main, Bruce and
Buck provide the mean estimate of the pay performance term. However, recent
US and international comparisons have calculated directly the pay performance
term for each CEO separately. Examples of this are, Jensen and Murphy (1990b),
Murphy (1999), Conyon and Murphy (1999) and Yermack (1995). This
observation may be important if the distribution of pay for performance
sensitivities is non-normal. Indeed, Chapter Five shows marked differences
between the calculated mean and median option pay for performance sensitivities.
The Main, Bruce and Buck results are easily summarised. The mean
(median) salary and bonus compensation of the highest paid director in 1989 was
£223,000 (E165,000). In contrast, the mean (median) total remuneration of the
highest paid director was £317,000 (E199,000). The econometric results based on
the dynamic panel of 60 companies revealed a statistically significant relationship
between salary and bonus and current dated share price. Similarly, there is a
significantly positive relationship between total remuneration and current dated
share price. Specifically, their estimated models forecast that a 10% increase in
stock returns yields a 2.25% increase in salary and bonus. This translates into an
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£8018 increase on the median highest paid director salary and bonus in 1989 of
£357,000. The specification that uses total remuneration as the dependent variable
forecasts that a 10% increase in stock returns yields an 8.94% increase in total
remuneration, translating into a £50,600 increase on the median highest paid
director total remuneration of £566,000. These results, the authors suggest,
demonstrate "a more robust connection between executive pay and performance in
British firms than has hitherto been reported" (Main, Bruce and Buck, p1641).
Although the results produced in Chapter Five onwards draw similar
conclusions to this only existing UK published study using options information,
there are marked differences in the two approaches.
	 In particular, two
improvements of the results presented here are: (1) The use of 510 companies
representing 98% by value of the London Stock Exchange as opposed to a sample
of just 60 firms. (2) The explicit use of option pricing theory to calculate the value
of options and the underlying incentives from them, as opposed to using
econometric methods to yield only mean estimates.
To recap, much of the evidence from early empirical work both in the US
and UK concluded that there was no link between direct executive compensation
and the stock market performance of their companies. Even where a link had been
identified its magnitude seemed to be extremely small (Jensen and Murphy,
1990b; Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 1993) and thus seemed to offer little
support to principal agent model.
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Haubrich (1994) however, argued that despite being small, given the risk
aversion of CEOs, such estimates of the pay for performance term could still
indeed be consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Garen (1994)
empirically tested the principal agent model by examining whether CEOs' stock-
related compensation is decreasing in the standard deviation of firm returns and
whether CEOs' salary based compensation is increasing in the standard deviation
of the firm returns. Using the Jensen-Murphy (1990b) sample of 430 US firms in
1988, he does find weak evidence in support of these propositions, although none
of his regressions providing a statistically significant coefficient on the standard
deviation of firm returns variable. More recent studies however have reported
results that lend even greater support to the theoretical model.
Results presented by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) for example strongly
support the principal agent model. They use the variation in stock return volatility
across firms to test whether executives at riskier firms have lower pay
performance sensitivities, as is predicted by most principal agent models. They
find that the pay-performance sensitivity of a manager's compensation is
decreasing in the variance of the firm's returns and that the pay performance
sensitivity for executives at firms with low stock price volatility is an order of
magnitude greater than it is for executives at firms with highly volatile stock
returns.
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Study	 Data	 Compensation	 Performance	 Estimated fi	 Remarks
measure	 measure	 (standard
error)
Jensen and	 US data on	 1. Change in salary	 Change in	 Ia) 0.0000139 Performance
Murphy	 2213 CEOs,	 and bonus of CEO	 shareholder	 (0.0000017) effects regarded
(1990b)	 1974-86	 2. Change in wealth	 return dated at	 Ib) 0.0000080 as small
(sa1ary+bonus+ value a) period t and	 (0.0000015)
of restricted stock+	 b). period t-1
other benefits+present	 2a) 0.000 176
value of salary	 (0.00003 4)
increment+ change in
	 2b) 0.000131
value of options) of	 (0.000034)
CEO
Main	 512 UK	 Change in salary and	 Stock market	 0.038
(1992)	 companies	 bonus of highest paid	 return	 (0.012)
1969-89	 director
Gregg, Machin	 288 UK	 Change in salary and 	 Change in
	 1983-8	 Effect of
and Szymanski	 companies,	 bonus of highest paid	 shareholder	 0.027	 performance on
(1993)	 1983-91	 director	 returns	 (0.013)	 compensation
displays time
1989-91	 heterogeneity.
-0.024	 Disappears after
(0.022)	 1988.
Main and	 220 UK	 Salary and bonus of	 Risk adjusted	 0.100	 Cross section
Johnston	 companies,	 highest paid director 	 market return
	 (0.135)	 evidence
(1993)	 1990
Conyon and	 294 UK	 Change in salary and	 Change in	 0.052	 Effects of
Leech	 companies,	 bonus of highest paid	 shareholder	 (0.020)	 governance
(1994)	 1983-86	 director	 wealth	 discussed
Conyon and	 169 UK	 Change in salary and
	 Shareholder	 1985-87	 Role of unions,
Gregg	 companies,	 bonus of highest paid	 return	 0.076	 mergers and
(1994)	 1985-90	 director	 (0.032)	 financial
structure on
1988-90	 director
0.020	 compensation
(0.036)	 evaluated
Conyon	 28 UK	 Change in salary and	 Return on	 0.0039	 Levels
(1995)	 privatised	 bonus of highest paid	 shareholders	 (0.0042)	 modelled, rather
companies,	 director	 equity;	 than first
1990-94	 differences;
_________________ _______________ _______________________ _________________ _______________ fixed effects
Cosh and
	 44 UK	 Level and change in	 1. Return on	 1. -0.02	 Effects of
Hughes	 companies in CEO pay
	 capital	 (0.5)	 shareholdings
(1997)	 electrical	 employed; 2.	 2.0.11	 evaluated;
engineering	 shareholder	 (0.047)	 relative
sector, 1989-	 return	 performance
94	 considered
Table 2.1: Recent Evidence On The Pay - Performance Relationship
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Study	 Data	 Compensation	 Perfor,nance	 Estimated fi	 Remarks
measure	 ,neasure	 (standard
error)
Smith and	 51 quoted	 Level of directors 	 1) Sales;	 Cross section	 Argue for the
Szymanski	 UK	 remuneration	 2) Earnings per	 1) 0.43	 need to include
(1995)	 companies,	 including performance share 	 (0.06)	 effect of average
1981-1991	 related pay, benefits 	 2) 0.03	 executive pay as
and basic salary (for 	 (0.10)	 an 'outside
all directors)
	
	
option'
Time series
1)0.41
(0.20)
2) 0.03
(0.24)
Conyon	 213 large UK Change in salary and	 Shareholder	 0.061	 Effects of board-
(1997b)	 companies,	 bonus of highest paid 	 return	 (0.020)	 room controls
1988-93 director evaluated
outcomes
ambiguous
Main, Bruce and 60 large UK
	
Board and top	 Share	 For CEO:	 Models include
Buck	 companies,	 directors'	 performance	 1) 0.146	 sector
(1996)	 1983-89	 remuneration.	 (0.113)	 performance
1) Salary and bonus	 term and lagged
2) 0.729	 dependent
2) Total remuneration	 (0.282)	 variable
(including stock
options)
Conyon and	 94 FT-SE	 Change in salary and	 Shareholder	 1) 0.088	 Data derived
Peck	 100	 bonus of highest paid	 return	 (0.047)	 directly from
(l998b)	 companies,	 director in companies	 annual reports.
199 1-94	 where	 2) 0.033	 Board structure
1) Proportion of	 (0.087)	 effects on pay
outside directors on 	 evaluated.
remuneration	 Outcome
conrniittee is above	 ambiguous.
the median
2). Same proportion
________________ _____________ is below the median 	 ________________ ______________ ________________
Hall and	 478 US	 1) Change in salary	 Shareholder	 la) 0.163	 Option data
Liebman	 companies,	 and bonus of CEO	 return dated at	 (0.0 12)	 derived by
(1998)	 1980-1994	 2) Change in salary,	 a) period t and	 lb) 0.0596	 tracking option
bonus and value of	 b). period t-1	 (0.011)	 holdings
current option grants	 2a) 0.280	 through
of CEO	 (0.022)	 progressive
2b)-0.0l6	 proxy
(0.024)	 statements.
Aggarwal and
	
1500 US	 1) Change in salary, 	 Change in	 1) 0.432	 Model also
Samwick	 companies,	 bonus and value of 	 Shareholder	 (0.053)	 considers other
(1999)	 1993-1996	 current option grants 	 wealth	 compensation
of CEO	 2)1.036	 measures and
2)The above plus 	 (0.3 13)	 extends analysis
change in value of
	 to other
option and equity	 executives
holdings of CEO
Table 2.1: Recent Evidence On The Pay - Performance Relationship (Cont.)
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Other more recent evidence also suggests the pay-performance link may be
becoming stronger. Murphy (1999) reports that pay performance sensitivities in
the US have nearly doubled between 1988 and 1996. This has been driven
primarily by executive share options and direct equity ownership with the author
stating that 95% of the estimated 1996 pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs in
manufacturing companies comes from options (64%) and equity (3 1%).
Furthermore, Murphy reports an inverse relation between company size
and pay-performance sensitivity. This can be intuitively explained since the CEOs
of large companies tend to own a small proportion of their company through
shares and options. While increases in the pay-performance sensitivity would
suggest a lessening of agency problems, Murphy (1999) also offers evidence
which suggests that agency problems might be increasing. This stems from the
observation that although the value of shares held by S&P-500 CEOs has
increased substantially over the past decade, the percentage of outstanding equity
held by such CEOs has been declining and it is the percentage ownership, rather
than the absolute value of shareholdings that indicates the severity of the agency
problem.
Several other authors have also documented recent increases in the pay-
performance sensitivity. Hall and Liebman (1998) used data from 478 companies
over a period of 15 years from 1980 to 1994 and further concluded that there was a
strong relationship between firm performance and CEO pay. Their method
differed from most previous studies because, in a similar vein to Main Bruce and
Buck (1996), they constructed a pay measure that included changes in the value of
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the stock of equity and options held by the CEO. Excluding these elements they
find similar although slightly larger pay performance to that of Jensen and
Murphy. But when these elements are included, their elasticity of pay estimates
are some thirty times larger than previously reported elasticities. In terms of dollar
returns, Hall and Liebman estimate median and mean values of the pay
performance sensitivity at $5.29 and $25.11 per $1000 in 1994, compared with
Jensen and Murphy's median estimate of $3.25
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find even larger pay performance
sensitivities. Using their sample of 1500 companies over the period 1993-1996
they construct a pay measure that, like Hall and Liebman, includes the change in
the market value of the executive's holdings of shares and options as well as
salary, bonus and the value of any grants of options or other long term incentives.
Based on this measure of pay they find median and mean dollar pay performance
sensitivities of $14.52 and $69.41 per $1000, even excluding the revaluation of
option holdings the respective figures are $6.59 and $58.61.
In addition, to rewarding managers based on their own company
performance, the owners of a company may wish to make pay dependent on
performance relative to that of other companies operating in the same industry or
sector (see Nickell, 1995, Tirole, 1988 or Holmstrom, 1982). The idea is simple.
In the model outlined above owners want to reward effort, but can only observe
the output. Some shocks, though, are common to the industry or sector as a whole
(e.g. industry profits may fall independent of the actions of the manager). To
control for such shocks the owner of the company merely looks at the profit
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outcome of the company relative to other firms in the same industry. One would
expect then to see managerial pay not only directly related to company
performance but also to the performance relative to other companies (see Gibbons
and Murphy, 1992).
The evidence on the whole issue is mixed, and still an under-investigated
area in the UK. Antle and Smith (1986) and Barro and Barro (1990) find no
strong association between executive compensation and relative performance
using US data. Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker (1992) on the other hand find
that compensation increases with industry performance using accounting data and
decreases with industry performance using stock return data. Gibbons and
Murphy (1990) assess the impact of relative performance on compensation using
data on 1688 CEOs from 1049 US corporations between 1974 and 1986. They
find that compensation is significantly (negatively) related to industry and market
rates of return. In addition, they note that the wider market, rather than firms in
the more narrowly defined industry group, are the more important comparison
firms.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) use annual cash compensation plus the
value of option grants during the year to test whether CEOs are rewarded for
exogenous shocks in oil prices, but find little evidence to support the relative
performance theory, although the link they do find is stronger for negative shocks
in the oil price than it is for positive ones. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) also
test for relative performance evaluation, but again find little support for the model.
They find minimal evidence that the industry pay performance sensitivity is
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negative and no evidence that the ratio of the industry pay performance sensitivity
to the own firm pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in a firm's stock beta,
both of which would be predicted by the theory.
The UK evidence on relative performance is also mixed; though no papers
to date have address the issue directly. Conyon and Leech (1994) and Conyon
(1998) find little support for the effect of share performance in other companies
influencing executive compensation. Cosh and Hughes (1997) find that a measure
of overall performance, defined as shareholder return net of the median total
shareholder return for the sample in the relevant period, has a positive effect on
compensation.
To summarise, early studies found little evidence of a link between
executive pay and company performance typically when using econometric
methods and when not dealing with the role of options. Namely, these early
studies focused on a narrow pay measure that included only salary and bonus.
Recent changes in the structure of compensation packages together with increased
levels of disclosure have led later studies to estimate much larger pay performance
sensitivities. These studies universally conclude that the main driver of this
sensitivity is equity based compensation such as ordinary shares and executive
options. While incentive effects of ordinary shares are fundamental, options are
much more complex. The following section then introduces option valuation and
the mechanism through which incentives are created by holding such instruments.
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2.4 Options
Executive options have now become a fundamental part of modem day
executive compensation packages.
	 Recent improvements in the level of
information disclosure with regard to director option holdings means that a
thorough analysis of the impact of executive options is now not only desirable, but
also empirically possible. Chapters Five and Six undertake such an empirical
analysis. As a grounding therefore, the following section provides an introduction
to options in general and a model for their valuation, for a more rigorous analysis
see Hull (1993).
2.4.1 An Introduction To Option Theory
A derivative security is a security whose value depends on the value of
other more basic underlying assets. A standard option is a particular form of a
derivative security that gives the holder the right to trade in a particular asset at a
fixed price, known as the exercise or strike price, at some time in the future.
There are two basic types of option, a call option, which gives the holder the right
to buy the underlying asset, and a put option, which gives the holder the right to
sell the underlying asset.
Options can further be classed as either European or American. A
European option is one that can only be exercised on the expiration date of the
contract, that is the final day in the life of the option. American options however,
are capable of being exercised at any time during the life of the contract.
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Options are written on all types of assets such as gold and oil, interest and
cunency rates and since there introduction on traded exchanges in 1973 have
become incredibly diverse in their specification. However, for the purpose of this
thesis only the valuation of a standard European call option written on a publicly
traded stock is considered.
Black and Scholes (1973) were the first to provide a closed form solution
for the valuation of European calls. They demonstrated that given the assumption
of frictionless markets and continuous trading opportunities, it was possible to
form a risk-free 'hedge portfolio' consisting of a long position in the share and a
short position in the European call written on that share. The reason the portfolio
is risk-less is because both the share price and the option value are affected by the
same single underlying source of uncertainty, thus over any short period of time
the two are perfectly conelated and the value of the portfolio at the end of the
period is known with certainty.
If risk-less arbitrage opportunities are to be avoided, then the above risk-
less portfolio must earn the risk-free rate of interest. This insight led Black and
Scholes to develop their famous option pricing formula. Their initial analysis
considered the case where the underlying asset paid no dividends, however Merton
(1973) showed how their formula could easily be modified for the case where the
stock paid continuous dividends. Accordingly, the value of one European call
option (c) on a stock paying dividends at a continuous rate (q) is given by;
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c = Se t N(d i ) - Xe_rfN(d2)	 (2.2)
where
aI
+— I t1n(S/X)+[r_	
2)
d1 
=	 crIi	
(2.3)
and
ln(S / x) + r - q –
______________ = d1 -aJd2=
The other five variables in the above equations are the share price (S), the
exercise price (X), the risk-free rate of interest (r), the time to maturity (t) and the
volatility or standard deviation of the share price returns (a). N(.) is the
cumulative normal function.
At any moment in time the value of a call option can be split into two
components, an intrinsic value and a time value. The former represents the gain
(if any) that could be achieved from exercising the option immediately and is thus
derived from the difference between the exercise price and the share price. The
time value, represents the potential for the intrinsic value of the option to increase
over the remainder of the option's life. These, two elements can be seen in Figure
2.1 which plots the value of a typical call option with an exercise price of 100
against the underlying share price. The upper curve represents the total value of
the option while the lower line depicts the intrinsic value. The time value of the
option is thus represented by the distance between the two lines.
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2.1: Value of a Call Option
A call option that has some intrinsic value, i.e. where the share price is
greater than the exercise price is said to be in the money. An option with no
intrinsic value is said to be out of the money, or in the specific case where the
share price exactly equals the exercise price, at the money.
HoJding the other variables constant, the value of the ca)) w,JJ increase as
the share price increases, or as the exercise price decreases since this directly
increases the intrinsic value of the option. Increasing the volatility of the
underlying asset also increases the value of the option, since greater returns can be
made from big increases in the share price, while the return is still bounded by
zero for large falls in the share price.
Call option values are negatively related to dividends, since dividends
have the effect of reducing the share price. Increasing the time to maturity of the
option generally has the impact of increasing the value of the option, since it
44
Chapter Two - ModellinR Executive Compensation: A Sun'ey of Recent Literature
provides a greater opportunity for the share price to rise. However, this is not
always the case, if the dividend yield is sufficiently large to significantly reduce or
even prevent growth in the share price, then increasing the life of the option can
reduce its value.
The way the risk-free interest rate affects the value of a call option is less
clear-cut. As interest rates in the economy increase, the expected growth rate of
the underlying share increases. However, the present value of any future cash
flows received by the holder of the option decrease. The first effect will increase
the value of the call option, while the second tends to decrease it. It can be shown
however that the first effect always dominates the second, and as such the value of
a call will increase as the risk-free rate of interest increases.
The delta (6) of an option is defined as the rate of change in the option
value with respect to the price of the underlying asset. This is thus equal to the
slope of the upper line in Figure 2.1. For example, a delta of 0.6 implies that for
any small change in the share price, the option value changes by 60% of that
amount.
For a stock paying dividends at a continuous rate (q) the delta of a call
option on that stock is given by:
S = e'N(d1)
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Where d 1 is as defined in equation (3). The value of delta varies between
zero and one, being close to zero for deep out of the money options, while
approaching one for deep in the money options. As will be demonstrated later, the
delta is fundamental to the understanding of the incentives provided by options.
2.4.2 Executive Options And The Black-S choles Formula
The Black-Scholes formula is widely used by both academics and
practitioners alike. It has been almost universally accepted and used as the
standard option pricing model within the executive compensation literature (e.g.
Conyon and Murphy, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Hall, 1998; Aggarwal and
Samwick, 1999; Main, Bruce and Buck, 1996) and is effectively endorsed by the
SEC as the preferred pricing model.
Accordingly, the model is used throughout this thesis. There are however,
a number of drawbacks to using the Black-Scholes formula to price executive
options which are addressed below.
Firstly, the Black-Scholes formula is based on an arbitrage argument which
assumes the holder of an option can hedge away risk. Holding a long position in
the option, this would be done by taking a short position in the underlying asset.
In terms of a corporate executive however, this is not possible. They are
prohibited from short-sell their company shares and cannot openly trade their
executive options. As such the value a risk averse company executive places on
an executive option will be lower than that placed on it by an outsider.
Furthermore, because directors are inherently undiversified, with both their labour
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and capital invested in the company, the impact of the inability to hedge is likely
to be greater than would otherwise be the case. The impact of risk aversion is
developed more fully in Chapter Seven.
Secondly, the Black-Scholes formula prices a European option which by
definition can only be exercised at maturity. Executive options however can
usually be exercised at any time in the options' life after an initial vesting period
(typically three years). This has ambiguous implications in determining the value
of the option. The right to exercise the option early will increase its value.
However, Carpenter (1998) showed that executives tend to exercise their options
earlier than a rational outsider would, thus reducing the expected value of the
option.
Finally, executive options are subject to forfeiture in certain circumstances,
for example, most executive options immediately lapse as soon as the director
leaves the company. Alternatively, many UK executive options have performance
criteria attached to them, preventing exercise unless some predetermined
performance threshold is reached. This probability of forfeiture again reduces the
expected payoff of the option and consequently its value.
2.4.3 The Option Delta
As mentioned above, the option delta is crucial in understanding the
incentive effects created by holding options. It establishes the link between
shareholder wealth, represented by the share price and CEO wealth represented by
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the option value. For every one pound rise in the share price 4, the value of an
executive option goes up by the delta, e.g. 60 pence if the delta is 0.6. For any
given increase in shareholder wealth then, the total increase in the CEO option
wealth will depend on two variables. Firstly the delta of the options, and
secondly, the number of options that the CEO holds. For example, holding five
options each with a delta of 0.6, would produce the same increase in option wealth
as holding 10 options each with a delta of 0.3, namely £3 for every £1 increase in
the share price.
The option delta of course is not constant, it is determined by the five
inputs to the Black-Scholes equation and a change in any one of these variables
will change the delta. Of particular interest is the way the option delta varies with
respect to the share price and time to maturity of the option.
Figure 2.2 shows how the delta of a typical call option with a strike price
of £4 written on a low dividend paying stock, changes as the underlying share
price is increased. When the share price is close to zero, the delta of the option is
very small. As the share price increases so does the delta, however the increase in
the delta is largely dependent on the remaining time to maturity of the option. If
the option is close to maturity, then the delta will only begin to rise significantly as
the share price approaches the exercise price and quickly approaches unity as the
share price climbs above the exercise price. For longer dated options, the option
Strictly speaking delta is only defined over a small change in the share price. A change of1 is
only used for simplicity.
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delta initially increases more quickly as the share price rises, however even at
share prices well above the exercise price the option delta remains well below one.
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Figure 2.2: Option Delta Against Share Price (Exercise Price = 4)
The explanation for this is simply. The delta can be thought of as the
probability that the option will end up in the money. The further the option is
currently in the money, the greater the probability will be that it will end up in the
money and the higher will be the delta. However, for long dated options, there is
still plenty of time for the share price to rise or fall and consequently the delta of
the option will not be close to one or zero. As the time to maturity shortens the
payoff to the option becomes more certain. At the instant before maturity either
the option is in the money and will have a positive payoff with probability one, or
the option is out of the money and will have a positive payoff with probability
zero. Thus as the time to maturity shortens, the delta begins to converge to either
one or zero depending on whether the option is in or out of the money. This is
demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Option Delta Against Time to Maturity
Note for at the money options, as the time to maturity approaches zero, the
delta approaches 0.5 reflecting the probability that at the moment of maturity the
option is effectively equally likely to have moved into or out of the money.
2.5 Information Disclosure
The next section of this chapter introduces the theme of disclosure which
is the main topic under discussion in Chapter Four and also has relevance to the
work presented in Chapter Five. A thorough review of the disclosure literature
(and its relation to option information in particular) is undertaken in Chapter Four,
while cunent disclosure requirements are dealt with comprehensively as part of
the description of the main data set presented in Chapter Three. As such the topic
is only introduced here for completeness.
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2.5.1 The Significance Of The Level Of Disclosure
In the context of this thesis, disclosure refers specifically to the level of
information companies choose to report with respect to the option holdings of
their directors. The motivation for considering levels of disclosure is twofold. As
highlighted previously, most of the empirical work in the UK to date has focused
exclusively on the direct cash compensation of directors, that is the total of salary,
benefits and bonus. However, non-cash elements of compensation, such as
options, have become increasingly significant in modern day compensation
contracts (Murphy, 1999; Perry and Zenner, 1998). A total pay measure though
can only be accurately calculated if companies report sufficient information to
allow a valuation of these non-cash elements. The absolute level of disclosure is
thus important since it determines how accurately total compensation can be
calculated. The impact of different levels of disclosure on the valuation of
directors option holdings, and consequently the incentives derived from them is
the focus of Chapter Five.
The second issue concerns the motivation for firms to choose varying
levels of disclosure. Information released by managers, especially financial
information, represents a signal of the firm's fundamental value albeit with some
element of noise. As such, differing levels of disclosure relating to director's
option holdings may reflect different signals about the companies remuneration
strategy. For example, case study evidence by Dial and Murphy (1995) showed
that compensation strategies are associated with stock market performance of
General Dynamics in the United States. See also, the review by Murphy (1999).
This general issue of option disclosure signals is the focus of Chapter Four.
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2.5.2 Current Levels Of Disclosure
There are of course statutory requirements that companies in the UK must
adhere to, for example the Companies Act (1985) or the Stock Exchange
Continuing Obligations for listed companies, and such requirements have
necessitated greater levels of disclosure in recent years. However, even the
regulations as they stand today, provide for considerable discretion in the amount
of information that can be presented.
The disclosure of directors' emoluments is primarily governed by the
Companies Act (1985). In addition, information on share options must be given in
compliance with the Yellow Book Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange.
Reviews of this are provided in Clark and Main (1997). Moreover, the revelation
of information surrounding executive share options is influenced by the policy
statements of institutions such as the Association of British Insurers 5 (ABI).
Forker (1992), and Egginton, Forker and Grout (1993) discussed the
information requirements in order to appraise option schemes. Forker (1992)
remarked "the value of options when they are granted represents the biggest
component of the cost of options to shareholders". The valuation of the stock of
options held by a director requires information on the number of options (N), the
exercise prices (X), the remaining life of the options (T), the volatility of the
underlying share (cr), the dividend yield (q) and risk-less rate of interest (r). While
the last three variables can be readily determined from general stock market
information, the first three can only be obtained from the company in question,
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either through direct contact with the company, or through their annual
publications.
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) note that this information has always been
available from the Register of Directors' Interests, but collecting such information
from this source is extremely costly to the investigator. The only real alternative
source is from the information contained in the company accounts which until
recently, was all too often incomplete.
Section 5.13 of the Greenbury report recommended that companies should
disclosure full details of each individual director's option entitlement in
accordance with the Urgent Issue Task Force's (UITF) Abstract 10. This implies
companies should provide information on the exercise price and time to maturity
of every tranche of options held by every director.
However, the Greenbury report goes on to state that "In the disclosure of
share option details there is some risk that the abundance of information will mask
rather than highlight the nature and scale of the option schemes. Remuneration
committees may wish, therefore, to consider the more concise disclosure models
also described by the U1TF".
These "concise" disclosure models as defined by the UITF Abstract 10
state that companies can instead disclose only the weighted average exercise price
and the maturity date of the longest dated option. The abstract does add that
See Chapter Seven for a further discussion on ABI guidelines
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where this alternative is taken, some additional disclosure may be necessary.
These take the form of distinguishing between in-the-money options and out-of-
the-money options and noting "unusually large individual items" to prevent
misleading conclusions being drawn from an average. The precise disclosure
requirements of both the full and concise disclosure models are presented in
Section 3.3.
2.5.3 Discretionary Disclosure
Verrecchia (1983) presented a discretionary disclosure model in which a
manager of a risky asset can exercise a choice in the disclosure of information. In
his model market participants form rational expectations concerning the manager's
motivation. The information released by the manager is then seen as a signal of
the asset's fundamental value perturbed by noise.
The significance of a proprietary cost is that if information is withheld,
then market traders are unsure whether it is withheld because (a) the news really is
bad or (b) that the news is good but not good enough to out-weigh the proprietary
cost associated with its release. The proprietary cost then, introduces noise into
the system by making the interpretation of the withholding of information
ambiguous. In short, non-disclosure can be associated with both "good" and
"bad" news.
To move to an empirical framework in the analysis later in the thesis it is
important to identify accounting and economic variables which co-vary with the
(proprietary) costs of disclosure. Pierce-Brown and Steele (1999) review the
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voluminous literature relating to accounting policy choice. Also, Forker (1992)
considers explicitly those factors which affect the costs of disclosing share option
information. Chapter Four thoroughly reviews these factors before presenting an
appropriate econometric model.
2.6 Tournament Theory
The main focus of this chapter to date has been the principal agent model
and the associated literature investigating the link between company performance
and executive compensation. As detailed above, most early studies suggested this
link was neither strong nor consistent (Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Conyon, Gtegg
and Machin 1995) although more recent research in the US, has suggested a
strengthening of the link (Murphy 1999, Hall and Liebman, 1998, Aggarwal and
Samwick, 1999).
In an attempt to further align economic theory and empirical reality,
economists proposed an alternative theory of executive pay known as tournament
theory. Tournament theory was initially developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981),
in part, to explain the large disparity between CEO pay and the pay of executives
located one level down the organisational hierarchy. The authors state "On the
day that a given individual is promoted from vice-president to president, his salary
may triple. It is difficult to argue that his skills have tripled in that one-day period,
presenting difficulties for standard theory where supply factors should keep wages
in those two occupations approximately equal. It is not a puzzle, however, when
interpreted in the context of the prize" (p847).
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Lazear and Rosen suggest that even though the salary of the top executive
may well exceed all measures of his marginal product, it can still be economically
efficient. The justification is that the high salary of the CEO acts as an incentive
to those on lower management levels to accept wages at less than their own
expected marginal product. Chapter Six provides some empirical evidence on
tournament theory using a sample of British companies to test the usefulness of
this theory for explaining executive pay outcomes.
The underlying theme of tournament theory then is that agents will exert
effort in order to get promoted to a higher position in the management hierarchy
associated with which is a higher level of compensation. Individual agents thus
compete with each other, increasing their effort in an attempt to increase the
likelihood of winning the prize of promotion. In this framework, it is of course
only relative performance that is of importance. As in a competitive sports game,
agents need not be concerned with their absolute level of performance, only that
they outperform their rivals.
One of the earliest works to address tournament theory was that of Green
and Stokey (1983), who demonstrated that when individual productivity within an
organisation is subject to a sufficiently diffuse common shock, then using the
optimal tournament dominates other forms of remuneration. 	 Similarly,
Malcomson (1984), showed how tournament compensation arrangements can be
superior to other structures of executive compensation.
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Tournament theory can also be applied to lower levels within an
organisation's hierarchy, which is usually triangular in shape (Beckmann 1978).
At lower levels, the prizes for promotion are likely to be smaller since a larger
number of positions exist within a particular hierarchical level. This indicates that
a relatively large proportion of individual competitors can be promoted. Closer to
the top of the hierarchy the number of positions available for competitors
decreases and so the prize needs to be greater to motivate tournament survivors
(Rosen 1986). Tournament theory thus predicts a convex relationship between
executive compensation and organisational level.
Tournament theory has not though gained universal acceptance. Dye
(1984) for example, provides a comprehensive critique of tournament theory
raising doubts about several features including the feasibility of constructing
appropriate handicaps, the difficulty of judging multidimensional performance in
an ordinal sense and the problems of collusion and sabotage among contestants
under such arrangements. Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) also question the
wisdom of using promotions as an incentive device, pointing to the costs of
promoting an individual with skills inappropriate to the promoted post.
On an empirical level there have been few tests of tournament theory in
general and only a handful in the context of executive compensation. Strong
evidence for tournament models has however been obtained from studies into
sport. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) demonstrated that professional golfers on
the European circuit produced better rounds (i.e. fewer number of strokes) when
the prize money on offer increased. In a similar vein Becker and Huselid (1992)
57
Chapter Two - Modelling Executive Compensation: A Survey of Recent Literature
showed that professional NASCAR drivers produced faster times in races with
higher prizes. Their results also showed however, that greater prizes can induce
drivers to pursue riskier driving strategies.
A further example is Fernie and Metcalf (1996), they undertook an
empirical test based on the pay and performance of an unbalanced panel of 50
jockeys over a period of eight years. Again, the transparency of not only the pay
but more importantly the performance of, in this case, the jockeys, made the pay-
performance link much easier to observe. Jockeys are usually paid a percentage of
any winnings, and their opportunity to win, that is the number of rides they are
offered, depends on their reputation and standing. Fernie and Metcalf concluded
that the existence of this, almost "ideal" payment system did improve the level of
effort and hence the performance of the riders when compared to other non-
performance related compensation packages.
Outside a sports setting, Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) produced a
laboratory study which used paid undergraduate student volunteers as subjects to
test whether tournaments produced desired effort responses, concluding that
tournament theory might have some predictive validity. Knoeber and Thurman
(1994) in a study on the broiler chicken industry, further reported results that were
in support of tournament theory. They also reported that farmers who were
unlikely to win the tournament engage in riskier actions in an attempt to improve
their chances.
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The first recognised test of tournament theory in an executive
compensation setting was carried out by O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988). In
their study O'Reilly et a!., tested the hypothesis that the larger the number of
candidates competing for a CEO position, represented by the number of vice-
presidents, the greater would be the disparity in pay between the CEO and other
executive levels. However, although they did report a statistically significant
result, it was in the opposite direction to that predicted by tournament theory.
In a further test of tournament theory, the authors re-defined the boundaries
for inclusion within the tournament. Rather than including all executives, only
those with significant responsibilities were included. It was proposed this was a
fairer representation of those individuals who would be most likely to be involved
in succeeding the CEO. However, with this refined sample no statistically
significant results were reported.
Main, O'Reily and Wade (1993) however do isolate a positive relationship
between the number of tournament participants and pay differentials. Further
support is provided by Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993), using internal firm
data, they show that differences in compensation between hierarchical levels are
consistent with tournament theory.
Main et a!. (1993) however while finding results that were consistent with
the operation of tournaments, concluded that there was little "support for the
empirical importance of consideration of pay equity at the top of corporations"
(p606)
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In a more recent study Eriksson (1999) using data on 2600 managers from
210 Danish firms during a four year period from 1992 to 1995, concluded that
"almost all of my findings are consistent with tournament models" (p241) finding
a positive relationship between the number of participants and the prize of the
tournament and a stable convex relation between pay and job level.
To conclude, tournament theory has been proposed by economists in an
attempt to explain the motivation of executives and the provision of incentives
within companies. Also, it can be used to explain the apparent lack of a strong
link between organisational performance and executive pay. Whilst theoretically
sound, the empirical evidence in support of tournament theory, other than in a
sports setting, is perhaps limited and at best mixed. This issue is further explored
in Chapter Six.
2.7 Concluding Comments
This chapter has introduced the fundamental concepts behind the modern
day analysis of executive pay. It also provided a background to the subsequent
more detailed chapters. The chapter began with a review of agency theory and
presented a typical principal agent model. It also provided a review of the pay
performance literature, suggesting that the link between executive pay and
corporate performance is strengthening. Much of that strengthening comes from
the increased use of equity based pay such as shares and executive options. The
chapter also introduced the topics of tournament theory and levels of information
disclosure with particular reference to executive share option information.
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As highlighted above, the strengthening of the pay-performance link is
largely a result of the broader pay measures being used, in particular the inclusion
of long term elements of remuneration such as share options. The contribution of
much the work presented in the following chapters of this thesis stems from the
richness of the data collected which, for the first time for a large sample of UK
firms, includes detailed option information. The next chapter describes in detail
the structure and content of that data.
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The Data
r Three - The Data
3.1 Introduction
The three main empirical chapters in this thesis are all based on unique but
interrelated data sets. This chapter details the construction and content of the main
data set consisting of 510 IlK quoted companies for the financial year 1997/8.
The empirical work in Chapter Five which estimates pay for performance
sensitivities and option values is based on this entire data set. The data used in the
remaining chapters is related as follows.
3.1.1 Disclosure Data Set (Chapter Four)
The data used in Chapter Four is for companies making up the FTSE35O
during the period 1995/6. All non-investment trust companies included in this
sample are also included in the main data set where they continued to survive into
1997/8. The variables collected in this data set relate to the levels of disclosure of
share option information at a time when new disclosure guidelines were being put
forward. Section 4.4 of Chapter Four provides more details on the construction
and content of this data set.
3.1.2 Tournaments Data Set (Chapter Six)
The tournaments data set, used in Chapter Six, includes data from 105 of
the largest (by market capitalisation) companies listed in the main data set. All
variables collected in the main data described below are replicated, but in addition
all Director Specific Variables, as described in Section 3.4.2, are collected for all
serving directors, executives and non-executives, at the company year end.
Further details describing this data are given in Chapter Six, Section 6.3.
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The remainder of the chapter is solely concerned with the construction and
content of the main data set of 510 companies. The main strength of this data set
is the rich source of option information collected. The improved disclosure levels
in the UK over the last few years mean that this data set is vastly superior to that
that could currently be constructed in the US, or until very recently, in the UK.
This chapter continues as follows. The next section illustrates how the
final sample of companies was arrived at for the main data set. Section 3.3
illustrates the current disclosure requirements for UK listed companies with
respect to directors' option holdings. The following section discusses the
variables collected and provides a general overview of the nature of the data set.
Section 3.5 compares the data set with that available under current US reporting
regulations while Section 3.6 discusses the overall strengthens and weaknesses of
the data.
3.2 The Main Sample
The main data set consists of a sample of 510 UK companies quoted on the
London stock market. The companies were selected as follows. Using
Datastream, the top 550 traded equity shares by market capitalisation on 17th July
1998 were listed. At this time nine companies, as shown in Table 3.1, had two
classes of shares listing on the London Stock Exchange, such as B or Non-Voting
shares. These repetitions were removed to leave 541 distinct companies.
64
Chapter Three - The Data
Company and Equity Class
Diageo B'
Southern Electric B'
Schroders NV.
Laing (John) 'A'
HSBC Holdings (HK$)
EMI B'
Charter BR.
Caradon B'
Cable & Wireless Communications6
Table 3.1: Companies With Multiple Shares Listed On The
London Stock Exchange On The 17/7/98
From this sample all companies that had been listed on the London Stock
Exchange since the 30th June 1997 were removed so that all remaining companies
had been listed for at least six months by the time they produced their first annual
report as a public company. This removed recently floated companies who may
not have had chance to implement option schemes and long term incentive plans if
they so wished. The 29 companies removed at this stage are shown in Table 3.2.
This reduced the sample to 512 companies. For these companies the
annual report that included the month of June 1997 was than collected. This was
obtained either through direct contact with the company or through the Financial
Times' Annual Report Service. This was only possible for 510 of the remaining
companies. The two companies excluded at this stage were Hambros, who were
taken over, and Geo Interactive who are registered in Israel, neither of which
produced an appropriate set of report and accounts.
6 Cable and Wireless Communications is not strictly a double listing. It is however controlled by
Cable and Wireless Plc and was only listed in April 1997 - for these reasons it was considered
unsuitable and removed from the main sample.
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Company Name	 Listing Date Company Name	 Listing Date
Coca Cola Beverages 	 10/07/98 Saatchi & Saatchi 	 12/12/97
Ecsoft Group	 23/06/98	 Energis	 11/12/97
New Look	 18/06/98 Bovis Homes Group	 08/12/97
Itnet	 11/06/98	 Holmes Place	 03/11/97
Computacenter	 20/05/98 Ultraframe	 22/10/97
Taylor & Francis	 15/05/98 Newsquest	 15/10/97
Matalan	 13/05/98	 Creative Publishing	 03/10/97
Thomson Travel Grp	 08/05/98 Northern Rock	 30/09/97
Arm Holdings	 23/04/98 Aggreko	 26/09/97
LLP Group	 16/04/98 Billiton	 25/07/97
Express Dairies	 27/03/9 8 Woolwich	 04/07/97
Oxford Asymmetry	 16/03/98 SGB Group	 24/06/97
Guardian IT	 13/03/98 PowderJect Pharmaceuticals 	 16/06/97
Monsoon	 10/02/98 Norwich Union	 13/06/97
Debenhams	 23/01/98
Table 3.2: Sample Companies Listed On The
London Stock Exchange Since O1/O6/97
The final sample of the 510 companies is listed at the end of the thesis in
Appendix One on page 237. The initial sample of 550 listed shares represented
98% of the UK stock market by market capitalisation, even after the above
exclusions, the remaining 510 companies still accounted for 97% by value of the
London equity market on the selection date.
The date given in the table represents the Base Date as defined by Datastream
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3.3 Disclosure Of Directors' Share Options
As highlighted previously, most of the empirical work in the UK to date
has focused exclusively on the direct cash compensation of directors, that is the
total of salary, benefits and bonus. It is only since the general adoption of the
Greenbury recommendations that companies have increased the level of disclosure
in their reporting and made a full analysis of executive option holdings and other
long term incentive holdings possible.
Section 5.13 of the Greenbury report recommended that companies should
disclose full details of each individual director's option entitlement in accordance
with the Urgent Issue Task Force's (UTTF) Abstract 10. This implies for each
director, companies should provide;
. the number of shares under option at the beginning of the year (or
date of issue if later) as well as at the end;
• the number of options granted, exercised and lapsed unexercised
during the year;
• the exercise prices of all options;
• the dates from which the options may be exercised and the expiry
dates;
• the cost of the options (if any);
• the market price of the shares at the date of exercise for options
exercised during the year; and
• a summary of any performance criteria on which exercise of the
options is conditional.
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However, the Greenbury report goes on to state that "In the disclosure of
share option details there is some risk that the abundance of information will mask
rather than highlight the nature and scale of the option schemes. Remuneration
committees may wish, therefore, to consider the more concise disclosure models
also described by the UITF". These 'concise' disclosure models as defined by the
UTTF Abstract 10, state companies can instead disclose the following;
. total shares under option at the beginning and end of the year for
each director, with appropriate weighted average exercise prices
applicable to shares under option at the year end;
. full details of any movements during the year (covering options
granted and lapsed during the year with disclosure of the exercise
price and the share price at the date of exercise).
The abstract does add that where this alternative is taken, some additional
disclosure may be necessary. These take the form of distinguishing between in the
money options and out of the money options and noting "unusually large
individual items" to prevent misleading conclusions being drawn from an average.
3.4 The Variables
A total of 57 variables were collected for each company. A full listing of
these variables together with brief definitions and the appropriate codings is given
in Appendix Two at the end of thesis.
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The variables can be split into two groups. Firstly, company specific
variables, that is, variables that are unchanged irrespective of the choice of
company director and secondly, director specific variables that naturally are
dependent on the individual named as the company's leading executive. A full
explanation of each variable is given below, with the name of variable shown
capitalised in brackets.
3.4.1 Company Specific Variables
With the company name (COMPANY), Datastream code (DSCODE) and
initial market value (MV) established through the creation of the sample, the next
variable collected was the company's sedol number (SEDOL), used as a unique
reference number for each company thereafter. The 3-digit (ICODE3) and 1-digit
(ICODE1) FISE industrial classification codes and industry description (ITYPE)
were then recorded based on the company's entry in the Hemmington Scott
Corporate Register for June 1998. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the sample
companies over the six main industrial groupings. The majority of the companies
are either service companies or general manufacturing companies, with these two
sectors alone accounting for 66% of the sample. Note, no investment trusts are
included within the sample.
From the annual report the financial year end date (YREND) was recorded.
Almost half of the sample companies (47%) had a December 1997 year end, with
a further 20% having a year end of March 1998. Overall, the accounting period
end dates begin in June 1997 and are distributed right through until August 1998.
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The reason this covers a period in excess of twelve months is that a number of
companies changed their year end dates. In particular, Diageo, Photobition and
WH Smith Group changed their fiscal year end dates resulting in accounting
periods of fifteen months ending on June 30th, June 30th and August 31st 1998
respectively. Excluding these three companies, the sample period covers twelve
months ending in May 1998.
Industry Sector
	
Number Of Companies
Mineral Extraction	 16
General Manufacturing	 146
Consumer Goods	 55
Services	 190
Utilities	 19
Financials	 84
Total	 510
Table 3.3: Industry Sector Groups
Next, the outstanding number of ordinary shares issued and fully paid at
both the beginning (EQSTART) and the end (EQEND) of the financial period
were collected. The UITF Abstract 10 also recommends that companies report
their year end share price and this too was recorded where given (SPRICE) with
Datastream used as alternative source when it was not. The mean year end share
price was £4.63 (median £3.43), with share prices ranging from just 34p (Guinness
Peat Group) up to £37.10 (Misys8).
8 Unsurprisingly Misys undertook a 5 for 1 share split in September 1998
70
Chapter Three - The Data
Based on the financial year end date, the prevailing three month treasury
bill rate on that day was recorded (TBRATE) from Datastream as a proxy for the
UK risk-free rate. Interest rates remained fairly flat over the sample period with
just a small downward trend as the year progressed, thus there is little variation in
this variable with all observations being within 1% of the mean interest rate of
7.22%.
Also from Datastream, the daily dividend yield on the preceding 365
calendar days was taken. The number of distinct observation was recorded
(DYDAYS), usually 262 although this is occasionally less, falling to a minimum
of 154 for the more recently floated companies. From the above observations the
average dividend yield for the period was calculated (DYAVE1). This rose from
zero for those companies not currently paying any dividends, to a maximum of
12.7% (Matthew Clark), with a mean of 3.29% (median of 3.13%).
Option valuations are particularly sensitive to dividend yields and yields in
excess of 6-7% are probably not sustainable in the long term, hence an alternative
dividend yield was also calculated (DYAVE2). This was taken to be the average
of the dividend yield quoted (on Datastream) on 28th of each month over the four
year period 1993-1997. Where a figure was not available the median industry
dividend yield calculated on that day from the remainder of the sample was used
as a proxy.
The mean of this new measure was very close to the first at 3.25%, but the
maximum had reduced to just 7.83% with just 6 observations above 7% compared
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with 22 for the first dividend measure (DYAVE1). Accordingly, the second
measure (DYAVE2) was used throughout the analysis presented in Chapter Five
and Chapter Six, although the use of the first measure (DYAVE1) does not
materially affect the results.
Similarly two volatilities were collected for each company. The first
(VOL1) is that quoted in the London Business School's (LBS) Risk Measurement
Service for the fourth quarter of 1997. The LBS volatility calculation involves
calculating monthly returns from which an annual volatility measure can be
estimated. In general, five years of monthly returns are used although this can
vary between one and five years depending on the availability of the data.
The LBS volatility measure was not immediately available in ten cases.
Although very recent listings had been removed from the sample, the remaining
ten most recently floated companies left in the sample had still not traded for a
sufficiently long enough period for the LBS calculation to be made. In these
cases, the volatility figure was taken from the relevant issue of the Risk
Measurement Service in which a measure of volatility was given for the second
time. For example, Halifax Plc was listed in May 1997, LBS first quoted a
volatility for it in the second quarter of 1998, hence the value used in the data set
was that quoted in third quarter of 1998. This reduced the potential bias of
unrepresentative volatilities due to the effects of trading around the share flotation.
The second volatility measure (VOL2) is very closely related to the LBS
measure but was calculated explicitly from returns data collected for each
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company over four years. The Datastream return index value was collected, as for
the dividend yield, on the 28th day of each month from January 1993 to December
1997 with an additional observation being made for December 1992. This
allowed 48 monthly returns to be calculated over the period. The return in month
i, (R1) was calculated as the natural log of the return index in month i divided by
the return index in month i-i. Again, where a figure was unavailable the median
industry return was used. The standard deviation of the monthly return figures
was calculated and then annualised to produce the volatility measure. Summary
statistics for the two measures are shown below in Table 3.4
Volatility Measure
VOL1	 VOL2
____________________	 (LBS)	 (Returns Data)
25t1 percentile	 21%	 20%
50th percentile	 25%	 23%
75th percentile	 31%	 28%
95th percentile	 54%	 44%
Mean	 28.3%	 25.7%
Table 3.4: Volatility Measures
Table 3.4 shows little variation in the two measures except towards the
95th percentile. On average the second measure (VOL2) is 2.6% lower than the
first. Table 3.5 shows the distribution of both volatility measures across the
industry sectors. Again, with the exception of the Utilities sector where the mean
and median volatilities calculated under the two method are extremely close, the
volatility as calculated using the returns data tends to smaller than that reported by
the LBS. However the pattern of volatility across the industry sectors is similar
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under both measures, with mean volatility highest in the Service sector and lowest
in the Utilities sector in both cases. Results presented in this thesis are all based
on the second volatility measure (VOL2), although as with the alternative dividend
yield measure, the results are not materially affected by the use of the first
volatility measure (VOL1).
Industry Sector	 VOL1	 VOL2
(LBS)	 (Returns Data)
Mean	 Median	 Mean	 Median
Mineral Extraction	 29.6%	 26.5%	 26.0%	 22.5%
General Manufacturing	 27.5%	 26.0%	 26.3%	 25.0%
Consumer Goods	 28.7%	 23.0%	 25.4%	 21.6%
Services	 30.1%	 26.5%	 27.0%	 23.6%
Utilities	 22.4%	 22.0%	 22.4%	 22.5%
Financials	 26.2%	 24.0%	 22.5%	 21.1%
Table 3.5: Volatility By Industry Sector
The Datastream return index was also collected at the beginning and end of
the financial year for each company in order to compute an annual log return
figure (TSR), calculated in the same way as the monthly return figures described
above. The market return, represented by the annual return on the FT-All Share
Index, for the calendar year 1997 was 18.0%, this compares with a mean log return
figure in the sample of 0.163, equivalent to annual return of 17.7%. There were
however some major winners and losers during the year as Table 3.6 illustrates.
The annual return could only be computed for 499 of the sample
companies, the remaining 11 had not been listed for a full twelve months at the
time of their financial year end. The best performer over the period was Verity
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Group with a log return figure of 1.489, equivalent to an annual rate of return of
343%. Meanwhile the worst performer was British Biotech, who reported a log
return figure of -1.392, equivalent to an annual rate of return of -75%.
__________________ Log_Return_= Ln(R/R11)
1 st Percentile	 -0.8335
5th Percentile	 -0.3 570
10th Percentile	 -0.2 195
25 t
 Percentile	 -0.0144
50th Percentile	 0.1630
75th Percentile	 0.3 639
90th Percentile	 0.5252
95th Percentile	 0.6800
99th Percentile	 0.9604
Mean	 0.1627
Standard Deviation	 0.3206
Table 3.6: Annual Returns Of Sample Companies
The final company specific variables to be collected were alternative size
and performance measures taken from Datastream. These included the net
adjusted earnings per share (Datastream item 211) over the accounting period
(EPS), the total number of employees (item 219) in the firm (EMPLOYEE), the
total capital employed (TOTALCAP) by the company at the financial year end and
finally a sales figure (SALES) was recorded for each company. These variables
are summarised in Table 3.7. Financial and property companies of course do not
report sales figures, thus where this was unavailable the proxy of total income
(item 948) was used or where this too was absent, for example banks, a net
interest income figure (item 816) was substituted. The indicator variable
(SALESIND) was included to show which of the three 'sales' figures was used.
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Variable	 Median	 Mean	 Standard
_____________________________ _________ __________ Deviation
EPS (pence)	 19.625	 20.399	 39.778
Employees (units)	 4279	 13057	 23966
Total Capital Employed (E000) 	 319778	 2128263	 7577817
Sales (f000)	 442221	 1601229	 4067490
Table 3.7: Size And Performance Characteristics Of Sample Companies
3.4.2 Director Specific Variables
Firstly, the leading executive at the financial year end in each company
was identified (DIRECTOR). This was taken to be the CEO if such a role existed.
Where no CEO existed the leading executive was taken to be either an executive
chairman, the group managing director or other named individual implied as the
leading executive in the company report and accounts.
The specific title given to the leading executive was also recorded (ROLE)
and from this an additional variable (COMBINE) was constructed which was
defined by whether or not the company had combined the roles of chairman and
CEO. Companies were assumed to have combined the two roles when either the
report had specifically indicated so or where the leading executive identified was a
chairman. Section 4.9 of the Cadbury Report recommends that the roles of
chairman and chief executive should be separate yet only 415 (8 1.4%) of the 510
companies seem to have done so.
Having identified the leading executive (hereafter referred to as the CEO),
the number of months during the accounting period for which that individual was
a director was recorded (DIRMTH). Similarly, the number of months during the
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accounting period for which the named individual held the post of leading
executive (ROLEMTH) was noted.
The vast majority (483 or 94.7%) of year end CEOs had served on the
board for the full financial period although only 442 (86.7%) had served as CEO
for the entire time. Thus of the 510 sample companies, 68 had appointed a new
CEO during the year where 41 (60.3%) of the new appointments were already
board members serving in an alternative capacity.
Direct cash compensation figures comprising, salary (SALARY), benefits
in kind (BENEFITS) and annual or mid term bonuses (BONUS) along with any
other additional payments (OTHER), but excluding pension contributions, were
collected to give the total cash compensation for the year (TOTAL). The total of
equivalent payments in the preceding financial year (TOTPY) was also included.
Mean and median values for these figures are shown in Table 3.8.
The results indicate that at the mean CEOs received total cash
compensation of £413,290 representing a pay increase of 17% over the previous
year, while at the median the total figure rose by 21%. The main component of
total cash compensation is still basic salary which constitutes 65.4% of the overall
total at the mean. The other main significant component is the annual or mid term
bonus figure, which represents a further 28.6%.
77
Chapter Three - The Data
Variable	 Mean	 Median
Basic salary	 £270,152	 £240,000
Benefits	 £19,930	 £14,000
Annual or mid term bonus 	 £118,074	 £68,764
Other payments	 £4,947	 £0
Total cash compensation	 £413,290	 £340,000
Total cash compensation in
	 £353,231	 £280,500
previous year
Table 3.8: Summary Of Direct Cash Compensation
The two remaining elements of bonus and 'other' between them account
for only 6%. (Bonus - 4.8%, Other - 1.2%). Benefits typically included the cash
value of the provision of a company car and membership of private medical
insurance and life assurance schemes. On occasions though it also included items
such as mobile telephones, magazine subscriptions and chauffeurs. Other
payments generally represented one of extraordinary items, such as relocation
expenses for a new CEO or compensation for changes to existing contracts.
Next, the total beneficial and non-beneficial shareholdings held by the
CEO at the beginning and end of the year were taken. The mean number of shares
beneficially held by the CEO at the end of their company's fiscal year was 2.7
million, although the distribution is severely skewed by some very large holdings.
At the median the figure is just 126,936 shares. Only 19 CEOs had no beneficial
holding in their own company at the year end date and the majority (5 8%) of these
were newly appointed CEOs who perhaps had not yet had time to build up a
sharestake.
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The remaining data collected relates to the long term incentives held by the
CEO and primarily concerns the option portfolio built up by the director. The
non-option variables relate to the number of shares held in long term incentive
plans other than in the form of options. The number of shares granted
(TSTGRANT) under such schemes during the year was recorded along with the
maximum possible allocation at the start (TSTSTART) and end (TSTEND) of the
financial year.
The first two option variables (OPDATA, OPYE) determine whether or
not the CEO held any options. If at no time during the year did the CEO hold any
options than OPDATA was set to 'No', otherwise it is set to 'Yes'. Similarly if
the CEO held options at the year end then OPYE is set to 'Yes'. Overall, 445
(87.3%) CEOs held options at some time during the year, with 439 (86.1%) of
those continuing to hold options at the end of the year.
Options are usually granted at regular intervals, so that over time it is
possible for directors to build up large stocks. Each individual grant of options is
known as a tranche, within which all option characteristics are identical. As
highlighted in Section 3.3, companies can choose to report either the average
statistics for the entire option stock held by each director, or opt for complete
disclosure and report information on each separate tranche held by the directors.
Where the company opts for the former, the entire stock of options is treated as
one large tranche, in either case, all information reported by the company is
recorded.
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For each CEO the level of disclosure was recorded (IORW), that is,
whether full information was given for each individual tranche, or overall statistics
based on the entire stock of options. Table 3.9 below shows that where the CEO
did hold options at the year end, 82.5% of the respective companies (362) reported
information on all individual tranches held by the director. A further 4.8% (21)
report a mixture of weighted and individual tranche information. In these cases,
companies had usually opted to report weighted average exercise prices, but had
split the CEOs option holding into; (1) those options in the money and those out of
the money; or (2) by those exercisable and those not yet exercisable; or
alternatively (3) by the scheme under which the option was granted. By doing this
it often become possible to identify individual tranches.
Number of observations
Number of CEOs in sample	 510
CEOs with options at sometime in the year
	 445 (87.3%)
CEOs with options at year end 	 435 (85.3%)
For CEOs with options at year end, the level of
disclosure given was:
All individual tranche data supplied
	 362 (82.5%)
Mixture of individual and average data supplied
	 21(4.8%)
Only average data supplied
	 56 (12.8%)
Table 3.9: Incidence Of Option Holding And Disclosure Levels
Next, the specific option characteristics for each tranche of options held at
the year end were recorded. These included the exercise price of the option
(XPRICE), the date on which the option first becomes exercisable (EXFIRST), the
date on which the option expires (EXLAST) and the date on which the option was
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granted (GDATE). Where companies report overall statistics, the exercise price
represents the weighted average exercise price of all option held, EXFIRST
represents the first date any option within the portfolio can be exercised and
EXLAST the date the final option expires.
Unfortunately companies were not consistent in the way they reported the
above dates. Some gave the exact day, some the month, while others only
specified the year. Thus the format of the date provided i.e. day, month or year
was recorded (DFORMAT) and the exercise dates were set to the earliest possible
day consistent with the information given. For example, if a company specified
May 1999 as the expiry date for an option, EXLAST was set to 01/05/99.
Similarly if only a year was specified the date is set to the first of January of that
year.
Most options are granted under executive option schemes, however a small
percentage are granted under employee wide save as you earn (SAYE) schemes,
thus the scheme under which a particular tranche is granted is recorded
(SCHEME). On average where a CEO held options at the year end, less than 2%
of the total number of options held had been granted under SAYE schemes.
Based on the company year end date and the EXLAST date, the remaining
life of the option was calculated (TMAT), representing the time to maturity of the
option. Executive options when granted usually have a life of ten years whereas
SAYE options tend to have a life of either three or five years. For the entire
sample, the average remaining life of an option was 5.6 years, for executive
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options this increased to 6.2 years. Executive options are usually required to be
held for at least three years before they become exercisable, the closeness of this
figure to 7 years then would seem to indicate that executive options are usually
exercised fairly quickly after they first become exercisable. For savings related
options the average remaining life of the option was 3.3 years
Since the publication of the Greenbury recommendations, most executive
options are now issued at-the money, that is at an exercise price equal to the
prevailing market share price at the date of issue. Savings related options however
are usually granted at a 20% discount to the prevailing market price. The average
year end share price was £4.63, this compared with the average exercise price of
only £2.95, and still only £2.96 if just executive options are considered. Thus the
majority of the outstanding options held by UK CEOs are deeply in the money
reflecting the fact that the majority of the options had been held for a number of
years over which time the company share price had appreciated.
Next the number (NUMBER) of options held in each tranche was
recorded, obviously where companies report overall statistics, this represents the
total number of options held by the CEO. For those directors who do hold
options, the average number of options held was 633,132, (median of 262,332).
Finally with regard to the year end stock of options, the number of
individual tranches held by the CEO (NTRANCHES) was calculated. This
represented the number of tranches for which full information was available, thus
for companies reporting only overall statistics or where no options at all were
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held, this was set to zero. Where this variable was non-zero (362 companies), the
average number of tranches held by CEOs was 3.69 with a maximum of 14
separate tranches held by Allan Leighton, the CEO at Asda.
The remaining variables relate to changes in the stock of options over the
financial year. An indicator variable (CHANGE) was included which was set to
'Yes' if the director had exercised or been granted any options over the period, or
if any of the options held at the beginning of the period had lapsed.
Options lapse when the expiry date is reached and the option has still not
been exercised. This usually occurs when the share price has failed to climb
above the exercise price at a time when the director wishes, or is able, to exercise
the option. Directors of course are under no obligation to exercise options
approaching their expiry date, even if they are in the money. Conversely, under
certain circumstances directors may choose to exercise an option even if it is out-
of the money and incur an immediate loss. Within the sample, 24 CEOs held a
total of 3.6m options that lapsed during the year.
Where a change had taken place, i.e. a grant, exercise or lapse of options,
all the option variables detailed above were recorded along with two additional
variables. Firstly the date on which the change occurred (EDATE) and secondly
the market price of the company's shares on that date (MKTPRICE).
The market price figure was usually only given explicitly where options
had been exercised. This enabled the monetary value of exercised options to be
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calculated as the market price minus the exercise price, multiplied by the number
of options exercised. Overall, 147 CEOs exercised options during the year,
resulting in an average realised gain of £502,175 (median of £180,905).
Conversely, nearly half the sample (254 CEOs) received some form of option
grant during the year with the average (median) value of £188,089 (69,428).
A final indicator variable (MARKER) was created to determine the status
of any recorded option at the year end. This was set to 'H' if the option was still
held at the year end, 'E' if the option had been exercised during the year, 'G' if the
option had been granted during the year and 'L' if the option had lapsed during the
year.
Thus if a director had received a grant of options during the year which
was still held at the year end, the individual tranche could appear twice in the data
set, once with MARKER set to 'H', and again with MARKER set to 'G'. This
however was not necessarily the case. It is possible that the company in question
only reported average statistics, in this case the individual tranche would only
appear once with a MARKER of 'G', while being included along with all other
options held by the director in a single block tranche with MARKER set to 'H'.
3.5 Comparison With US Data
As a result of enhanced federal reporting requirements for fiscal years
ending on or after 15 December 1992, US companies were required to increase
9SEC Release numbers 33-6962, 34-3 1327 and IC-19032 pertaining to Regulation S-K. The new
regulations were published in the Federal Register 57, No 204 (1992): 48126-48159
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their levels of disclosure with respect to share options granted to and held by the
company directors. In particular, the relevant exercise price of options granted
during the year had to he reported along with an estimated value of the award.
US companies have certain discretion on how to provide such estimates.
In short, the SEC provided them with two basic alternatives. Firstly to assume
that the share price rises at 5% and 10% per annum over the life of the option and
report the two payoffs that would occur at the date the option expires. The second
alternative is to report a figure based on the Black-Scholes formula. Initially
companies were not required to disclose the inputs used to generate - such
valuations, for example, dividend yields, interest rates, etc. Indeed, companies
were further allowed to discount the resulting Black-Scholes values by an
undisclosed amount if they deemed it appropriate. However an amendment to the
rules in November 1993 required companies to "describe the assumptions used
relating to the expected volatility, risk-free rate of interest, dividend yield and time
of exercise [and] any adjustments for non-transferability or risk of forfeiture"°
While the above alternatives do allow some variation in the reporting of
option information, the resulting levels of disclosure do usually allow an
independent Black-Scholes valuation of the current grant of options to be made.
However, this is not the case for stock of share options already held by the
director.
'°Federal Securities Law Reports, December 15, 1993, p61892
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In determining the stock of options held by directors at the financial year
end companies must first report the number of options exercised during the year
along with the monetary gain realised from the exercise. They are not required to
disclose the exercise price of the options exercised, nor the market price of the
shares on the date the option is exercised. Thus even if complete information is
held on the stock of options held at the beginning of the year, it may still not be
possible to identify which options have been exercised.
Finally, US companies are required to report the total number of
unexercised options held by the director at the year, split between those that are
currently exercisable and those that at the year end date remain unexercisable. In
addition, again splitting the options into these two categories, they must report the
end of year value of the stock of options calculated as the aggregate value of the
difference between the exercise price and the year end share price. Because of this
valuation method, only options that are in the money are considered in
determining the year end value of the option stock.
This implies that American CEOs could hold vast numbers of options,
worth considerable sums (based on Black-Scholes values), which would pass
unnoticed if the exercise price were above the current stock price at the time of
reporting. This reporting mechanism causes particular distortions when the
options held are very close to the money. Option values that had appeared in
previous statements can suddenly disappear from the balance sheet as a result of
only a very small downward movement in the share price. This would incorrectly
give the impression that the CEOs total holding of options had fallen. Conversely,
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marginally out of the money options can be put back in the money by just a small
increase in the share price giving the misguided impression that the CEO had
received additional option grants.
These reporting guidelines mean that is virtually impossible to gather full
information for all the individual tranches of options held by US directors. Hall
and Liebman (1998) attempted to overcome this problem by recording CEO's
option holdings over time from the moment they first held options using each
years annual proxy statement to track any grants or exercises. However, because
of the limited data on exercised options supplied by US companies, even this
requires a number of assumptions to be made resulting in errors in the final stock
of options held (see Hall and Liebman, 1998, p689). Thus even from a series of
proxy statements let alone a single years reporting, it appears impossible to build a
complete and accurate picture of the stock of options held by American CEOs.
This represents the main difference of this UK data to that available for US
companies. Namely the ability to identify separately each and every tranche of
options held by the director (where the UK company provides full information).
This richer UK data allows the implications of the differing reporting mechanisms
to he more closely investigated, an analysis of which is undertaken in Chapter
Five.
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3.6 Strengths And Weaknesses Of The Data
Although the data sample includes only 510 of approximately 1800
companies currently listed on the London Stock Exchange, it does represent over
97% of the UK stock market by market capitalisation and as such provides an
accurate picture of the current state of executive remuneration in the UK.
The main strength of the data set is the rich source of option material
collected. As explained above, it is vastly superior to that that could be
constructed in the US. It is of course, only through the increased disclosure levels
over recent years that such material has become available, as such, to the authors
knowledge the completed data set represents the most comprehensive collection of
option data currently available in the UK.
The structure of the data set also makes it a simple task to extend it to
cover additional companies, or more importantly successive reporting periods. As
the 1998 reporting season closes, information from new annual reports can easily
be added to the data set to build up an impressive panel of option and executive
compensation data.
Though comprehensive, the data set is not without it's weaknesses. Most
of these stem from the varying levels of disclosure observed across the sample
companies. Although the full disclosure of option data has vastly increased, many
companies (approximately 20% in the sample) still opt to give a weighted average
exercise price for the stock of options held at the year end. Companies that
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disclose option information in this way usually only report an exercise window for
the entire stock. That is, they give the first exercisable date as the date on which
any of the options held can be first exercised and the expiry date as the date the
very last option held expires. This means a precise valuation of the option stock is
still not possible for one fifth of the sample. The impact of this reporting
mechanism is explored in Chapter Five.
Even when companies do report information on individual tranches, some
fail to provide the full information necessary to accurately price the option. The
most common omission is the exact date the option expires, occasionally this is
missing completely but more commonly it is only specified approximately. This
creates the possibility of mispricing the option due to an error in estimating the
remaining life of the option. As previously stated, the convention used was to
assume an expiry date that is as early as possible but still consistent with the
information provided by the company. In this way option values will be typically
underestimated, since the value of an option is usually, but not necessarily, an
increasing function of time (see Section 2.4.1)
However, the error is not likely to be significant. Consider a typical in-the-
money option with a remaining life of 7 years, dividend yield of 3%, volatility of
30%, risk-free interest rate of 8%, an exercise price of £2 and an underlying share
price of £3. This option has a Black-Scholes value of 140.43 pence. Where the
expiry date is only given to the nearest month, there is potential to be a maximum
of one month out in the estimate of the remaining life of the option. That is, the
true remaining life of the option can be up to one month longer than that
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estimated. However, using a life of 7.08 years (7 years, 1 month) the value of the
above option would only increase to 140.59 pence.
When the expiry date is only given as a year, which occurred in less than
7% of the 1486 individual tranches valued, the time to maturity of the option is
potentially underestimated by up to twelve months. However, the value of the
above option still only rises to a maximum of 142.14 pence when the remaining
life of the option is set to 8 years. As such, the lack of exact dates in some
circumstances is unlikely to materially affect the results presented. Note, where
no information at all is provided on the expiry date, in order to produce an option
value, a remaining life of seven years is assumed for executive options and four
years for savings related options.
A another limitation of the data is the treatment of long term incentive
scheme holdings. Companies have only recently introduced such schemes and
there is considerable heterogeneity between companies, both in terms of schemes
adopted and the way in which they are reported. As such, only a very broad and
rather superficial analysis of incentive schemes is undertaken here, the main focus
of the data being the option holdings.
Finally, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries recently issued new
guidelines on the disclosure of pension benefits. The recommendations were only
incorporated into the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange in respect of
accounting periods ending on or after 1 July 1997. As such there has been a
distinct change in the way pension benefits have been reported over the last two
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years. Traditionally company pension contributions were included as part of a
directors total remuneration, however under the above guidelines they are now
treated separately and are excluded from that total.
The timing of this study covers this transition period and whilst the
majority of companies have excluded pension contributions from both the current
and previous years total remuneration, a number of companies, while providing a
current year total remuneration figure that excludes pension contributions (or more
precisely providing an inclusive total but with the level of pension contribution
explicitly stated and hence deductible), they provide a previous year total that
includes pension contributions. As a result the total of the previous years
remuneration (TOTPY) will marginally overstate the true figure. However, given
the size of pension contributions relative to salaries and bonus payouts and the
small number of firms in question, the difference is again not considered material.
This chapter has detailed the construction of a data set made possible only
because of the improved levels of disclosure observed since the publication of the
Greenbury report's recommendations in 1995. The following chapter examines
the nature and determinants of disclosure levels observed before such
recommendations were widely accepted.
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Chapter Four - The Disclosure of Directors' Share Option Information
4.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on the disclosure of directors' share options in
company reports in the period immediately surrounding the publication of the
Greenbury report. An important issue in the corporate governance literature has
been in placing a numerical value on directors' share options so that shareholders
and other stakeholders, are able to understand the total value of executive
compensation as well as the incentive structure faced by senior executives (see
Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995).
Although suitable methods for approximating the value of share options
exist (see Section 2.4.1), the relevant information necessary to do the calculation
was typically not available in company accounts (see Main, Bruce and Buck,
1996). Against this background, the Greenbury report (1995) argued for full and
complete information about all aspects of director share options to be disclosed in
company accounts. Forker (1992) presented a model that considered the decision
to disclose information about senior executive share options. This chapter
addresses the same problem in light of the Greenbury recommendations.
The objectives are twofold. Firstly to cast light on the state of share option
disclosure in a sample of UK companies at the time of the Greenbury report and
secondly, to model the decision to disclose share option information as a function
of the proprietary costs of disclosing that information (see Verrecchia, 1983).
Here, the accounting policy choice literature and the agency costs associated with
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revealing particular information inform the analysis (see Forker, 1992; Pierce-
Brown & Steele, 1999).
The results indicate a high degree of information disclosure about director
share options. This contrasts with earlier academic findings. The broad
econometric models indicate that the quality of information disclosed about share
options is a positive function of the presence of non-executive directors. This is
evidence in favour of the monitoring function of non-executives. Also, there is
evidence of a negative correlation between the quality of information disclosure
and corporate size. This is consistent with a class of models that suggest that
larger firms suffer propriety and political costs from information disclosure. For
example, political costs may include reductions in profits due to regulation,
adverse media reporting, or union rent seeking demands (see Pierce-Brown &
Steele, 1999).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2
considers the regulatory environment surrounding directors share options. Section
4.3 discusses the potential theoretical determinants of executive share option
disclosure. As noted in Chapter Three (Section 3.1.1) the data used in this chapter
is different from the main data set, hence Section 4.4 details the assembly of this
data sample and the estimation strategy. In Section 4.5 the results are presented
while finally, Section 4.6 offers some concluding remarks.
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4.2 Directors' Share Options. Institutional Context
The cost to shareholders of directors' share options stem from two main
sources. The first is the potential for equity dilution faced by incumbent
shareholders from new issues of shares (Clark and Main, 1997). There is indeed
evidence that many companies service executive share option schemes through the
issue of new shares (i.e. through subscription). The alternative method, not
resulting in equity dilution, is share purchase from the current pool of already
issued equity (i.e. through acquisition). Egginton, Forker and Grout (1993)
present evidence that shows that 79% of companies use the subscription method.
Clark and Main (1997 p. 65) comment: "Given that current accounting practice
does not require the expense of meeting executive share options through equity
dilution to be reported as a charge against earnings or even as a footnote in the
profit and loss account, the practice seems set to remain a common one".
The second cost is a need to value the share options received by directors
in order to fully understand organisational incentive systems (Conyon, Gregg and
Machin, 1995; Main, Bruce and Buck, 1996; Bruce and Buck, 1997). The
Companies Act 1985 required that the emoluments of the highest paid director and
chairman, where different, be reported' 1 . The contribution of the value of options
to overall remuneration is not a legal disclosure requirement although it clearly
impacts on the behaviour of management by altering mcentives' 2 . The valuation
of share options can be calculated (for instance using the Black - Scholes method)
if certain information requirements are met. However, as Main, Bruce and Buck
In addition, the total remuneration of the board is to be given and the numbers of directors within
certain specified pay bands.
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(1996) make clear, until 1995 this information had not been reported in sufficient
detail in company accounts.
Forker (1992), and Egginton, Forker and Grout (1993) discussed the
information requirements in order to appraise option schemes. Forker (1992)
remarked "the value of options when they are granted represents the biggest
component of the cost of options to shareholders". The valuation of the stock of
options held by a director requires information on the number of options (N), the
exercise prices (X), the remaining life of the options (T), the volatility of the
underlying share (o, the dividend yield (q) and risk-less rate of interest (r). While
the last three variables can be readily determined from general stock market
information, the first three can only be obtained from the company in question,
either through direct contact with the company, or through their annual
publications.
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) note that this information has always been
available from the Register of Directors' Interests, but collecting such information
from this source is extremely costly to the investigator. The only real alternative
source is from the information contained in the company accounts which was all
too often incomplete. Accordingly, their analysis of share options (using data
from the Register) focused on only 60 companies. The emphasis here however is
different since it considers not the actual content of the information disclosed, but
more the decision to reveal option information in the accounts (see Forker, 1992,
Pierce-Brown and Steele, 1999).
12 See chapters Five and Seven for more information on the incentive effects of options
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The disclosure of directors' emoluments is primarily governed by the
Companies Act (1985). In addition, information on share options must be given in
compliance with the Yellow Book Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange.
Reviews of this are provided in Clark and Main (1997). Moreover, the revelation
of information surrounding executive share options is influenced by the policy
statements of institutions such as the Association of British Insurers' 3 (ABI). The
Greenbury report (1995) recommended full and complete disclosure of share
option information in company accounts. This recommendation included a
requirement that companies detail the performance criteria to which options were
subject (see Section 3.3 for full requirements).
4.3 Modelling The Share Option Disclosure Decision
Verrecchia (1983) presented a discretionary disclosure model in which a
manager of a risky asset can exercise a choice in the disclosure of information.
Market participants / traders form rational expectations concerning the manager's
motivation. The information released by the manager then represents a signal of
the asset's fundamental value perturbed by noise. The manager chooses to release
the information contingent upon the effect of its release on the assets' market
price. The manager then, reveals or withholds information. If he reveals
information the value of the asset is reduced by some cost (the cost of information
disclosure). At the most basic level the cost is simply the cost of preparing and
disseminating information to market participants / traders.'4
13 See Chapter Seven for a further discussion on ABI guidelines
14 Other theoretical models of discretionary disclosure and accounting policy choice include:
Wagenhofer (1990) and Verrecchia (1990).
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However, Verrecchia (1983) invokes a wider notion of costs to include the
cost associated with disclosing information that is proprietary in nature and so can
be potentially damaging to the firm if disclosed. For instance, releasing
unfavourable financial information about a firm would incur a proprietary cost
(e.g. a bank may re-negotiate loan payments with terms that are unfavourable to
the company). However, the release of genuinely favourable accounting
information (such as increasing sales revenue or reduced costs of operations) may
also have adverse consequences for the firm's prospects. For instance, this may
take the form of rent seeking or opportunistic behaviour by trade unions 15 , or it
may serve to attract competitors into that market. The costs may also involve
adverse media comment. The UK privatised utilities can attract severe media
criticism if financial statistics are considered to be excessively favourable,
prompting calls for stricter regulatory control.
The significance of a proprietary cost is that if it is withheld, then market
traders are unsure whether it is withheld because (a) the news really is bad or (b)
that the news is good but not good enough to out-weigh the proprietary cost
associated with its release. The proprietary cost then, introduces noise into the
system by making the interpretation of the withholding of information ambiguous.
In short, non-disclosure of information can be associated with both 'good' and
'bad' news.
Verrecchia (1983) cites the case of the Chrysler Corporation which on announcing that the firm's
fortunes had improved prompted the United Auto Workers to accept fewer labour concessions.
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To move to an empirical framework it is important to identify accounting
and economic variables which co-vary with the (proprietary) costs of disclosure.
Pierce-Brown and Steele (1999) review the voluminous literature relating to
accounting policy choice. Also, Forker (1992) considers explicitly those factors
which affect the costs of disclosing share option information. A description of the
most relevant variables is detailed below.
4.3.1 Company Size
The size of a company is a potentially important predictor of information
disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1978) presented a model where organised
pressure groups within an economy, lobby for regulators to transfer rents from
large corporations to other parties. This may be thought of as rent seeking
behaviour by outside parties. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) hypothesise that
larger companies are more "politically visible". Accordingly, they will attract
greater costs associated with political or regulatory control. Forker (1992) argues
that firm size may proxy data collection costs and the threat of take-over. He
argues that the adverse impact of poor disclosure on share prices increases the
threat of take-over.
He contends that this effect is larger the lower is the market value of the
firm. The prediction is that if the costs of disclosure increase with the size of a
firm there will be a negative association between disclosure and company size.
Forker (1992), in an analysis of 182 listed companies in 1987/8, found that
company size is positively related to option disclosure. In a sub-sample of 85
small firms the predicted negative relation was observed but was not significant.
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4.3.2 Board Structure
UK boards comprise of non-executive and executive directors. An
important difference between them is their role and function on the board. Agency
models typically predict that non-executive directors act as agents for shareholders
by monitoring the executive management team. In the absence of this monitoring
function (or other countervailing mechanisms such as the threat of take-over) the
management team may have the opportunity as well as the incentive to behave
opportunistically. They may pursue their own interests at the expense of
shareholders (see Jensen, 1993). However, as noted by Nickell (1995) and Hart
(1995), it is not clear that non-executive directors have sufficient incentives to
fulfil their monitoring function effectively.
Non-executives typically have low financial stakes in the company; they
may be executive directors at other companies and so are time constrained; the
information they need to effectively evaluate the board may be derived from the
chief executive officer (CEO); and ultimately their job position may be owed to
the incumbent CEO. The combined effect of these considerations is to mitigate
against the effectiveness of outside director monitoring. Empirical evidence
relating to the effects of non-executive directors is reviewed by Conyon and Peck
(1998b).
The study of CEO turnover in the United States by Weisbach (1988) found
that CEOs were likely to be dismissed for poor corporate performance. Also, the
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likelihood of dismissal for poor performance was greater the higher the proportion
of non-executive (outside) directors there were on the board.'6
Forker (1992) argued that disclosure of option information is greater the
more non-executive directors are present. This is consistent with a positive
monitoring effect by non-executives to the extent that such information revelation
adds to shareholder interests and reduces opportunistic behaviour by the
management team. However, his empirical results indicate that the proportion of
non-executive directors is not in the predicted positive direction and is not
significant.
4.3.3 Debt Structure
Pierce-Brown and Steele (1999) discuss the impact of restrictive debt
covenants on the choice of accounting policy. They argue that the firm may
endeavour to assure its financiers / bank about its credit standing and reduce the
cost of servicing existing debt. This would imply that the company would choose
income increasing accounting policies that maximise reported profit and equity
and so reduced capital gearing. It has been suggested that debt holders, and banks
in particular, perform an important monitoring role for shareholders (see
Diamond, 1984).
Accordingly, debt can provide an important discipline function which may
constrain managerial discretion. High levels of capital gearing may promote
16 See also, the UK evidence on the CEO-performance-board structure relationship presented by
Cosh and Hughes (1997) and Conyon (1997b).
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management behaviour to pursue shareholder interests so as to avoid the increased
probability of default. If revealing information about share options is an
unfavourable signal of the firms prospects then proprietary costs are incurred.
Disclosing such adverse information is less likely in firms with high debt to equity
ratios. If, on the other hand, the revelation of such information acts as a
favourable signal of managerial effort then, ceteris paribus, proprietary costs are
reduced and a positive correlation may be expected between debt structure and
information disclosure.
4.3.4 Corporate Performance
Companies with good corporate performance may be less likely to reveal
information about their reward structures for senior executives for similar reasons
as those given for corporate size. If good corporate performance makes companies
politically visible then revealing option information may be useful to competitors
(they may try to emulate the reward strategy in an attempt to achieve similar
performance patterns at the expense of the original firm). Similarly, employees
may also value the options from the disclosed information. Since the firm has an
"ability to pay" afforded to it by good performance, employees may then engage in
rent seeking activity (see Verrecchia, 1983).
4.3.5 Business Risk
Pierce-Brown and Steele (1999) argue that the volatility of earnings is
believed to affect accounting policy choice. Specifically, more volatile companies
are more likely to employ techniques that smooth earnings. They find, despite
their prediction, that companies with higher betas are more likely to use creative
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accounting techniques. In this context, the implication is that companies with high
betas would be expected to be less likely to disclose option information.
4.3.6 Industry Effects
Finally, many authors have noted that there may be distinct industry effects
in accounting policy choices (see Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981, and Pierce-
Brown and Steele, 1999). In the case of option disclosure it seems clear that some
industries may be politically more visible than others. 	 For instance, the
consequences of the privatised utilities decision to reveal information about share
options may differ from firms operating in say the electrical engineering sector.
This analysis caters for these industry variations by incorporating industry specific
effects into the model.
4.4 Data Assembly And Model Estimation
The 350 companies used in this analysis represented the UK FTSE 100 and
FTSE Mid 250 companies in 1996. As highlighted in Section 3.1.1, this sample of
companies (excluding the investment trusts) is effectively a subset of the main
data sample, however, the data used here is from a different time period to that
used in the main data set The main source of data was the company annual
accounts for the years 1994 and 1995. The information on option disclosure
comes from inspection of the annual reports (see below). Other data on company
size, board structure, debt, corporate performance, risk, and industry effects comes
from Datastream. There is a potential maximum of 350 companies for 2 years
(700 cases). However, Datastream provides limited information on investment
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trusts and hence these were excluded from much of the analysis. Also, a number
of other companies were delisted during the period, for example, through take-
over. These effects reduced the sample to 550 cases in the typical regression
reported below.
4.4.1 The Econometric Model
The following Probit model is estimated where 	 is the standard
cumulative normal with zero mean and unit variance:
Pr(y^0Ix1 3)=(xí3)	 (4.1)
The term x113 is the probit score, where x contains forcing variables and 13 is the
population vector to be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The term y is
an indicator variable relating to the disclosure of option information (see below).
A zero (0) indicates a negative outcome or failure, whereas as a one (1), represents
a positive outcome or success. Firms are denoted over i. Specifically, the x
matrix contains proxies for company size, board structure, debt structure,
corporate performance, risk, and industry effects as defined below.
The indicator variable y can be defined in a number of ways to indicate
success in option disclosure. The strategy is to estimate j separate probit equations
(j = 1 - 7) representing different levels of disclosure quality (see Forker, 1992).
Separate regressions are performed to allow unrestricted estimation of 13•17
' Since x1 has a normal distribution, then interpreting the probit coefficients means dealing in the
Z metric. Accordingly, marginal effects rather than the coefficient estimates are reported. The
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The LHS variables
The quality of share option disclosure in annual accounts was classified
according to the degree of information given about the number of share options
(N), the exercise prices (X) and the vesting period (T). These classifications
accord with Forker (1992) and can potentially provide sufficient information to
value options as one moves from N to X to T. In addition, disclosure quality is
also classified according to whether information was provided about the
performance criteria to which options were subject (P).
Clearly, the quality of disclosure can vary according to N, X, T and P. For
example, it may be that information on exercise prices is only given for some of
the executive options. A finer classification would be that exercise prices are
given on all share options. In the event, there was, in fact, very little variation in
N and accordingly this could not be satisfactorily modelled. Therefore, the
following LHS indicator variables are defined.
. LHS variables relating to X:
. Y1 = 1 if exercise prices are given for all options; 0
otherwise
• Y2 = 1 if exercise prices are given for some options; 0
otherwise
• LHS variables relating to T:
• Y3 = 1 if earliest exercise date is given for all options; 0
otherwise
transformation makes it possible to specify a change in the probability resulting from an
infinitesimal change in a component of x.
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• Y4 = 1 if earliest exercise date is given for some options;
o otherwise
• Y5
 = 1 if expiry date is given for all options; 0 otherwise
•	 = 1 if expiry date is given for some options; 0
otherwise
LHS variable relating to P:
• Y7 1 if the options are reported to be subject to some
performance criteria; 0 otherwise
The RHS variables
The above discussion highlighted a number of economic and accounting
variables which can potentially explain the cross sectional variation in the
disclosure of directors' share option information. The following variables are thus
selected with the Datastream item number or datatype shown in brackets:
• Size: The log of the market value of the enterprise in 1995 (MV).
• Board structure: The number of non-executive directors (243)
and the total number of directors (242).
• Debt structure: The debt to equity ratio of the company (733).
• Corporate performance: Measured as return on capital employed
(707).
• Risk: Represented by beta, the systematic risk of the company's
ordinary shares (BETA).
• Industry effects: A set of indicator variables allocating companies
to their FUSE industry group.
To filter out any idiosyncratic time fluctuations in the right hand side
variables averages were taken over a number of years. Accordingly, the means of
Datastream items 242, 243, 733, and 707 between 1990 and 1995 were evaluated.
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4.5 Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1. These are provided for
the complete sample. The pattern that emerges is generally one of a high degree
of option disclosure. Some 83% of the companies in the sample disclose exercise
prices for all options (Y 1 ), with 93% reporting exercise prices for at least some of
the share options (Y2).
LHS Variable	 Mean
Y i (All exercise prices) 	 0.8307
Y2 (Some exercise prices)	 0.9334
Y3 (All earliest exercise dates) 	 0.69 18
Y4 (Some earliest exercise dates) 	 0.8379
Ys (All expiry dates)	 0.6946
Y6 (Some expiry dates)	 0.8480
Y7 (Performance criteria)	 0.3140
Number of observations 691
Table 4.1: Analysis Of Share Option Disclosure
Information on the vesting period is slightly less well reported. Only 69%
of companies gave the earliest exercise date for all options, whereas 83% give
details for at least some of the options. An almost identical pattern is observed for
the disclosure regarding the expiry date with 69% of companies revealing all
expiry dates and 84% providing information on at least some of the expiry dates.
Finally, the Greenbury report urged that companies disclose information about the
performance criteria to which options were subject. The data indicates that only
31% of these companies gave information indicating that the options had any
performance criteria attached to them which had to be satisfied before the options
could be exercised.
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The results can be contrasted with those in Egginton, Forker and Grout
(1993) which relate to the disclosure of option information in the top 100 and
bottom 100 listed companies in the times 1000 for the account year 1988 / 89.
They found that about 73% of the top 100 companies reported minimum data on
the number of share options in issue for directors (in this data set the figure is
98%). Furthermore, they document that only 5% of companies in the top 100
detail complete information on N, X and T (i.e. number of shares, the exercise
price and the vesting period). For all participants here, the figure is 40%.
Variable	 Observations	 Mean	 Standard
deviations
Market value	 662	 2003.22	 3597.17
662
588
584
588
570
log (market value)
Number of directors
Number of non-executives
Borrowing ratio
Return on capital employed
6. 84754
10.2377
4.59282
0.77752
22.23 15
1. 10534
3. 135 13
2.25678
2.2827 1
35.5592
Beta	 652	 0.95247	 0.22237
Table 4.2: Analysis O Right Ran1 Ss Vnh
The means and standard deviations of the right hand side variables are
provided in Table 4.2. The mean company market value is £2003m. The mean
size of the board of directors is 10 individuals with an average of just under 5 non-
executive directors representing an approximate 50% mix between inside and
outside directors. The mean debt to equity ratio is 0.77 and the average return on
capital employed is 22%. Finally, the mean estimate of beta (risk) is 0.95.
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Number of directors (total)
Number of non-executives
Borrowing ratio
Return on capital employed
-0.02992
(0.0 1028)
0.05659
(0.01383)
-0.00378
(0.00555)
-0.00045
(0.00045)
-0.0 1641
(0.00664)
0.02342
(0.00998)
0.00901
(0.00423)
-0.00060
(0.00030)
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The econometric results are contained in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Table 4.3
relates to the determinants of exercise price disclosure (X), Table 4.4 to the
vesting period (T) and Table 4.5 to the performance criteria (P). The primary
results from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are easy to summarise. First, after controlling for
corporate governance, debt, company performance and risk considerations, there is
a negative and statistically significant relationship between information disclosure
about share options and log market value. This appears valid for most of the
regressions.
LHS variable = Y i	LHS variable = Y2
(All exercise prices)	 (Some exercise prices)
Log (Market value)	 -0.04819	 -0.01985
(0.01987)	 (0.01425)
Beta	 0.25858	 -0.11014
(0.09074)	 (0.06233)
Industry effects	 Yes	 Yes
Time effects	 Yes	 Yes
Observations	 514	 353
99.40	 70.37
PseudoR2	0.1859	 0.2616
Observed P	 0.8132	 0.8810
Predicted P (at mean x)
	
0.8602	 0.947 1
White (1980) standard errors reported in parentheses
Table 4.3: Determinants Of Disclosure Of Exercise Prices
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This is consistent with the hypotheses that large firms are less likely,
ceteris paribus, to reveal information about share options due to proprietary costs.
Revealing information about share options may impose proprietary costs on the
company in the form of adverse media attention, provide valuable information to
competitors about organisational reward strategies, or generate greater potential to
attract regulatory or rent redistribution activities.
LHS variable LHS variable LHS variable LHS variable
(All earliest	 (Some earliest	 (All expiry	 (Some expiry
	
exercise dates) exercise dates)
	 dates)	 dates)
Log (Market	 -0.08456	 -0.05480	 -0.06727	 -0.01566
value)	 (0.02737)	 (0.02053)	 (0.02667)	 (0.01874)
Number of
directors (total)
Number of non-
executives
Borrowing ratio
Return on capital
employed
-0.05564
(0.0 1475)
0.06066
(0.01938)
-0.03 141
(0.01496)
-0.00114
(0.00075)
-0.0 1680
(0.01038)
0.03689
(0.0 1418)
0.00560
(0.00610)
-0.00083
(0.00055)
-0.06775
(0.01482)
0.07075
(0.0195 1)
-0.037 12
(0.01880)
-0.00106
(0.00073)
-0.03928
(0.00984)
0.04 13 1
(0.0 1298)
0.00359
(0.00537)
-0.00027
(0.00038)
Beta	 0.02473	 -0.09670	 0.07668	 -0. 13999
(0.12528)	 (0.09966)	 (0.12543)	 (0.08363)
Industry effects
	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Time effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Observations	 526	 506	 526	 502
136.58	 100.54	 131.30	 107.51
PseudoR2	0.2283	 0.2141	 0.2178	 0.2221
Observed P	 0.6673	 0.8024	 0.6711	 0.8127
Predicted P (at
	
0.7113	 0.8549	 0.7 163	 0.8738
mean x)
White (1980) standard errors reported in parentheses
Table 4.4: Determinants Of Disclosure Of Vesting Period
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In the case of Y2
 and Y6 the relationship is negative and not significant.
All models report marginal effects. Focusing on the decision to disclose exercise
prices for all options (Y 1 ), the results indicate that a small increase in company
size decreases the likelihood of disclosure by approximately ½%. Inspection of
the log market value variable in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicates a broadly similar
quantitative effect.
The results reported here contrast with those in Forker (1992). Whilst a
negative correlation between option disclosure and company size was predicted, it
was only established in a sub-sample of firms and was not significant. Pierce-
Brown and Steele (1999 p. 11), however, report that larger companies, who face
greater political costs, are more likely to use creative accounting techniques.
The corporate governance variables in the analysis, too, turn out to play an
important role in shaping the option disclosure choice. The main attention is
reserved for the impact of non-executive directors on disclosure. Generally, after
controlling for company characteristics and industry fixed effects, this variable
exhibits a significantly positive relationship with option information disclosure.
For example, in Table 4.3 column 1, a small increase in the number of non-
executives on the main board is associated with a 0.0566% increase in the
likelihood of disclosing exercise price information for all share options. This
result is consistent with the monitoring function of non-executive directors (see
Weisbach, 1988 and Conyon, 1997a).
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In contrast, the impact of increasing the total number of directors on the
main board decreases the likelihood of disclosure (by about 0.0299% in most
regressions). This may be because increasing the number of directors increases
the proprietary costs of disclosure (e.g. greater political visibility etc.). As such it
functions in a similar way to the corporate size variable and so the results appear
coherent. The effect of corporate governance contrasts with the findings made by
Forker (1992). He found that the proportion of non-executives had an
(unexpected) negative effect on disclosure (although the result was not generally
significant).
The effect of the debt variable is generally (but not always) negative. The
effect of the borrowing ratio variable is less well determined than those variables
reported above. The result is consistent with increased proprietary costs (such as
increased likelihood of bank re-negotiation of loan terms) in high leveraged firms.
The performance variable (the return on capital employed) attracts a negative sign
in the disclosure regressions. This is consistent with increased political visibility
and hence lower disclosure. Finally, the risk variable is not well determined. It is
only sometimes significant and alternates sign. This is not consistent with the
priors since one would expect less disclosure about options in high beta
companies.
Table 4.5 considers explicitly the determinants of the disclosure of the
performance criteria that options are subject to, typically this is growth in earnings
per share or total shareholder return. Column 1 contains the size variable as a
level, whereas column 2 introduces non-linearities by including the square of the
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Log (Market value) squared
Number of directors (total)
Number of non-executives
Bonowing ratio
Return on capital employed
-0.08377
(0.0 19 13)
0.03717
(0.0153 1)
-0.04775
(0.0193 8)
0.0 1192
(0.00983)
0.00001
(0.00065)
0.02922
(0.01535)
-0.04122
(0.01976)
0.00142
(0.01077)
-0.00010
(0.00066)
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company size variable. The results in column 1 indicate that although there is a
negative relationship between option performance criteria disclosure and company
size the result is not significant.
LHS variable = Y7	LHS variable = Y7
(Performance criteria)	 (Performance criteria)
Log (Market value) 	 -0.01963	 1.17860
(0.02814)	 (0.27321)
Beta	 -0.01667	 -0.08 157
(0. 1278 1)	 (0.12706)
Industry effects 	 Yes	 Yes
Time effect	 Yes	 Yes
Observations	 538	 538
66.70	 89.86
PseudoR2	0.1012	 0.1285
Observed P	 0.36 80	 0.3680
Predicted P (at mean x)	 0.3545	 0.3493
White (1980) standard errors reported in parentheses
Table 4.5: Determinants Of Disclosure Of Option Performance Criteria
The model in column 2 fits a concave relationship between disclosure and
size. The results indicate a positive (significant) relationship between disclosure
and size at low levels of company size. This may be a credibility effect where
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disclosing the option performance criteria adds to firm value and is not
outweighed by propriety costs. Beyond a local maximum, these benefits are
outweighed by the costs and a significantly (negative) association is found. The
concave correlation between accounting policy choice and company size has
recently been considered by Pierce-Brown and Steele (1999).
Finally, it is worth commenting on the robustness of the findings. All
models report standard errors that have a stationary covariance matrix. This
adjustment was made using the White (1980) method. Also, the industry effects
were always found to be important. For example, Table 4.5 (column 2) estimated
the unconstrained model which includes industry specific effects. The constrained
model (omitting these industry variables) was then also estimated.
The resulting Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 18 yielded a test statistic of 56.07
distributed as z2 (32). Clearly, industry effects are important, and the LR test
rejects the null of non-inclusion of the industry effects. This implies that there are
significant industry differences in the disclosure of option information. Overall,
the model diagnostics are satisfactory. The 2 statistics for variable inclusion are
always good, and the pseudo R 2 are within an acceptable range across all the
models.
18 Suppose that L0 and L 1 are the likelihood values from the unconstrained and constrained models
respectively. Then the LR statistic is calculated as = - L0) with d0 - d 1 degrees of freedom.
The terms d0 and d 1 are the model degrees of freedom.
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4.6 Concluding Comments
This chapter has considered the information disclosed about directors'
share options in a sample of UK companies in 1994 and 1995. The results add to
the recent UK corporate governance literature (see Keasey, Thompson and Wright,
1997). The objectives were first to cast light on the state of share option
disclosure in a sample of UK companies and second to model the decision to
disclose share option information as a function of the proprietary costs of
disclosing that information (see Verrecchia, 1983).
The main results indicate a high degree of information disclosure -about
director share options. Many firms now report sufficient information to value
options (a matter dealt with in the subsequent chapters of this thesis). The current
disclosure position contrasts with earlier academic findings (e.g. Forker, 1992).
The main econometric models indicate two substantive results. First, information
disclosed about share options is a positive function of the presence of non-
executive directors. This is evidence in favour of the monitoring function of non-
executives and adds to the growing evidence concerning the effects of board
structure on firm performance.
Secondly, a negative correlation between option information disclosed and
corporate size is isolated. This is consistent with a class of models that suggest
that larger firms suffer propriety and political costs from information disclosure.
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This chapter has considered the level of disclosure of share option
information in a sample of companies in 1994/5. The subsequent annexing of the
Greenbury recommendations to the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange,
dramatically increased this level of disclosure and made it possible for the first
time to accurately analysis and value the stock of share options held by UK
corporate executives. The following chapter considers these issues, specifically
the value and incentive effects of options and impact of varying disclosure
mechanisms.
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5.1 Introduction
An important mechanism by which incentives are provided for executives
is through their holding of share based compensation such as share options,
ordinary equity, restricted stock or other such awards under long term incentive
plans (LTIPs). Researchers using US data, including Murphy (1999) and Hall &
Liebman (1998), have demonstrated that these elements of executive
compensation are the dominant factors in driving the level of executive
compensation and the pay-performance sensitivities in recent US corporate
history.
In contrast, the provision of share options in the United Kingdom, and their
contribution towards total annual compensation and executive incentives, is much
less well understood. In part, this is explained by the historically poor disclosure
requirements in the UK, highlighted in Chapter Four, whereby the necessary
information to evaluate the overall compensation package was simply not
available. This is no longer the case. With the publication and subsequent
implementation of the Greenbury report (1995), and latterly the Hampel
committee report (1998), there now exists sufficient information in annual reports
to begin the task of interrogating the design of British CEO compensation
contracts.
This chapter makes use of the fact that, as detailed in Chapter Three, the
majority of large UK quoted companies provide considerable information on the
share options held by executives. Indeed, for these companies the amount of
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information disclosed about the entire stock of share options (as opposed to simply
the current grant of options) is usually greater than the information currently
supplied to researchers using US data. This level of UK information disclosure
allows a number of innovative contributions to be made to the executive
compensation literature.
Firstly, for the main data sample of 510 CEOs at UK quoted companies in
the fiscal year 1997/8, the total value of compensation is determined using the
adjusted Black-Scholes pricing formula to value awards of share option. For each
CEO, the incentives arising from the entire stock of share options is then
calculated. CEO incentives from holding options are calculated as the slope of the
Black-Scholes function (the option delta) multiplied by the fraction of total
outstanding options on common equity expressed as a percentage. This is a
measure of how CEO option wealth varies for given changes in shareholder
wealth1 9•
Secondly, how the amount of information available regarding the inputs to
the Black-Scholes function affects the valuation of executive pay and the
calculation of the pay-performance term is considered. In the case of the United
States, complete information is given on the current grant of options, but for prior
grants, US companies only provide data on (1) the total number of options held,
and (2) the total intrinsic value of the unexercised options. Even in the UK,
companies can opt to provide a more concise form of disclosure whereby they
19 This approach to measuring executive incentives has been used by Jensen and Murphy (1990b),
Yermack (1995), Murphy (1999) and Conyon and Murphy (1999).
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supply only the total number of outstanding options, the weighted average exercise
price and the expiration date of the longest dated option.
However, where UK firms do provide full information, this richer UK
data, which contains input information on both past and current grants, makes it
possible to test whether there are any differences in the valuation of executive's
share options and the pay-performance sensitivities, arising from the different
disclosure methodologies. This can be done by imposing on the full information
UK share option data the disclosure conditions that pertain to US companies and
the UK firms opting for concise disclosure. It then becomes possible to identify
any distortions that arise from the lack of complete information about the stock of
options held by executives.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly
recaps the method of valuing share options and deriving the pay-performance
incentives from them. Section 5.3 describes the varying disclosure requirements
in the UK and the US and the sources of the UK compensation data. In Section
5.4 empirical results are presented that show the effect of the different disclosure
requirements on option valuation and pay-performance. Finally, Section 5.5 offers
some concluding remarks.
5.2 The Provision Of Share Based Compensation
Prior to examining how different information disclosure levels impact on
option valuations and incentives it is worth recapping the option valuation method
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and how executive incentives that arise from share options are calculated.
5.2.1 Share Option Valuation
As described in Chapter Two the Black-Scholes pricing formula has
become the generally accepted option pricing model and is used extensively by
academics and practitioners alike. Unsurprisingly then it has become standard
practice in the executive compensation literature to estimate the value of executive
options using this formula, adjusted for continuously paid dividends. This
convention is used here. The standard Black-Scholes equation (5.1) calculates the
value (c) of a single European style call option:
c = SeIT N(d 1 ) - XeTN(d2)	 (5.1)
where
d 1 = { ln(S/X) + (r-q + t32/2)(T) } / {aTa I
d2 = { ln(S/X) + (r-q - 2/2)(T) } / {c T"2
 }
The six inputs to the function are described in detail in Chapter Two
(Section 2.4) but for completeness they are, the share price (S), the exercise or
strike price (X), the time to maturity (T), the dividend yield (q), the risk free rate
of interest (r) and the standard deviation of returns on the share (cr). N(.) is the
cumulative probability distribution function for a standardised normal variable.
The terms S, q, r, and are all common to the firm whereas the inputs X and
T vary within the company across different option tranches. Since executives can
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hold many tranches of options, to accurately value the stock of share options held,
each tranche needs to be valued separately and the sum taken. Note however, that
to calculate the total annual pay for the fiscal year 1997/8 in the initial analysis
below, it is only necessary to value the current grant of options.
There are potential drawbacks to using the Black-Scholes formula in
calculating the value of an executive share option. These were discussed in
Chapter Two but to recap the main causes for concern are as follows. The Black-
Scholes value is, at best, a measure of the company's cost of granting the option
and will typically overstate the value to the risk averse executive recipient. Also,
executive share options are typically subject to forfeiture if the executive leaves
the firm prior to vesting; this probability of forfeiture reduces the value of the
option and thus implies that the Black-Scholes formula will again overstate the
option's value.
Furthermore, the Black-Scholes formula determines the value of a European
call which assumes that the option can only be exercised at the expiration date.
Executive options however, can usually be exercised at any time in the options'
life after an initial holding period has elapsed (usually three years). In this respect
executive options more closely resemble American style options and as such the
Black-Scholes formula would under value them. However, to some degree this
latter effect is negated because executives tend to exercise options well before it is
rational to do so which reduces the option value. Finally, UK executive options
increasingly have performance conditions attached to them whereby the holder is
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prevented from exercising the option if certain performance targets have not been
met. This probability of forfeiture again reduces the value of the option and
implies the Black-Scholes formula overstates the option's worth to the executive.
These issues question whether the Black-Scholes formula is wholly
appropriate in valuing executive options. Almost all the bias however is in an
upward direction and as such, the Black-Scholes values can be regarded as an
upper bound on the value a director would place on an executive option. The most
significant of the above issues is almost certainly the concept of CEO risk aversion
and this topic is discussed more fully in Chapter Seven. However, as stated above
it has become the accepted model in the compensation literature and is therefore
used here.
5.2.2 Executive Incentives and Shareholder Wealth
The executive compensation literature treats CEO incentives as the change
in executive rewards brought about by a change in company performance. In this
context, it is customary to measure company performance as changes in
shareholder wealth. Executive holdings of any form of equity based asset
provides a direct linkage between executive and shareholder wealth. The
aggregate executive incentives arising from all forms of equity claims can be
evaluated by considering each type separately and then summing across the
various elements (see Conyon & Murphy, 1999). This chapter initially considers
the incentives arising from all holdings of equity based assets, but then focuses on
the incentives derived from holding options.
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Incentives arising from ordinary equity are measured as the percentage of
ordinary equity held by the executive. If a CEO holds 5% of the common equity
and shareholder wealth increases by £100, then the CEO receives £5 of that
increase. This 5% is the "sharing rate" or "effective ownership" arising from a
change in shareholder wealth that is translated into executive equity wealth.
Calculating the sharing rate I effective ownership is slightly different for
share options. It is not simply the percentage of outstanding options on common
equity since it is important to recognise that the change in the value of the share
option is not one-for-one with the change in the share price as is clear from the
Black-Scholes pricing formula
As reported in Chapter Two (Section 2.4.3), the change in the value of the
option, resulting purely from a (small) change in the price of the underlying asset
is termed the delta of the option (ö). It is equal to the derivative of the Black
Scholes call option value with respect to share price. For a European call on a
share paying dividends the delta is given as: = e' N(d 1 ). The option delta
varies between zero and one. Deep in the money options (that is where the share
price is way in excess of the exercise price) have deltas that are close to unity
whereas deep out of the money have deltas close to zero. Consequently, CEOs
who only hold deep out of the money options will, independent of the fraction of
options on outstanding equity held, have low pay-performance sensitivities.
Again, since CEOs hold many tranches of options it is necessary to calculate a
pay-performance I sharing rate term for each tranche separately and sum to get the
total pay-performance sensitivity. Alternatively, this can be thought of as the
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product of the share weighted option delta and the ratio of outstanding options on
common equity expressed as a percentage.
5.3 Executive Compensation Disclosure
The precise disclosure requirements for UK companies are explained in
detail in Chapter Three, Section 3.3. A summary however is provided below.
5.3.1 UK Share Option Disclosure
Current compensation disclosure requirements for directors are contained
in the Greenbury (1995) report. In turn, the Greenbury rules are predicated on the
expert opinion of the UK's Accounting Standards Board. The Accounting
Standards Board's Urgent Issue Task Force (UITF) concluded in 1994 that it is not
practicable or viable to specify a standard method for valuing share options.
Instead full details of each individual director's entitlement are required in
accordance with UTTF Abstract 10 and its successors. The resulting information
disclosure requirements for companies were given on page 67.
To provide an accurate Black-Scholes valuation of the complete stock of
options held by the CEO, information on the time to maturity, the exercise price
and the number of options is required for each and every tranche held. Companies
that reveal information allowing this to be done are said to be providing full or
complete information.
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However, as noted in Chapter Three, the Greenbury (1995) report made
provision for less than complete share option information disclosure in certain
circumstances, and allowed companies to opt for a more concise form of
disclosure. In short, this requires companies to provide (1) the total number of
share options held, (2) the weighted average exercise price for the stock of
unexercised options held and (3) the maturity date of the longest dated
unexercised option. This concise form of disclosure thus creates the potential
for a difference to arise between the 'true' value of the stock of options and the
associated pay performance sensitivity, and those calculated under concise
disclosure conditions. One aim of this chapter is thus to determine the magnitude
and significance of such differences.
5.3.2 US Share Option Disclosure
The current disclosure requirements for US companies as defined by the
SEC, are set out in detail in Chapter Three (Section 3.5). In short though, US have
certain discretion in how they present executive option information. With regard
to the current grant of options, companies can either assume that the company
share price rises by 5% and 10% per annum over the life of the option and report
the two payoffs that would occur at the date the option expires. Alternatively, they
can report a figure based on the Black-Scholes valuation of the option.
With regard to the stock of options held by directors at the financial year
end companies are required to report the total number of unexercised options held
by the director at the year end, split between those that are currently exercisable
and those that, at the year end date, remain unexercisable. In addition, again
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splitting the options into these two categories, they must report the end of year
intrinsic value of the stock of options, calculated as the aggregate value of the
difference between the exercise price and the year end stock price. Because of this
valuation method, only options that are in the money are considered in
determining the year end value of the option stock.
These reporting guidelines mean that is virtually impossible to gather full
information for all the individual tranches of options held by US directors, even by
tracking option holdings through successive proxy statements (see Hall and
Liebman, 1998). The limited data on exercised options supplied by US companies
always necessitates a number of assumptions to be made about which options have
been exercised resulting in errors in the estimates of the final stock of options held
In order to calculate the Black-Scholes option values from the US data,
two variables must be determined. The exercise price and a time to maturity.
Because no data at all is supplied on the latter variable, the assumption that all
unexercised options have a remaining life of 7 years is generally made (e.g.
Conyon & Murphy, 1999; Murphy, 1999). The exercise price can be estimated
from the intrinsic value of the stock of options supplied. This intrinsic value is
given by N times Max{(S-X),O}, where N is the number of options held, S is the
year end share price and X the average exercise price. Since S and N are known
and the intrinsic value, (Value) is supplied, the average exercise price of the
unexercised options held at the year end can be calculated as;
X = S - Value/N
	 (5.2)
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5.3.3 Data Collection
The UK data used in this chapter is comprehensively described in Chapter
Three. To briefly recap however, the sample consists of 510 of the largest UK
companies by market capitalisation for the fiscal year 1997/8. These companies
account for almost all (97%) of the market capitalisation of the entire UK stock
market. For each company a CEO or equivalent most senior executive officer was
identified and detailed information on their equity and option holdings collected.
This made it possible to calculate the fraction of company equity owned by the
CEO and the explicit pay-performance sensitivity derived from equity and option
holdings.
5.4 Empirical Results
Table 5.1 provides details of compensation received by UK CEOs.
Aggregate figures and those by company size bands are provided. Total cash pay
is equal to the sum of salaries, realised short term bonuses, benefits and other cash
compensation. Total annual pay represents total cash pay plus the grant-date value
of share options and grant date value of any awards under LTIPs, the latter being
discounted by 20% for performance contingencies.
Total annual pay for all companies has a mean (median) of £588,000
(E414,000). It is also positively correlated with firm size, median pay in
companies with sales less than £250 million is £286,000 and is £811,000 for
companies with sales in excess of £1,500 million. A qualitatively similar picture
is observed for the total cash pay figure. Median cash pay in companies with sales
128
£340510
£235
£287
£386
£558
182
89
116
123
£588	 £414	 £413
£434	 £286	 £294
£419	 £345	 £338
£602	 £505	 £430
£925	 £811	 £629
All Companies
By Fir,n Sales (iii)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
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less than £250 million is £235 and is £558 in companies with sales in excess of
£1,500 million. Median total cash pay represents 82% of total annual pay for all
companies. The percentage of total annual pay accounted for by total cash
remuneration falls as companies get larger. For companies with sales less than
£250 million median cash pay as a percentage of total annual pay is 82% but for
companies with sales in excess of £1,500 million it is only 69%. This implies
larger firms are utilising option grants to a greater extent than the smaller firms.
Number of
	
Total Annual Pay	 Total Cash Pay
Companies	 (000)	 (i000)
Average	 Median	 Average	 Median
Note:	 Sales for financial firms defined as net interest income (banks)
and tota' income (insurance companies).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics On CEO Pay By Company Size
Average and median shareholdings for UK CEOs (expressed as a percentage
of outstanding shares) are presented in Table 5.2. These show that the mean stock
ownership is 2.13% and the median is 0.05%. This implies that at the mean
(median), the CEO receives 2.1% (0.05%) of any given increase in shareholder
wealth through the increase in the value of their equity holding. CEO equity
ownership is negatively conelated with firm size. Companies with sales of less
than £250 million have mean (median) stock ownership of 4.1% (0.47%) whereas
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companies with sales in excess of £1,500 million have mean (median) stock
ownership of just 0.21% (0.01%). Thus firm size is undoubtedly a prime driver in
the determination of the pay performance statistic.
Number of
Companies
Share Holdings
(Effective
Ownership %)
Option Holdings
(Effective
Ownership %)
Long Term
Incentive
Holdings
(Effective
Ownership %)
Total Pay to
Performance
Sensitivity
(Effective
Ownership %)
Average Median Average Median Average Median	 Average Median
All Companies	 510	 2.13% 0.05%	 0.18% 0.06%	 0.02% 0.00%	 2.34% 0.25%
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 182
	
£250 to £500	 89
	
£500to1,500	 116
	
Above £1,500	 123
4.07% 0.47%
2.62% 0.14%
0.76% 0.02%
0.21% 0.01%
0.29% 0.16%
0.17% 0.09%
0.12% 0.07%
0.07% 0.02%
0.02% 0.00%
0.03% 0.00%
0.03% 0.00%
0.02% 0.00%
4.38% 0.94%
2.82% 0.36%
0.91% 0.16%
0.31% 0.05%
Note:	 Revenues for financial firms defined as net interest income (banks) and total income (insurance
companies).
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics On CEO Share Stakes By Company Size
As illustrated above, holdings of uneKeccised thare pthns &
direct link between CEO and shareholder wealth, because the value of the options
held increases with increases in the stock price. Table 5.2 shows that the average
UK CEO would receive 0.18% of any increase in shareholder wealth through the
increase in the value of their options (median 0.06%). Again, CEO share option
ownership is negatively correlated with firm size. Companies with sales of less
than £250 million have mean (median) stock ownership of 0.29% (0.16%)
whereas companies with sales in excess of £1,500 million have mean (median)
stock ownership of 0.07% (0.02%).
130
Chapter Five - Option incentives & Reportin .g Style
The recent introduction of new long term incentive schemes also provides
additional effective ownership stakes, although as Table 5.2 shows they are
currently not very widespread in this data set, with the median equal to zero across
all sales bands, however they are included here for completeness.
The final column of Table 5.2 shows the total pay-performance sensitivity.
At the mean this is 2.34% and dominated by the CEO equity stake which
represents 91.3% of the sensitivity. However, as company size increases, option
holdings become an increasingly significant proportion. For companies with sales
under £250 million, option holdings represent 6.7% of the total pay-performance
whereas for companies with sales in excess of £1,500 million, option holdings
represent 24.0% of the total pay-performance.
Having provided summary statistics for the complete data set, the
implications of the US and concise UK styles of disclosure are now considered.
Before formal results for this analysis are presented for the full data set however, a
worked case example is provided to illustrate the methodology.
5.4.1 Worked Case Example
The results that follow demonstrate how for two companies, the estimates
of the pay-performance sensitivity and the value of the stock of options are
dependent on the underlying level of disclosure. Table 5.3a below provides the
company specific variables for the two example companies, Headlam Plc and
GWR Plc. These two companies are typical of those providing full information
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and represent one from each of the two sub-divisions used later in this chapter,
namely holders of only in the money options (Headlam Plc) and holders of at least
some out of the money options (GWR Plc).
Company	 Share	 Dividend Risk-free Volatility Number of Shares
Price	 Yield	 Rate	 Outstanding
Headlam Plc	 353.5p	 2.36%	 7.34%	 20.9%	 68,046,894
GWR Plc
	 l78.5p	 1.57%	 7.25%	 30.6%	 109,043,880
Table 5.3a: Company Specific Variables
Each of the CEOs at these two companies have three tranches of options
outstanding, the details of which are provided in Table 5.3b which also shows the
individual option values and option deltas which can be calculated under full
information disclosure.
Company	 Tranche Exercise Time to	 Call	 Call	 Number
Price	 Maturity	 Value	 Delta	 of options
_____________ _________ (pence) 	 (years)	 (pence)
Headlam Plc	 1	 132.80	 7.59	 219.82	 0.8328	 40438
2	 138.90	 3.33	 218.12	 0.9235	 12420
3	 311.50	 6.38	 123.16	 0.7451	 117000
GWR Plc	 1	 46.76	 4.84	 132.61	 0.9238	 325046
2	 135.00	 3.26	 71.11	 0.8245	 12789
3	 212.00	 5.03	 51.27	 0.6415	 1000000
Table 5.3b: Option Tranche Details For Headlam And GWR
From Table 5.3b the total value of options held and the option pay-
performance sensitivity (PPS) can be calculated. The total option value is simply
the sum over the three tranches of options of the product of the call value and the
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	£165,043	 £433,779
169858	 1337835
l46.O8p
7
	
7
152.74p
0.7902	 0.7824
	
£259,448	 £1,126,264
0.1973	 0.9599
169858	 1337835
256.34	 171.12
7.59
	
5.03
155.15	 65.16
0.7808	 0.7336
£263,527	 £871,791
0.1949	 0.9000
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number of options. The full option PPS is similarly the sum over the three
tranches of options of the product of the call delta and the number of options,
divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the company (multiplied by
100 for a percentage). That is, the full option PPS is defined as;
PPs=	 xl00%
M
where E is the delta of options in tranche i, N number of options held in
that tranche and M the total number of issued company shares. The values for the
full PPS are given in the first two rows of Table 5.3c
Headlam Plc	 GWR Plc
UK Full Information
Total Option Value
Option PPS
US Restricted Information
Total Intrinsic Value
Total Number of Options
Average Exercise Price
Time to Maturity
Individual Option Price
Individual Option Delta
Total Option Value
Option PPS
UK Restricted Information
Total Number of Options
Average Exercise Price
Maximum Time to Maturity
Individual Option Price
Individual Option Delta
Total Option Value
Option PPS
£260,072
	
£952,878
0.1944	 0.8733
Table 5.3c: PPS And Option Values For Headlam Plc And GWR Plc Under
UK And US Disclosure Systems
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Table 5.3c then displays how the equivalent figures are calculated under
the alternative assumptions of US and UK restricted information. Looking at
GWR Plc, the first step in calculating the figures under US regulations is to
determine the total intrinsic value of the options. From tables 5.3a and 5.3b, it can
be seen that only options in tranches 1 and 2 have any intrinsic value since for
tranche 3 the current share price is lower than the exercise price.
Having determined the total intrinsic value of the options held, the average
exercise price can then be calculated according to equation (5.2) on page 127. The
individual option value and delta can then be calculated using the Black-Scholes
formula and finally the total option value and option PPS determined by
aggregating over the N options.
The calculation of the total option value and the option PPS under UK
restricted information differs from the US calculation only in the estimate of the X
and T variables which alter the individual call price and call delta. In the concise
UK case, X is the average exercise price weighted by the number of options held,
thus for GWR Plc, X is given by:
- (46.76x 325046)+(135x12789)+(212x 1000000)
-	 (325046^ 12789 + 1000000)
X=171.12
The time to maturity, (T) in this case is the maximum maturity length over
the three tranches. Again for GWR this is given as Max (4.84, 3.26, 5.03) = 5.03.
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Having established these variables the individual option value and delta and the
total option value and PPS are calculated as in the US case. Thus under full
information the option PPS for GWR is calculated to be 0.87, under US restricted
information the figure is now estimated at 0.96 and under UK restricted
information the estimate is 0.90.
Having demonstrated the relevant calculation for two example case
companies, the same calculations are now made for the whole data set where
appropriate. The results are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 which report the share
option pay-performance sensitivity and the value of the outstanding stock of share
options by firm size. The important feature of these tables is the information
assumptions used to calculate the pay-performance term and the value of the share
options. Full information is defined as having information on all individual
tranches of options held by the CEO. There are 439 companies where the CEO
held share options at the year end. Of these, 362 (82%) companies report
complete information on all share option tranches. The data analysis in Tables
5.4a and 5.5a is therefore based on these 362 companies.
In the case of Table 5.4a, restricted information relates to the US reporting
system and is defined as using only the total number of unexercised options, their
total intrinsic value (as defined in the previous section) and a maturity of 7 years,
to compute the pay-performance sensitivities and option values. In the case Table
5.5a which relates to the concise UK reporting system, restricted information is
defined as using the total number of unexercised options, a weighted average
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exercise price and longest dated time to maturity (as defined in the previous
section) to compute the pay-performance sensitivities and option values.
5.4.2 US Disclosure Results
In Table 5.4a, for the 362 companies, the mean CEO option pay-
performance sensitivity is 0.231% under full information and 0.230% under US
imposed restricted information. The final column in Table 5.4a indicates that the
difference in option pay-performance sensitivity means is just 0.0006 and is not
statistically significant. The pay-performance term calculated under US disclosure
rules for the full sample is thus not significantly different from that calculated
under full information.
The share option pay-performance sensitivity is negatively correlated with
firm size. For firms with sales less than £250 million the full information mean
(median) option pay-performance term is 0.39% (0.22%) and for firms with sales
in excess of £1,500 million the mean option pay-performance term is 0.09%
(0.03%). Again, the calculated differences in means between the full and
restricted information cases are generally not statistically significant, although
there is evidence that the PPS in the largest firms is overestimated under US
reporting conditions. Figure 5.1 plots the distribution of pay-performance terms
under complete and US imposed reporting rules.
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o PPS (full information)	 A PPS (US information)
6
4
2
0
0	 1	 2	 3	 4
PPS
Figure 5.1: Share Option Pay-Performance Sensitivity Calculated Under Full
And Restricted US Information
The lower half of Table 5.4a details the valuation of the stock of share
options under the full and the US restricted information cases. The mean (median)
value of the share options using complete information for all companies is £732K
(275K). The equivalent figure for the US restricted information case is £745K
(293K), representing a mean difference of just £12K which is not statistically
significant. Again across all size bands the difference in valuing the share options
according to the full or restricted information case is generally not significant.
The data thus indicates that the valuation of the stock of share options, like the
pay-performance sensitivity is not distorted by the limited information disclosure
requirements under US regulations.
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No.
All Companies	 362
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 131
	
£250 to £500	 63
	
£500 to £1,500	 92
	
Above £1,500	 76
No.
All Companies	 362
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 131
	
£250 to £500	 63
	
£500 to £1,500	 92
	
Above £1,500
	
76
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)
Average	 Median
0.2309	 0.0954
	
0.39 10
	
0.2236
	
0.2 124
	
0. 1065
	
0.1331
	
0.0772
	
0.0888
	
0.0282
Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)
(Full information)
732.24	 274.84
	
841.35	 345.52
	
432.27
	
204.67
	
480.88
	
229.66
	
1097.13	 324.72
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(US Restricted information)
Average	 Median
0.2303	 0.0996
	
0.3882
	
0.232 1
	
0.2082
	
0. 1041
	
0. 1357
	
0.0929
	
0.09 10
	
0.0326
Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)
(US Restricted information)
744.61	 292.90
	
837.37
	
346.17
	
471.35	 202.56
	
506.14
	
268.63
	
1099.91	 367.25
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
0.0006 (0.39)
0.0028(0.75)
0.0042(1.38)
-0.0026(1.39)
-0.0022(2.17)
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
-12.37(1.65)
3.97(0.39)
-39.07(1.15)
-25.26(3.17)
-2.78(0.31)
Table 5.4a: The Share Option Pay-Performance Sensitivity And Value Of
Stock Of Share Options By Company Size: US Reporting System
This however, is not the whole story. It is not that there is no bias in the
calculation of the above terms, but that there are two at work pulling in opposite
directions, which, at least in this data set, seem to cancel each other out. This can
be seen more clearly by dividing the 362 companies into those where the CEO
only holds options that are in the money (232 companies) and those where at least
some of the options that the CEO holds are out of the money (130 companies).
Table 5.4b repeats the same analysis as in Table 5.4a but for the 232 CEOs
who hold only in the money options. The estimate of the option PPS under US
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disclosure is now significantly lower than that calculated in the full disclosure
case. This pattern is repeated across all sales bands, with the difference being
significant in all but the £500m to £1,500m category. The total value of the stock
of options however is still not generally significantly different under the two
reporting mechanisms, although there is evidence that the value for the very
largest firms is underestimated under US disclosure conditions.
The explanation for these results lies in the determination of Black-Scholes
inputs. Because all the options being considered here are in the money, the
aggregate intrinsic value represents all outstanding options and as suèh the
estimate of the average exercise price is an accurate reflection of the true weighted
average exercise price. For example, the analysis of Headlam Plc in Section 5.4.1
showed that all the options held by their CEO were in the money and the average
exercise price calculated under US restricted information was equal to the
weighted average exercise price calculated under UK restricted information.
With an accurate estimate of the a'eragt
	
cisc ict, k'	 c
error is now in the estimate of T, the remaining life of the option. The average T
for the 735 option tranches held by the 232 CEOs who only hold in the money
options is just 5.04 years. The US estimate of 7 years then is a considerable over
estimate. Under normal circumstances an over estimate of the time to maturity
would result in an over estimate of the value of the option. However, because
these options are all well in the money, the existence of even moderate dividend
yields, tends to reduce the impact of the increase in T. Indeed if the option is
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sufficiently in the money and dividend yield sufficiently high, increasing T can
actually reduce the value of the option.
The result is that error in the T term has little impact on the valuation of the
option. However, it does significantly reduce the delta of the option and this is
what drives the PPS term down for the US restricted information case in Table
5.4b while leaving the total value of the options unaffected.
All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
No.	 Share option Pay-	 Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)	 Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)	 (US Restricted information)
Average	 Median	 Average	 Median
232	 0.2486	 0.1089	 0.2413	 0.1046
91	 0.4090	 0.2175	 0.3964	 0.2237
44	 0.2097	 0.1078	 0.2011	 0.1013
48	 0.1657	 0.0942	 0.1635	 0.0901
49	 0.0670	 0.0164	 0.0653	 0.0158
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
0.0074(4.32)
0.0126(3.42)
0.0085(2.14)
0.0022(1.09)
0.0017(3.27)
No.	 Value of Stock of Share	 Value of Stock of Share	 Difference in
options (000s)	 options (000s)	 means
(Full information) 	 (US Restricted information) 	 (t-statistic)
232
	
833.36	 340.21	 826.54	 331.11
	
6.82(0.64)All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
91	 890.09	 343.49	 865.61	 332.80
44	 482.11	 215.13	 523.56	 207.80
48	 713.29	 415.93	 710.62	 388.08
49	 1161.02	 511.18	 1139.57	 497.33
24.48(1.95)
-41.45(0.85)
2.67(0.48)
21.45(3.07)
Table 5.4b: The Share Option PPS And Value Of Stock Of Options By
Company Size: US Reporting System For Only In The Money Options
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The situation is different for CEOs who hold out of the money options.
Table 5.4c shows the equivalent table but for the 130 CEOs who hold at least
some out of the money options. The US disclosure estimates of the option PPS
are now significantly higher for all companies and across all sales bands.
Furthermore, the total value of the stock of options is also significantly
overestimated for all companies and across all sales bands under the US restricted
information case.
The variable driving the error in this case is the estimate of the exercise
price. As can be seen in the case of GWR Plc, where some of the options held are
out of the money, the estimate of the average exercise price is too low. For GWR,
the US estimate of the average exercise price was £1.46 compared to an actual
weighted average exercise price of £1.71. This is because all of the out of the
money options are by default assumed to have an exercise price equal to the ruling
share price, which by definition is lower, than the exercise price of the out of the
money option.
The underestimate of the exercise price results in the overestimate of the
option value and its delta. Again, the T is overestimated, the average time to
maturity in this group of options is still only 5.56. However, because the options
are out of the money, the overestimate of T further increases the estimate of the
option value and its delta and adds to the distortion in the PPS and total option
valuation.
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All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
No.	 Share option Pay-	 Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%) 	 Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)	 (US Restricted information)
Average	 Median	 Average	 Median
130	 0.1994	 0.0854
	
0.2108	 0.0968
40	 0.3500	 0.2479	 0.3697	 0.2527
19	 0.2187	 0.0886	 0.2246	 0.1148
44	 0.0976	 0.0737	 0.1054	 0.0929
27	 0.1284	 0.0410	 0.1377	 0.0507
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
-0.0115(4.43)
-0.0197(2.68)
-0.0059(1.94)
-0.0078(2.52)
-0.0093(4.32)
No	 Value of Stock of Share	 Value of Stock of Share	 Difference in
options (000s)	 options (000s)	 means
(Full information)	 (US Restricted information)	 (t-statistic)
130
	
551.80	 209.06
	
598.40	 258.95	 -46.61(6.07)All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
40	 730.47	 370.41	 773.14	 357.39
19	 316.85	 155.31	 350.43	 178.71
44	 227.33	 157.98	 283.06	 223.63
27	 981.18	 219.43	 1027.92	 277.86
-42.67(3.01)
-33.58(4.41)
-55.73(3.91)
-46.74(2.42)
Table 5.4c: The Share Option PPS And Value Of Stock Of Options By
Company Size: US Reporting System For Some Out Of The Money Options
The above results show that recent estimates of US pay-performance
sensitivities and total option values by imposing a fixed time to maturity of 7 years
across all options may have produced accurate results, but more by luck than
judgement. The relatively large overestimates of the PPS variable for the one third
of CEOs who hold some out of the money options is almost perfectly
counterbalanced by smaller underestimates for the remaining two thirds of CEOs
who hold only in the money options. The same is true for the valuation of the
total stock of options held with the small under estimates in the majority of cases,
balancing the larger overestimates in the minority of cases.
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This is of course unlikely to remain true indefinitely. In particular, markets
have been steadily rising over recent years resulting in fewer options being out of
the money. As soon as the stock markets experience a significant downward
trend, the number of CEOs holding out of the money options will rise and the
balance will be lost. The result will be that estimates of the PPS and the total
value of the stock of options derived from US data will be overestimates of the
true figures.
5.4.3 UK Concise Disclosure Results
Table 5.5a turns to the results relating to the alternative, concise level of
disclosure available in the UK. The prior analysis is replicated but now imposing
the condition that companies only reveal the average exercise price and longest
dated time to maturity. As before, the mean CEO option pay-performance
sensitivity is 0.23% under full information and now 0.22% under UK restricted
information. The final column in Table 5.5a indicates that the difference in option
pay-performance means is statistically significant for all companies and indeed the
differences in the PPS term are significant across all the sales bands with the PPS
under full information being consistently higher than that under restricted
information. The differences in the share option pay-performance terms are also
seen in Figure 5.2.
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o PPS (full information) 	 PPS (incomplete information)
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Figure 5.2: Share Option Pay-Performance Sensitivity Calculated
Under Full And Restricted UK Information
Again the results show that independent of the method of disclosure, option
pay-performance sensitivities are negatively correlated with firm size. The mean
(median) PPS in the restricted information case falls from 0.38 (0.22) for firms
with sales of less than £250 million to 0.09 (0.03) for firms with sales in excess of
£1500 million.
The lower half of Table 5.5a details the valuation of the stock of share
options under the full and restricted information cases. The mean (median) value
of the share options using complete information for all companies is £732K
(E275K). The equivalent figures for the restricted information case are £736K and
£292K. In all size bands the difference in valuing the share options according to
the full or restricted information case is small and insignificant. The data indicates
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that the valuation of the stock of share options is not sensitive to using the concise
level of disclosure.
All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
0.0067(5.47)
0.0110(3.67)
0.0078(3.43)
0.0031(2.40)
0.0026(3.73)
No.	 Share option Pay-	 Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%) 	 Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)	 (UK Restricted information)
Average	 Median	 Average	 Median
362	 0.2309	 0.0954
	 0.2243	 0.0944
131	 0.3910	 0.2236	 0.3800	 0.2236
63	 0.2124	 0.1065	 0.2046	 0.0991
92	 0.1331	 0.0772	 0.1300	 0.0785
76	 0.0888	 0.0282	 0.0862	 0.0288
All Companies
By Firm Sales (m)
Less than £250
£250 to £500
£500 to £1,500
Above £1,500
131	 841.35	 345.52	 841.84	 349.04
63	 432.27	 204.67	 444.92	 202.56
92	 480.88	 229.66	 497.31	 252.29
76	 1097.13	 324.72	 1084.69	 328.84
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
-3.94(0.86)
-0.49(0.05)
- 12.65(1.22)
-16.43(2.39)
12.44(1.63)
No	 Value of Stock of Share 	 Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)	 options (000s)
(Full information)	 (UK Restricted information)
362
	
732.24	 274.84
	
736.19	 291.68
Table 5.5a: The Share Option Pay-Performance Sensitivity And Value Of
Stock Of Share Options By Company Size: UK Reporting System
Overall, the imposition of UK restricted information on the entire data set,
has resulted in significant distortions in the calculation of the pay-performance
term but not in the valuation of the stock of share options. Just as in the US case,
the companies are once again divided into those where the CEO holds only in the
money options and those where the CEO holds some out of the money options.
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No.
All Companies	 232
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 91
	
£250 to £500
	
44
	
£500 to £1,500
	
48
	
Above £1,500	 49
No.
All Companies	 232
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 91
	
£250 to £500	 44
	
£500 to £1,500	 48
	
Above £1,500	 49
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)
Average	 Median
0.2486	 0.1089
	
0.4090
	
0.2 175
	
0.2097
	
0. 1078
	
0. 1657
	 0.0942
	
0.0670
	
0.0164
Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)
(Full information)
833.36	 340.21
	
890.09	 343.49
	
482.11
	
215.13
	
713.29	 415.93
	
1161.02
	 511.18
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(UK Restricted information)
Average	 Median
0.2406	 0.105 1
	
0.3945
	
0.2133
	
0.2027
	
0.0980
	
0. 163 1
	
0.0865
	
0.0648
	
0.0157
Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)
(UK Restricted information)
831.09	 337.70
	
883.77
	
334.37
	
492.38
	
209.09
	
720.57
	
416.29
	
1145.67	 499.27
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
0.0080(4.61)
0.0145(3.51)
0.0069(3.75)
0.0025(1.42)
0.0022(3.96)
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
2.26(0.43)
6.31(0.64)
-10.27(0.7 1)
-7.28(0.85)
15.35(2. 15)
Table 5.5b: The Share Option PPS And Value Of Stock Of Options By
Company Size: UK Reporting System For Only In The Money Options
The results for the in the money option holds are shown in Table 5.5b. They
follow a similar pattern to those in Table 5.4b, that is the PPS is significantly
under estimated in the restricted case whereas the differences in the valuation of
the stock of options is small and again generally not significant. This is
unsurprising since as in the US case, the mispricing is once again mainly due to
the over estimate of T.
Finally, Table 5.5c shows the differences caused by the UK concise
reporting system for the out of the money option holders. The results do show that
for all firms the PPS is significantly underestimated, a pattern repeated across all
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sales bands, although the difference is only significant in the two largest sales
bands. Total option values are slightly over estimated, but again not significantly
in most cases. This differs from the results in table 5.4c because in the UK case,
the estimate of the average exercise price is accuratc irrespective of whether the
options are in or out of the money.
No.
All Companies	 130
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250
	
40
	
£250 to £500	 19
	
£500 to £1,500
	
44
	
Above £1,500	 27
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(Full information)
Average	 Median
0.1994	 0.0854
	
0.3500	 0.2479
	
0.2187
	
0.0886
	
0.0976	 0.0737
	
0. 1284
	
0.0410
Share option Pay-
Performance Sensitivity (%)
(UK Restricted information)
Average	 Median
0.1950	 0.0806
	
0.3469
	
0.2385
	
0.2089
	
0. 1005
	
0.0939
	
0.0759
	
0.1249
	
0.0425
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
0.0043(3.08)
0.0030(1.19)
0.0098(1.55)
0.0037(1.98)
0.0034(1.99)
No.
All Companies	 130
By Firm Sales (m)
	
Less than £250	 40
	
£250 to £500
	
19
	
£500 to £1,500
	
44
	
Above £1,500
	
27
Value of Stock of Share
options (000s)
(Full information)
551.80	 209.06
	
730.47
	
370.41
	
316.85
	
155.31
	
227.33
	
157.98
	
981.18
	
219.43
Value of Stock of Share
options (f000s)
(UK Restricted information)
566.82	 220.43
	
746.44	 367.61
	
335.01	 175.42
	
253.75	 178.03
	
974.03	 220.05
Difference in
means
(t-statistic)
-15.02(1.77)
-15.98(0.73)
-18. 16(3.24)
-26.42(2.43)
7. 15(0.41)
Table 5.5c: The Share Option PPS And Value Of Stock Of Options By
Company Size: UK Reporting System For Some Out Of The Money Options
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Thus under restricted information in the UK, the PPS term is
underestimated for the CEOs who hold only in the money options, just as it is
under US disclosure conditions. However, unlike in the US, the PPS estimate of
out of the money option holders are not overestimated and hence there is no
cancelling out of the two mispricing effects. This explains why as a whole there
are significant differences in the PPS term under UK restricted information
conditions and not under US conditions.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has considered the current levels of CEO share option
holdings under in the UK. Using data on 510 CEOs for fiscal year 1997/8 it has
demonstrated a number of features relating to the valuation and incentives arising
from UK executive share options.
First, taking all companies together the US reporting system does not
significantly affect the valuation of the stock of share options nor the estimated
PPS. However, this is the result of two mispricing errors which work in opposite
directions and currently cancel each other out. The PPS term is underestimated
for holders of in the money options because of the errors in estimating the time to
maturity of the options. However, the PPS term is significantly overestimated for
the smaller number of CEOs who hold out of the money options, because of errors
in the estimate of the average exercise price. A similar pattern is observed in the
valuation of the stock of options held, although the distortions are of a smaller
magnitude.
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The results for the concise form of UK disclosure are somewhat different.
The PPS term for the whole data set is now underestimated as a result of the
restricted disclosure conditions. This is because the underestimate of the PPS
term for the in the money option holders is no longer counterbalanced by an
overestimate in the estimate for the out of the money holders. This is because,
unlike in the US case, in this latter case there is no error in the estimate of the
average exercise price.
To conclude, UK restricted information results create errors in the estimate
of the PPS term mainly as a result of errors induced by inaccuracies in thetime to
maturity (T) variable. This error is likely to persist in the same direction, as long
as the current concise disclosure convention is maintained. In contrast, the US
restricted information results, currently produce no significant errors in the
estimate of the PPS term, nor the valuation of the stock of options. However, this
is unlikely to persist. In the event of a downturn in the market, or the increased
use of premium options (see Chapter Seven), both of which will result in an
increase in the number of out of the money option holders, estimates of the PPS
and the value of the stock of options will become exaggerated.
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6.1 Introduction
As documented in Chapter Two, the empirical determination of executive
pay has attracted considerable academic attention from economists (Conyon,
Gregg and Machin, 1995; Hallock and Murphy, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b;
Murphy, 1999). It has also emerged as an issue of crucial importance in the
strategic management literature (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Finkeistein and
Hambrick, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987). Traditionally, the main
issues have involved identifying the hypothesised positive relationships between
executive pay, company performance and firm size (see Murphy, 1999).
Another stream of research has centred on tournament theory. This
predicts that executives will exert effort in order to be promoted to a better-paid
job position. An important implication of this work is that the structure of
compensation is central to the understanding of wage setting in the boardroom.
Consequently, it is impossible to tell whether a particular CEO is over (or under)
paid simply by relating CEO pay to measures of output and performance. Instead,
it is important to look at the structure of the within company pay distribution and
attempt to evaluate its incentive properties (Lazear, 1995).
Tournament models however, have received far less empirical
investigation and none relate to the UK. The intention of this chapter is to test the
predictions of tournament theory that have appeared in the literature for a sample
of UK firms. The research is informed by tests carried out by Eriksson (1999),
Lazear (1995), Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1993) and reviewed by Prendergast
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(1999). In particular this chapter tests three tournament propositions. Firstly, do
wages rise in a convex manner as one moves up the corporate hierarchy?
Secondly, is the prize for becoming CEO increasing in the number of competitors
for the job? Finally, is wider boardroom pay dispersion associated with higher
company performance?
The UK evidence provides an evaluative benchmark by which to assess
other international research on tournaments. For instance, although the UK and
US governance systems are similar they are not identical. Important recent
changes in corporate governance arrangements in the UK, ushered in since the
Cadbury Committee (1992) report, mean that board structures are different
between the two economies, for example UK company boards now usually do not
combine the posts of CEO and chairman. This may have implications for the
operation of corporate tournaments.
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the existing tournament
literature. First, it presents UK evidence on the operation of tournaments.
Second, it uses a measure of total compensation (i.e. cash remuneration plus stock
based compensation) for each named executive on the company board. This
overcomes a weakness of most UK compensation research that has typically
focused only on the non-named job position of 'highest paid director'. Also prior
empirical tournament research ignored the importance of stock-based executive
pay and did not consider a Black-Scholes valuation of stock options in the
compensation variable. Finally it also considers for the first time the within firm
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distribution of the pay-performance sensitivity derived from holdings of share
options.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section
considers incentives and tournament theory and underpins the formulation of the
subsequent empirical hypotheses. This is followed by the methods section, which
outlines the sample and the data. The main results are presented in Section 6.4
while Section 6.5 considers the within firm distribution of the pay-performance
sensitivity. The chapter closes with summary conclusions.
6.2 Incentives And Empirical Tests Of Tournament Theory
This section build on the work presented in Chapter Two and outlines
some theories of compensation which inform the subsequent empirical work. The
analysis is based on Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Lazear (1995).
6.2.1 Linear Compensation Contracts
A key hypothesis in the empirical literature on the determination of
directors' pay is the supposed positive association between compensation and
company performance. The empirical work is typically motivated by agency
considerations. As illustrated in Chapter Two, a simple agency model defines a
risk neutral principal (shareholders) who seeks to design an optimal wage contract
to motivate a risk averse agent (managers) in the presence of asymmetric
information. To recap, company performance, denoted 11, depends on the
manager's effort level a and. a chance random variable E.
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The model assumes that managerial effort is private information. The
profit function is non-separable in a and c and accordingly a contract which relates
agent income, W, to effort, a, is not enforceable. Instead, one solution to the latent
agency problem is to relate managerial compensation to profits (Lazear, 1995).
This is often supposed to be a linear function of H and so can be written as:
U=f(a,c)
W= a + bH
	 (6.1)
The model is characterised by a trade-off between incentives and insurance
(see, Hart, 1995). To induce high effort the contract offered to the agent should
specify high powered incentives (i.e. managerial compensation, W, should be
sensitive to company performance, H). Agency theory is concerned with finding
the optimal trade-off between efficiency and risk-sharing.
Empirical models of executive compensation determination typically
added a stochastic error term to equation (6.1) and used appropriate estima(ion
techniques (i.e. panel fixed effects) to determine the size of b (see Murphy, 1985,
p.22-25). Estimates of b have typically been found to be low or, indeed, difficult
even to isolate (see Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). This may be interpreted as
low power of the underlying incentive contract. However, there are some other
potential explanations of why it has been difficult to isolate a robust link between
pay and performance, particularly in the UK. Firstly, it is not clear that the pay
variable has been appropriately measured. For instance, Main et al (1996) stress
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that most UK studies ignore the role of share options in the pay contract. When
this is accounted for (using a Black-Scholes valuation method) the pay-
performance correlation becomes quantitatively much stronger (Conyon and
Murphy, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998).
Secondly, the unit of observation in these studies has been the 'highest
paid director'. This may not correspond to the CEO and may lead to significant
jumps in the pay time series. Also, the relationship of b to a formal economic
model and hence interpretation is ambiguous. However, these points not
withstanding there may be other reasons to suppose that pay and performance may
not he correlated. One of those factors is the role played by tournament theory.
6.2.2 Tournament Theory And Incentives
Tournament models are premised on the notion that motivation is
produced not by an absolute reward, but by compensation that is based on relative
comparisons (Lazear, 1995). The managerial labour market is a good example:
managers are often rewarded on the basis of being better than their peers, not
necessarily for being good. An implication is that one cannot say whether a
particular executive is "over-paid" simply by looking at individual performance
(see Lazear, 1995; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986).
For simplicity consider a stripped down version of the Lazear-Rosen
tournament model. A firm has two employees and two job slots (boss and
worker). The two employees compete with one another, the loser gets the worker
job while the winner becomes the boss. The overall prizes are fixed in advance
155
Chapter Six - Corporate Tournaments & Executive compensation
with the winner receiving W 1 and the loser W2. The probability of winning the
contest depends on the level of effort that each contestant exerts together with a
random shock component. Denoting the individuals as j and k then:
qj = + aj
qk = l tk + ak
where qj and qk are individual output; t and tk is the effort levels of the respective
individuals and a and ak are the white noise chance factors. Dealing with the
individual labour supply decision first, each individual wants to maximise their
expected payoff. Looking first at employee j, the problem then is;
Max (t): PW 1 + ( 1 - P)W2 - C(.i)
where P is the probability of j winning and C(t) is a convex cost of effort
function, i.e. the monetary value associated with a particular level of effort. The
first order condition for j is thus:
(W 1
 - W2)aP/a1 -
	
= 0	 (6.2)
There is a corresponding problem for employee k. Employee j wins the contest if
he produces more output than employee k, that is j wins if qj > qk . The probability
thatj wins is therefore given by:
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P = prob( > q) = prob( ak - a <11j -
= prob (tj - Lk >ak - a) = G(j.i - ilk)
where G is the distribution function on the random variable ak - a. Also, note that
=	 -	 = gOL - J-tk). However, since individuals j and k are ex
ante identical there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium where j and k choose the
same effort level thus tj
 - = 0 and so equation (6.2) can be written:
(W 1
 - W2)g(0) = acia	 (6.3)
Now consider the optimal wage chosen by the firm given the labour supply
decision characterised by equation (6.3). Lazear (1995 p.30-31) demonstrates that
the average wage necessary to attract employees to the firm and the optimal wage
spread are given by:
(W 1 -W2)/2 = C(p)
(W 1 -W2)= lIg(0)
Tournament models, together with equation (6.3), have some testable
implications. First, an increase in the wage spread, W 1 - W2, implies a higher
equilibrium effort since C(t) is convex. So a bigger rise in the pay gap will
induce workers to compete harder for promotion. Furthermore, the absolute level
of the prize does not affect effort, if both prizes rise by the same amount so the
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prize differential remains unchanged then the effort level will also remain
unchanged.
The intuition is that the value of winning is not only the prize at that level,
but also the possibility to compete for larger prizes at higher levels. However, the
higher up the organisational hierarchy the individual moves, the smaller the
opportunity for promotion becomes since there are fewer and fewer positions to
move into. One substitute for the loss of the chance to compete further is higher
current compensation. In consequence, tournament models predict that
compensation is an increasing function of organisational level (Lambert et al.
1993; Main et al. 1993). Indeed, Rosen (1986: p701) comments "The extra
weight of rewards at the top is due to the no tomorrow aspects of the final stage of
the game." This yields the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Tournament models predict a convex relationship between
executive compensation and organisational level.
Second, tournament models predict that the tournament prize is increasing
in the number of competitors (see Eriksson, 1999; Lambert et a!. 1993; Main et al.
1993; O'Reilly et al. 1988; Prendergast, 1999). Each tournament participant
implicitly gives up some of the expected salary associated with his marginal
product or performance. This excess then becomes part of the overall tournament
prize. As O'Reilly et a!. (1988: 261) remark: "Given this fact, then it should
follow that, in general, the more players in the tournament, the larger the prize
should be. In an organisational context, this should mean that, after controlling for
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other possible economic determinants of CEO compensation, the more vice
presidents, the larger should be the observed gap between the CEO's salary and
bonus and those of the vice presidents." This provides the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Tournament models predict that the tournament prize (gap) and the
number of contestants are positively correlated.
Third, tournament models have implications for the effect of within
company wage variation on corporate performance (Eriksson, 1999; Main et a!.
1993). Theoretical tournament models argue that to induce effort by agents a
relatively large prize (i.e. a gap or variation in wages) is required. If a large prize
(wage gap) induces higher effort by executives then standard productivity models
suggest that this should be reflected in higher outputs and performance. This
suggests a positive relationship between company performance and wage spread
or variation between tournament players. In line with prior research then, the
following hypothesis is tested.
Hypothesis 3: Tournament models predict that corporate peiformance is
positively correlated with executive wage dispersion.
However, since the tournament outcome depends simply on being better
than the other contestants then winning can be achieved by either a) being more
productive than a co-worker or b) undermining or sabotaging co-worker efforts.
As Eriksson (1999) makes clear, the senior management of a firm often act as a
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team performing highly interdependent work, and so paying executives in a
tournament like fashion can lead to undesirable effects.
The problem arises because individuals are rewarded on how they do
relative to others. Thus, they may be less likely to help others, or may even
sabotage the efforts of co-workers engaging in so called "hawkish" behaviour.
Lazear (1995: p36), for instance, concludes that: "Since the upper ranks of the
organisation tend to be dominated by Hawks, it pays to sacrifice some effort in
order to prevent these extremely competitive individuals from killing each other
off." The implication is that pay compression can potentially reduce sabotage
incentives, and so raises output and performance by making board members
behave in a more co-operative manner. As Main et al. (1993) discuss, the effects
of pay compression and pay dispersion in the boardroom are both theoretical
propositions that require empirical testing.
A number of theoretical papers have demonstrated that tournaments
possess properties that allow principals to ensure that agents expend the "correct"
or optimal amount of effort. For instance, Prendergast (1998) shows that effort
expended by tournament participants (the agents) is increasing in the size of the
prize and in the efficiency of monitoring. See also Baker, Jensen and Murphy,
1988; Lazear, 1995; Lazear and Rosen, 1981 and Dye, 1984 for insights and
limitations of tournaments.
Empirical research on tournament theory has been limited, although strong
support for it has been found for it in a sporting setting. Ehrenberg and Bognanno
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(1990) looking at professional golfers and Becker and Huselid (1992) looking at
professional NASCAR drivers, both report results in favour of tournament theory.
A further example is Fernie and Metcalf (1996), they undertook an empirical test
based on the pay and performance of an unbalanced panel of 50 jockeys over a
period of eight years. The transparency of not only the pay but more importantly
the performance of the jockeys made the pay-performance link much easier to
observe. Jockeys are usually paid a percentage of any winnings, and their
opportunity to win, that is the number of rides they are offered, depends on their
reputation and standing. Fernie and Metcalf conclude that the existence of this,
almost "ideal" payment system does improve the level of effort and hence the
performance of the riders when compared to other non-performance related
compensation packages.
Empirical tests of tournament theory in a business context have also
received comparatively little attention. Exceptions documented in Chapter Two,
include Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993), O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988)
Main et al. (1993) using US data for the 1980s and Eriksson (1999) using Danish
data for the 1990s.	 None of these studies consider a "total" executive
compensation measure by calculating a Black-Scholes valuation of stock options
grants (although Lambert et al. (1993) do use an approximate valuation
procedure). The analysis below uses UK data for the late 1990s. It makes a
methodological step forward by using a cash compensation measure and a variable
that includes the valuation of current stock option grants.
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The UK context also differs from the US in a number of important
respects. First, the position of CEO and chairman are increasingly not combined
in the UK (Conyon and Peck, 1998a) unlike in the US where the two roles are
typically still held by a single individual. Second, boards in the UK tend to be
smaller than in the US (Conyon and Peck 1998b). Third, the mix between inside
(executive) and outside (non-executive) directors is approximately equal in the
UK (Conyon and Peck, 1998a) whereas in the US, executives dominate the board.
Given these international differences in board arrangements, which occur within
essentially similar governance systems, it is important to evaluate whether the
tournament process is empirically valid in a UK context.
6.3 Data And Measures
As noted in Chapter Three (Section 3.1.2), the sample of companies used
in this chapter represents a subset of the main data set. The sections below
describe this sample along with the specific variables used in the analysis.
6.3.1 Sample
The sample consists of 105 companies drawn from the 250 largest UK
stock market companies in 1997-98. These companies account for 68% of the
market value of all companies on the London Stock Exchange (at the selection
date) and are distributed across the six main stock exchange sectors. A crucial
data requirement in order to test tournament models is the pay information for all
directors within a company. Such data has not been available to UK researchers
until very recently. The recommendations of the Greenbury (1995) report and the
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subsequent additions to the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange, requires
UK listed companies to detail information on the pay of each named director
separately. The available data is thus now sufficient to move beyond simple cash
compensation measures and now allows an estimate of the value of stock options
and other non-cash elements of pay to be included
The director compensation data is augmented by individual director data
(for controls) on age and other cross board membership. Company level data,
such as performance and size, was also added from Datastream. The final data set
contains information on 1170 executive and non-executive directors. There are
552 executive (inside) directors and 618 non-executive (outside) directors
confirming that boards of UK companies are approximately evenly split in their
outsider-insider representation.
The average size of the company board is 11 (ranging from 6 to 22).
Average shareholder return in the sample is 15%, whereas mean return on capital
employed is approximately 27%. The empirical tests of tournament theory that
follow are based on the 552 executives at 105 companies for the year 1997-98.
However, a few observations in the regressions that follow are lost due to
occasional missing data points. The average age of an executive in the data set is
52 years. Also, one out of every two executives holds at least one other off-board
directorship.
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6.3.2 Measures
Executive compensation: Two measures of compensation are used. The
first is the total cash compensation received by an executive director as reported in
the annual company accounts. This variable includes salary, bonus, and benefits
where appropriate and is denoted cash compensation. This is the measure used
widely in the executive compensation literature and that used by Eriksson (1999)
and O'Reilly et al. (1988) to test tournament models.
The second measure includes the cash compensation measure noted above,
but also includes the value of any options granted during the year along with any
other non-cash elements of pay such as shares allocated under a long term
incentive plan (LTIP). The grants of options are valued using the Black-Scholes
(1973) pricing formula adjusted for continuous dividends (see Section 2.4.1).
LTIP grants are valued at the year-end market price using a probability factor that
the award will vest in full. The sum of all these components is called total
compensation below. Prior research on tournament models, in a business context,
typically do not focus on such a total compensation measure.
Performance (total shareholder return): Lambert et al. (1993) amongst
others (see Murphy, 1999) argue that compensation and performance should be
linked due to agency cost reasons. In the executive compensation equations
corporate performance is measured as total shareholder return. This reflects share
price appreciation plus the value of dividends on a continuously reinvested basis.
Such market based measures have been widely used (e.g. Hambnck and
Finkelstein, 1995; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).
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Size (total capital employed): Executive compensation equations
universally control for measures of company size (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). This is measured as (log) total capital
employed.
Age: Hill and Phan (1991) identify a number of human capital proxies as
important for explaining executive pay. In the data, therefore, to proxy for
experience, the age of the executive is included as disclosed in the annual report.
Multiple board membership: Executives can hold more than one board
position. Booth and Deli (1996) argue that outside directorships may represent
value increasing opportunities for the firm (for example, through exposure to
different management styles). Controlling for these quality differences, superior
reputation and ability of executives may be important. Conversely, Hallock (1997:
p332) claims that CEOs on reciprocally interlocked boards may have "both the
incentive and opportunity to raise each other's pay". In the data therefore, the
control variable is defined as the number of board positions held by the executive
at other UK listed companies.
Hierarchical level ('job position): The discussion of tournament models has
highlighted the importance of hierarchical level in explaining wage outcomes and
incentives. Allocating job levels to executives is a difficult and fuzzy task in the
UK. For instance, other than the CEO, there is no agreed seniority ranking of
other executives on the board. A dummy variable equal to one for the job position
of CEO and zero for all other non-CEO executives is included.
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6.4 Analysis And Findings
Tournament theory (hypothesis 1) predicts a convex relationship between
managerial compensation and hierarchical level. Focusing firstly on the raw
(unconditional) executive compensation data.
Median cash	 Mean [Sd] cash
	
Median total
	 Mean total
compensation	 compensation	 compensation compensation [sd]
Chief executive	 522,000	 592,653	 728,963	 916,229
officer (CEO)	 [339935]	 [767546]
Other executive	 305,000	 389,287	 438,121
	
564,328
directors	 [288455]	 [475791]
Notes:
Cash compensation includes salary, bonus and other benefits.
Total compensation is cash compensation plus the value of options and LTIP grants
Table 6.1: Executive Compensation In UK Corporate Boards 1997/8 ()
The results presented in Table 6.1 indicate that CEOs in large UK
companies receive median cash compensation equal to £522,000. 	 Other
executives receive median cash compensation of £305,000 implying that CEOs
receive about 1.71 times other board members. In terms of total pay, CEOs
receive £728,963 compared with £438,121 for other executives implying a similar
order ratio of 1.66. The evidence thus appears consistent with hypothesis 1, with
extra compensation weight placed on the most senior executive position.
The results of the multivanate regression analysis and a direct test of
hypothesis 1, are presented in Table 6.2. The coefficient on the CEO indicator
variable is positive and significant under both compensation measures, ranging
from 0.46 to 0.48 indicating that CEOs receive a compensation premium. This
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Shareholder return
log(total capital employed)
Executive age
log(multiple board membership)
CEO job position
0.2581
(0.1209)
0.0974**
(0.0233)
0.0163**
(0.0040)
O.2143**
(0.0552)
0.4577**
(0.0524)
0.4555
(0.1409)
0.1197**
(0.0263)
0.0070
(0.0048)
0. 2422
(0.0552)
0.4757**
(0.0524)
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result is established, regardless of the measure of compensation and also after
controlling for individual, firm and industry characteristics. The data is thus
consistent with hypothesis 1.
Log(cash compensation) 	 Log(total compensation)
Observations	 521	 521
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes
Overall R2	 0.3151	 0.268 1
Notes:
.y. <pO.lO; *p<o . os; **p<o . o l. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
All regressions contain a constant.
Table 6.2: The Determination Of Executive Compensation
The other control variables are also of interest outside the direct area of
tournament theory. The shareholder return variable is typically significant. Of
more importance, however, is the difference between the shareholder return
estimates for the two compensation measures. The estimated coefficient is
quantitatively larger on the total compensation measure (0.46) compared to the
cash pay measure (0.26). The compensation size elasticity is in region of 0.10
which is consistent with other non-UK based research (see Murphy, 1999). The
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age variable is positively signed and significant for the narrower pay measure.
Finally, the multiple board membership variable is also positive and significant
under both pay measures.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the prize for winning is increasing in the number
of competitors. Two measures of the prize or gap are calculated. The first is the
log of CEO cash pay minus the log of average cash compensation received by the
executive team. The second wider measure, is the log of CEO total pay less the
log of average total compensation received by the executive team. This is the
procedure used by Eriksson (1999), Main et al. (1993) and O'Reilly et al. (1988).
Log(CEO cash compensation) - Log(CEO total compensation)
log (average executive cash 	 minus log(average executive
compensation)	 total compensation)
Log (total capital	 0.0012	 -0.0 141
employed)	 (0.0 157)	 (0.0209)
Number of directors	 0.0357**
	 0.0297*
in the executive team	 (0.0088)	 (0.0117)
Observations	 104	 104
Industry dummies	 Yes	 Yes
Notes:
4. <pO.1O; *p<o.o5; **p<O.Ol. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
All regressions contain a constant.
Table 6.3: The Effect Of Tournament Contestants
On The Tournament Prize
The results are contained in Table 6.3 and indicate that after controlling for
company size and industry effects that there is a positive relationship between the
size of the prize (gap) and the number of executives. Dependent upon the measure
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of the tournament prize used, the addition of each executive raises the gap by
either 3.0% or 3.6%. The evidence then is consistent with hypothesis 2, namely
that more competitors are associated with an increased prize for becoming CEO.
To test hypothesis 3 the procedure followed by Main et a!. (1993) and
Eriksson (1999) to estimate the relationship between company performance and
wage variation is used. The performance measures are return on assets and total
shareholder return. The coefficient of variation of the board's executive
compensation is also constructed (this too is in line with Main et al. 1993 and
Eriksson, 1999). There are no proxies for the degree of inter-dependence of
executive team members (as in Main et al. 1993 or Eriksson, 1999) thus instead
the relationship between performance and wage variation is tested.
Shareholder return	 Return on assets
Coefficient of variation of
executive team compensation
Log(total capital employed)
Observations
Industry dummies
Overall R2
0.0876
(0. 123 1)
0.0242
(0.0222)
99
Yes
0.2175
-16.3982
(14.6583)
11.9144*
(4. 167 1)
99
Yes
0.2617
Notes:
.!.<pO.lO; *p<o.05; **p<O.Ol. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Left hand side variables are shareholder return and return on assets separately
All equations contain a constant.
Table 6.4: Regression Of Shareholder And Asset Returns On
Wage Variation Within The Executive Team
The performance determination results are given in Table 6.4. Each model
contains, in addition to the compensation dispersion variable, a size control and
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industry dummies (6 companies are omitted due to lack of data). The size variable
attracts a negative and significant value in the return on assets equation. However,
the results indicate that wage dispersion does not have a robust positive or
negative effect on corporate performance.
6.4.1 Discussion Of Hypothesis Results
To date, this chapter has examined the determination of executive
compensation in 105 leading UK companies. These results were predicated by the
theory of tournaments and tested using two measures of pay reflecting both direct
cash compensation and total compensation which includes cash and non-cash
measures (i.e. the value of current share option grants and current long term
incentive plan allocations).
The results are easily summarised and are broadly consistent with other
studies. The first test was whether there is a convex relationship between
executive compensation and hierarchical level and also whether the tournament
prize varies positively with the number of competing participants. Tournament
models predict these results and the empirical findings support them. Conditional
on other factors, (company size, sector, executive age and board interlocks)
obtaining the CEO job slot (or winning the tournament) commands around 47%
pay premium relative to other executives. This result is slightly larger than in
Eriksson (1999) where the change in reward from moving from vice president to
CEO in Danish firms is found to be 37.2%.
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Also consistent with tournament theory notions, the results show the
addition of each executive raises the tournament prize gap by approximately 3%.
The result is very similar to Main et al. (1993) who estimate a 3% effect and
Eriksson (1999) who estimates a 2% effect. This is established for both for the
cash compensation measure used in prior tournament research and the wider pay
measure also used here. The quantitative impact of additional members of the
executive team is similar for both gap measures. However, the results do contrast
with OReilly et al. (1988: 270) who find that the greater the number of vice
presidents the smaller the difference between CEO salary and that of the vice
presidents. They argue that their evidence is "exactly opposite to the result
predicted by tournament theory".
Finally, the impact of the within company executive pay distribution on
corporate performance was tested. Previous US research has found that wider pay
distributions imply higher equilibrium levels of effort and consequently higher
performance. However, it is possible that this wider pay variation could
encourage uncooperative behaviour. In line with some other recent research, the
impact of wage variation on corporate performance was tested (see Eriksson,
1999; Lazear, 1995; O'Reilly et al. 1988). The results indicate that wage
dispersion does not have a robust positive effect on corporate performance.
These results contrast with Main et a!. (1993) who find a positive effect on
the coefficient of variation on return on assets in US firms but no effects on
shareholder return. Similarly, Eriksson (1999) finds that the coefficient of pay
variation has a positive effect on a performance index in a sample of Danish firms.
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The difference between the results and those found in the US and Denmark maybe
attributable to a number of factors including the fact that the data does not have a
measure of executive inter-dependence which prior studies have included.
Clearly, future UK tournament research might focus on this measurement issue.
6.5 Distribution Of Within Finn Pay-Performance Sensitivity
The above analysis has considered the within company distribution of
various compensation measures. The following section now focuses instead, on
the incentives faced by executives. Just as tournament theory predicts a within
firm variation in compensation, variation is also possible within the overall pay-
performance sensitivity of company directors. Theory would predict that those at
the top of the executive hierarchy would require greater pay-performance
incentives since they lack the added incentive of further promotions.
Pay-performance sensitivities are derived from holdings of share options.
As described in Chapter Five, incentives from holding options are calculated as
the slope of the Black-Scholes function (the option delta) multiplied by the
fraction of the total holding of outstanding options on common equity expressed
as a percentage. The resulting statistic, the pay-performance sensitivity, provides
a measure of how director option wealth varies for given changes in shareholder
wealth (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990b)
Table 6.5 shows the median and mean pay-performance sensitivities in the
105 companies. At the median, the pay-performance sensitivity is nearly 2.3 times
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as big for the CEO as it is for the other executive directors on the board, and 2.7
times at the mean.
Median Pay-
	 Mean [Sd] Pay-
Performance	 Performance
Sensitivity	 Sensitivity
Chief executive	 0.0167	 0.0410
officer (CEO)
	 [0.0889]
Other executive	 0.0073	 0.0 150
directors	 [0.0242]
Table 6.5: Pay-Performance Sensitivities In UK
Corporate Boards 1997-98
These results are consistent with career concern ideas.
	
Non-CEO
executives require less direct incentive from compensation since they also have
the added incentive of trying to achieve the top position. In contrast, CEOs have
no incentive in terms of promotion and thus require larger incentives from pay.
The determinants of the pay-performance sensitivity are shown below.
Controlling for size and industry effects, the coefficient of the CEO indicator
variable is positive and significant showing that the CEOs have a pay-performance
premium over other executive directors. The coefficient on total capital employed
is negative indicating that larger firms have lower pay-performance sensitivities.
This is consistent with the results presented in Chapter Five and is a consequence
of CEOs in larger firms owning a smaller fraction of the total outstanding equity
of their firm than CEOs in smaller firms.
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Pay-Performance
Sensitivity
Chief Executive Office 	 0.02574**
(0.0088)
log(total capital employed)	 -O.O100**
(0.0028)
Executive age	
-0.0005
(0.0025)
Executive age2
	
0.000002
(0.0002)
Observations	 540
Industry dummies	 Yes
Overall R2 	0. 1498
Notes:
.. <pO.IO; *p<O . 05; **p<O . 0I . Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
All regressions contain a constant.
Table 6.6: The Determination Of Director
Pay-Performance Sensitivity
The standard regressions yield a coefficient on the age variable that is just
negative and not significant even at the 10% level. Table 6.7 below however
gives robust regression estimates. This regression performs an initial screening to
eliminate outliers 20. In this case age becomes a significant variable, with a
positive coefficient, while age squared has a negative coefficient indicating a
concave relationship between the pay-performance sensitivity and age.
20 Robust regressions use Stata rreg function: This begins by estimating the regression, calculating
Cook's D and excluding observations where D>1. It then works iteratively performing a
regression, calculating weights based on absolute residuals and then regressing again using those
weights until the changes in weights drop below the desired tolerance.
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Pay-Performance
Sensitivity
Chief Executive Office	 0.00453
(0.00 132)
log(total capital employed)	 0.00267**
(0.00050)
Executive age	 0.00 15 8*
(0.00069)
Executive age2
	 0.00001*
(0.00001)
Observations	 540
Industry dummies	 Yes
Notes:
.. <p0.10; *p<O . 05; **p<0 . OI .
 Standard errors reported in parentheses.
All regressions contain a constant.
Table 6.7: The Determination Of Director Pay-Performance Sensitivity -
Robust Regressions
A possible explanation for this relationship is as follows. The option
holding characteristics of the typical director can be split into three separate
phases. Firstly, as the director proceeds up the executive ladder he receives
additional and bigger grants of options, slowly building up a large stock o
unexercised options. During this phase the pay-performance sensitivity is
increasing. The next stage is when the limit recommended by the ABI is reached2'
During this stage the director can only receive further options when old options
are exercised or lapsed, the result is that the pay-performance sensitivities
stabilise. The final stage is as the director approaches retirement. Executive
options lapse when a director leaves the company, thus as the director approaches
this watershed he begins to unwind his holding of options, exercising more
21 See Chapter Seven for more details on the ABI option limits
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options than are granted. The result is that the pay-performance sensitivity begins
to decline.
6.6 Conclusions
Overall, this chapter has moved beyond the standard empirical linear pay-
performance model (see Hallock and Murphy, 1999) by testing some of the
notions predicted by tournament theory. The established weak pay-performance
relationship has encouraged commentators to seek alternative theoretical
explanations of executive pay outcomes (see for example Gomez-Mejia and
Wiseman, 1997). The results derived from tournament theory predictions are
largely consistent with the empirical work cited, and despite continuing
differences between international corporate governance systems it is arguable
whether this should be a surprising outcome. As Kaplan (1999) notes, different
governance systems generate similar outcomes when they are located within
competitive market economies (see also Conyon and Schwalbach, 1999). The
results provide further non-US evidence that incentives generated by tournament
mechanisms may be important for the operation of European managerial labour
markets.
However, at the micro-economic level, it seems that a richer understanding
of the top pay setting process should take account of the myriad potential factors
that can influence within company incentives and compensation outcomes.
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) review the rich variety of such explanations.
A further strategic management implication of the research may be that linking
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executive pay to measures of corporate performance (although this appears to be
important) may not be the only mechanism to generate management incentives.
The evidence presented on the existence of tournaments in the UK context
indicates that the structure of pay between board members (tournament
participants) can also be important for executive motivation and a consideration in
UK boardroom pay setting processes.
The final section considered the within firm variation of pay-performance
sensitivities. The results indicate that CEOs do have a pay-performance premium
over other executive directors which is consistent with tournament theory. It also
demonstrated how and why pay-performance sensitivities are seen to decline as
executives approach retirement.
The pay-performance sensitivities used in this and previous chapters have
been calculated from directors holdings of share options by applying the Black-
Scholes pricing formula. Although, this is widely accepted practice and used
extensively by other researchers (e.g. Murphy 1999; Hall & Liebman, 1998) such
valuations are built on a number of underlying assumptions which in the context
of executive options may not be valid. The following chapter considers more fully
the incentives provided by options, initially in a Black-Scholes context. It then
considers the effect of relaxing the fundamental assumption of the Black-Scholes
formula that the option risk can be hedged.
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7.1 Introduction
As Chapter Five highlighted, executive options have become an
increasingly significant factor in the remuneration and incentivising of executive
directors. Managerial incentives as a whole can no longer be fully understood
without a solid understanding of the nature and valuation of these instruments.
Since their introduction in the early 1980's, annual grants of options have
soared. As illustrated in Chapter Three, now more than 85% of UK CEOs hold
options and the mean value of current option grants is equivalent to over 40% of
the total cash compensation. In the US, the increase has been even more dramatic,
with the value of the average CEO option grant (Black-Scholes values, inflation
adjusted 1994 dollars) increasing from $155,000 to $1,200,000 between 1980 and
1994 (Hall and Liebman, 1998). More than 90% of all US CEOs currently hold
share options and annual option grants are now often larger on average than salary
and bonus combined.
The aim of this chapter is to develop a deeper understanding of options as
incentive tools and to address some of the short comings of current valuation
methods. More specifically, the chapter focuses on two particular issues.
Firstly, the chapter explains the rationale behind the adoption of executive
options. Options provide a much more efficient means of creating incentives than
equity. This property is demonstrated through the leverage effect of options, the
implication is, however, that companies should increase the number of options
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that they are currently granting. This policy is explored in light of current UK best
practice with respect to the Association of British Insurers guidelines. These
guidelines effective limit the number of options a company can issue to their
directors and consequently, limit the incentives produced.
The second problem addressed is that of CEO risk aversion. Option values
based on the Black-Scholes pricing formula assume the option risk can be hedged,
and hence ignored. This is not the case for CEOs or indeed any other company
director. As a result, risk averse CEOs will place lower values on executive
options than those supplied by the Black-Scholes formula. More importantly, the
subsequent delta of the option will also be lower under a risk averse valuation and
this has important consequences for the provision of CEO incentives.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section
develops the rationale for using share options as incentive tools and explains the
leverage effect of options. Section 7.3 considers the implications of the ABI
guidelines while Section 7.4 accounts for the effects of risk aversion amongst
CEOs. Section 7.5 makes some recommendations to improve current best
practices while final conclusions are drawn in section 7.6.
7.2 The Rationale For Options
This section seeks to provide an explanation for the use of options as the
preferred tool for providing executive incentives. It is once again premised on the
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principal agent results that were presented in Chapter Two and which are further
discussed below.
7.2.1 Aligning the Agent
Chapter Two illustrated the agency problems faced by large modern day
corporations and described two methods for alleviating them. One alternative is to
adopt behaviour based contracts and attempt to improve monitoring such that the
actions of the CEO can be fully observed. Unfortunately, monitoring is typically a
blunt and ineffective solution to the agency problem. There are an innumerable
actions a CEO can take many of which are highly complex. Shareholders typically
do not know what ex ante actions maximise firm value and even if they did,
verifying actions expost is extremely difficult.
Furthermore, in practice, monitoring is done on behalf of the principals
(shareholders) by the board as a whole, in particular by the non-executive
directors. This creates its own principal-agent problem. Who monitors the
monitors? There is no more reason to believe the board will act in the
shareholders' best interests in monitoring the CEO and other executives, than
there is to believe the executives themselves are acting in the best interests of
shareholders. The result is, that even the best monitoring is unlikely to solve or
even substantially reduce the agency problem in large companies.
The alternative solution is to adopt outcome based contracts and attempt to
align the interests of the CEO with that of the shareholders. The most direct way
of reducing agency problems through this means, is through so called, 'high-
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powered' incentive schemes. That is, by tying a large proportion of CEO pay
directly to shareholder wealth.
This, unfortunately, is easier said than done. The sheer size of large
modem companies makes it difficult for CEOs to own any significant proportion
of the firm's equity. Even a wealthy CEO with a personal fortune of £10 million
say, could only purchase less than half of one percent of the average firm in the
main sample22 . Thus they can never become owners themselves in any real sense,
yet they must be incentivised in such a way as to think and behave as if they were.
If significant direct equity ownership is not possible, then options provide
a means of building up the 'effective' ownership stake (see Chapter Five). It is
precisely this, that boards have been attempting to do over the past twenty years.
As vast holdings of options build up over successive years the effective ownership
stake increases and the CEOs will be faced by a much stronger link between pay
and performance.
7.2.2 Pay And Performance
Chapter Five estimated the current pay to performance links in the UK
from equity and option holdings. Virtually all past studies have found that the
elasticity of CEO cash compensation with respect to firm value to be within the
range 0.1 - 0.15 (Rosen, 1992). Hall and Liebman (1998), estimated an elasticity
of 0.24 for the late 1980s and early 1990s which although slightly higher than
previous estimates, still suggests a small relationship between CEO cash pay and
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firm performance. An elasticity of 0.24 implies that an increase in shareholder
wealth of 10% during the year would increase a CEO's salary and bonus payments
by 2.4%. Table 5.1 (page 129) reported the mean total cash pay of CEOs in this
data set to be £413,000, thus a 2.4% increase is equivalent to just £9,912.
Based on the mean total PPS for all the CEOs reported in Chapter Five of
2.34% (see Table 5.2, page 130) and a mean company value of £2233 million, the
same 10% increase in shareholder wealth would increase the value of the mean
CEO's total stock of shares, options and other long term incentive stakes by £5.23
million. That is, while a 10% increase in firm value would increase the mean
CEO's cash compensation by £9,912, indirectly the CEO would receive an
additional £5.23 million through the increase in the value of their shares and
options, more than 500 times the increase from cash compensation.
The fact that equity and share options represent over 99% of the pay-
performance relationship suggests that the annual change in salary and bonus can
all but be ignored. CEOs may give disproportionate weight to annua'l changes in
salary and bonus, partly because they perceive these elements as more tangible and
also because higher direct cash compensation is seen to represent greater status
and power. However, CEOs who fully appreciate their overall compensation
package will realise that it is their equity and share option holdings that hold the
key to realising substantial gains from improvements in the company performance.
22 Based on the market value of the 510 companies at the end of their fiscal periods
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One of the most widely cited estimates of the pay-performance link is
Jensen and Murphy (1990b). They reported that total CEO wealth changed by
only $3.25 cents for every $1,000 change in shareholder value and concluded that
CEOs are essentially paid like bureaucrats. Hall and Liebman's (1998) estimate of
this measure of sensitivity showed that it had essentially doubled between 1980
and 1994, indeed adjusting for size, the sensitivity had increased four fold.
However, while this may represent a substantial increase in sensitivity, reporting
changes in CEO wealth of $3.25 or even $7.5 and $10, misrepresents the pay to
performance link, implying a small and insignificant relationship.
The point is that firm values do not change by a thousand pounds, not even
by tens of thousands of pounds, but by hundreds of thousands, indeed millions.
For example, the mean standard deviation of annual firm returns in the main UK
data sample was 25.6%23. The mean market value of the firms at there fiscal year
end was £2233 million. Based on these figures, a one standard deviation increase
in firm value represents an increase of £572 million in shareholder wealth.
Even based on the Jensen and Murphy sensitivity of $3.25 per $1000, such
an increase would generate an additional return for the CEO of £1.86 million.
Based on the PPS reported here, the CEO would gain an additional £13.38
million. The point is that while swings in CEO wealth may be small in
comparison to changes in firm value, they are large in absolute monetary terms.
23 Based on the second volatility measure VOL2, see Chapter Three for full description.
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7.2.3 Creating Incentives Without Options
In theory boards could use changes in direct pay, salary and bonus, to
motivate managers. However, unless there are dramatic changes in the way that
boards operate, it is unlikely that salary and bonus can ever become an effective
tool for creating the type of high powered incentives that result from executive
share option holdings.
The main problem is that high powered incentives require large swings in
their payouts, both on the upside and the downside. Unfortunately, in the case of
salary and bonus, swings in any direction are resisted. On the upside, very large
bonuses are resisted by what Jensen and Murphy (1990a,b) call implicit
regulation. Executive pay is undoubtedly a politically sensitive topic. Large salary
increases or bonuses tend to attract the attention of the media and the public and
invite criticism, even if the size of the bonuses are small in comparison to the total
increases in shareholder wealth.
A perfect example is the case of Cedric Brown, the CEO of British Gas Plc
in 1995. Following readjustments in the company's remuneration policy towards
its top executives, it was widely reported that British Gas had increased the salary
of its CEO by over 70% to £475,000 per year. Not only did Mr Brown's
remuneration become the focus of attention at the company's 1995 annual general
meeting which attracted over 4500 shareholders, but Mr Brown was forced to
defend his salary before a House of Commons employment committee. Share
option gains, while still inviting some criticism, seem to be less controversial.
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Sam Chisholm of British Sky Broadcasting last year realised over £6 million
through exercising some of his options with almost no public or media reaction.
On the downside, large decreases in salary or bonuses are naturally resisted
by CEOs. Board members are typically quite friendly with the CEO and find it
difficult and awkward to impose large decreases in compensation. Moreover,
compensation consultants can be fired for giving unwelcome advice or more likely
may find it difficult to recruit new clients if they obtain a reputation for austere
pay packages within management circles. As such, they may be reluctant to push
for large decreases in executive pay.
Furthermore, many of the non-executives sitting on today's remuneration
committees are themselves executive directors at other companies. While it may
not be the case that executives from a pair of listed companies advise directly on
each other's pay, the significance of this situation should not be underestimated.
Such individuals, when they sit on remuneration committees are setting, if only
indirectly, the going rate for top managerial personnel, which in turn will be a
factor in the determination of their own remuneration. Finally, as is demonstrated
later in this chapter, CEOs actually lose money from holding options if, as a result
of poor company performance, the share price falls. It is hard to imagine 24 any
board inflicting a negative bonus, which would be the analogous move, on a CEO
in today's boardrooms.
24 Though not impossible, there is one instance (LucasVarity) within the main data set where the
remuneration committee claims negative bonuses will be imposed for poor performance.
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It is therefore unlikely that salary and bonus will ever provide the type of
high-powered incentives that come automatically from equity based assets such as
ordinary shares and options.
7.2.4 Share Options And Incentives
The initial analysis has argued that equity-based pay has become and is
likely to remain the primary driver of pay to performance. The question then
becomes which provides the better incentive, equity or options? To answer this,
the incentives provided by options must be properly understood, something that is
clearly not the case for a large number of executives, the boards that grant the
options or even the policy makers establishing the corporate guidelines and best
practices.
One of the most confusing features about executive share options is their
downside risk. It is commonly argued that call options only have upside potential
whilst equity provides the opportunity for both positive and negative returns. This
is of course not the case, indeed, it can be argued that options have a greater
downside risk than shares.
The view that share options have limited downside risk stems from the fact
that if the share price falls below the exercise price the holder is under no
obligation to exercise the option an incur and immediate loss. Instead he can
allow the option to lapse and make a zero gain. While this is true, it misses the
point. That is, that when the options were granted they had value, just as equity
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itself has value. As the price of the share falls, the value of an option on that share
also falls and the CEO 'loses' money.
This can be made clearer with an illustration. The typical share option
grant is made at the money (i.e. the exercise price is set equal to the share price on
the day of issue) and has a duration of 10 years. Based on the main data set of 510
companies, the mean values of the relevant Black-Scholes variables are as
follows; a dividend rate of 3.25%, a volatility of 26% and a share price of £4.
Assuming a risk-free rate of 8%, these values would price a ten year, at the money
option at £1.41 and yield an option delta of 0.61.
If a company wishes to transfer a wealth equivalent of £100,000 to its
CEO, it can do this either by granting him 25,000 shares (with a value of £4 each)
or 71,117 at the money options (with a value of1.41 each). Table 7.1 shows the
value of both the equity holding and the option holding at the end of the first year
under various year end share prices. If the share price has risen then the CEO can
make a larger gain from holding the options than from holding the equity.
However, he can lose far more when the share price falls. A fall in the share price
to £2 would wipe out half of the CEOs wealth if he held it in equity, but wipes out
over three quarters of it, if the same wealth had been held in options.
In this respect CEOs can and do lose as well as gain from having options
and in both cases the change in wealth can be greater than that from equity alone.
The key is simple, for the same ex ante value transfer to the CEO, a company can
give a greater number of share options than shares, because each option is worth
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less than each share. For at the money options a company can give about three
times as many options as shares for the same ex ante value transfer to the CEO.
	
Year End	 Equity	 Options
	
Share Price	 Value CEO Return Value	 CEO Return
£2.50
£3.00
£3.50
£4.00
£4.50
£5.00
£50,000
£62,500
£75,000
£87,500
£100,000
£112,500
£125,000
-50.0%
-37.5%
-25.0%
-12.5%
0.0%
+12.5%
+25.0%
£22,908
£38,227
£56,099
£75,887
£97,163
£119,504
£142,695
-77.1%
-6 1.8%
-43.6%
-24.1%
-2.8%
+19.5%
+42.7%
Table 7.1: Value of Equity and Options Under Increasing Share Price
The larger number of options more than offsets the lower sensitivity per
option relative to shares, as denoted by the option delta. Granting options at the
money with a delta that is 0.62 means the total sensitivity of options is about 1.7
times higher than that provided by equity. This is the leverage effect of share
options as a compensation tool. The same ex ante transfer of options has more
sensitivity than the equivalent value of shares.
By extension, the same ex ante transfer of out of the money, or premium,
options has greater sensitivity than at the money options. An option with an
exercise price that is 50% above the share price is worth approximately a quarter
of one share, which implies that a company can give about four options for every
share. Each of these out of the money options has a delta of about a half which
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Increase in CEO wealth
from £1 increase in share
equity.
Exercise	 Value of	 Delta
Price	 One Option
price
£0.0025 £25,000
Number of Options
Equivalent to
£100,000
25,0001.00
0.698
0.657
0.606
0.552
0.498
0.449
£2.00
£3.00
£4.00
£5.00
£6.00
£7.00
£4.00
£2.04
£1.69
£1.41
£1.18
£0.99
£0.84
£0.15
£0.01
£20.00
£50.00
0.120
0.013
£34,313
£38,911
£43,092
£46,872
£50,300
£53,427
£79,412
£106,779
49,136
59,201
71,117
84,973
100,903
119,068
660,689
7,936,932
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means the total sensitivity of such an out of the money grant would be twice as
large as that of equity. Out of the money options can thus provide even greater
sensitivity than at the money options for the same transfer value of wealth.
Another example will illustrate this leverage effect more clearly. The
benchmark transfer to the CEO is still £100,000. With a share price of £4, this can
be done as before by granting 25,000 shares. If the share price increases by £1 the
value of the CEO's equity increases by £25,000. Consider again granting an
equivalent value of at money options i.e. X = £4, instead. As can been seen in
Table 7.2, this implies granting the CEO 71,117 options, each with a delta of 0.61.
When the value of one share rises by £1 the CEO's wealth now increases by
£43,092, approximately 1.7 times the increase in wealth from that of holding
Table 7.2: Total Pay-Performance Sensitivities for Varying Exercise Prices
25 This row represents equity directly and not strictly an option at X=0.
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The gain to a CEO from holding out of the money options is even higher.
If the exercise price is set at £6, representing 150% of the current share price, then
the CEO can now be granted 100,903 options, each with a delta of 0.50. A £1
increase in the share price now leads to an overall increase in the CEOs wealth of
£50,300, over twice that from equity.
The same basic logic applies to downward movements in the share price
although the leverage effect of options is slightly smaller in the downward
direction since option deltas fall as the share price falls. The key conclusion is
still that, for the same value transfer to the CEO, options have greater pay to
performance sensitivity both for upward and downward movements, than shares
and out of the money options have greater sensitivity than at the money options.
This relationship is depicted graphically in Figure 7.1 where the incentive
represents the increase in the value of a bundle of options, initially worth
£100,000, from an increase of £1 in the share price.
Xncentive
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.-C	 .1	 1	 ,-i	 i-i	 -	 N	 N	 N
X Price
S	 £4
8%
sigma 26%
T = lOyrs
q	 3.25%
Figure 7.1: The Leverage Effect Of Share Options
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7.3 Leverage And The Association Of British Insurers
Thus far this chapter has considered how companies could potentially
increase the pay-performance sensitivity by providing directors with increased
numbers of premium options. However, in the UK, companies are limited under
Association of British Insurers (ABI) guidelines in the number of options they may
allocate to executives. This section now documents some of the empirical effects
of this rule in terms of how it impacts on the calculated option pay-performance
term.
7.3.1 The ABI Guidelines
In addition to the regulatory framework for disclosure explained in Chapter
Three, UK companies are effectively constrained by the number of share options
that they are permitted to issue. The ABI guidelines (1995,1994) indicate that the
total value of options held by a director should not exceed four times the pay of
that executive. "The total market value of all options granted to any one
participant under any discretionary/executive scheme involving the issue of shares
should not exceed four times (4X) the participant's total annual remuneration (see
paragraph 4.2 of the Guidance Notes). Options having a market value of up to a
further 4X remuneration may be granted in the form of super-options" ABI (1995).
In practice the total market value is calculated as the aggregate face value of the
options, i.e. the sum over all tranches, of the exercise price times the number of
options per tranche.
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7.3.2 The Empirical Gonsequences Of The ABI Rules
The above restriction was tested among the 510 companies constituting the
main data set as described in Chapter Three. For each CEO the aggregate face
value, as defined above, of their total option holding is calculated. In effect, this is
the amount the CEO has to pay in order to buy his option portfolio. This
aggregate figure is then divided by total cash compensation. If the ABI constraint
is binding this ratio will be less than four. Table 7.3 details this variable by size of
enterprise.
Ratio of Face Value of Share options to Total Cash Remuneration By
Firm Sales (millions)
Percentile	 All	 Less than	 £250 to	 £500 to	 Above
Companies	 £250	 £500	 £1,500	 £1,500
5th Percentile	 0.12	 0.36	 0.07	 0.11	 0.05
10th Percentile	 0.49	 0.67	 0.42	 0.34	 0.42
25 Percentile	 1.46	 1.72	 1.18	 1.37	 1.58
50th Percentile	 2.52	 2.64	 1.87	 2.25	 2.86
75th Percentile	 3.91	 3.91	 3.04	 3.80	 4.32
90th Percentile	 6.27	 5.91	 5.59	 5.21	 g. 13'
95th Percentile 	 9.73	 8.74	 8.98	 7.41	 11.85
Average	 3.65	 4.33	 3.35	 2.82	 3.80
Table 7.3: Ratio Of Face Value Of Share Options To
Remuneration By Firm Sales
The results indicate that the "four times" rule is in fact a binding constraint
for the median company in all size bands. Also, except for firms with less than
£250 million in sales revenue the average of this ratio is also less than 4 and is
only 4.3 in this smallest sales band. Indeed even at the 75th percentile, the four-
times rule is adhered to taking all the companies together, and in three of the four
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size bands when by splitting by company sales. The implication of this is that
most companies are complying with the ABI limit in restricting the number of
options that they issue. As will be seen below, this has implications for the
provision of share option incentives.
The leverage effect of share options can also be evaluated empirically
using the share option data described in Chapter Three. Table 7.4 examines this
effect for the 510 companies in the main UK data set. Row 1 details the original
stock of equity shares held by the 510 CEOs. The mean (median) pay-
performance sensitivity is 2.13% (0.05%). If the share price at the end of 5 years
is the same as the beginning of period share price then the CEO would receive
£366,000 if the shares were exchanged for cash. If the end of period share price is
200% of the opening period share price (i.e. the share price doubles) then the CEO
would receive £732,000.
Row 2 considers exchanging the CEOs equity holdings for an equivalent
value of 5 year share options with an exercise price equal to 100% of the
beginning period stock price (i.e. issuing at-the-money share options). The mean
(median) pay-performance sensitivity is now 2.16% (0.08%) i.e. an increase
relative to that from holding equity. If the share price at the end of the period is
unchanged then the median CEO now receives no payout. In this case though a
rise of 200% in the share price yields a total cash payout of £1,425,000 for the
CEO, nearly double that received from holding equity (ignoring dividend
payments).
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Original Stock of
Equity Shares
Exercise price as
% of Stock price
£0
	
£712
£0
	
£577
£0
	
£243
£0
	
£0
£0
	
£0
£0
	
£0
Chapter Seven - Option Incentives & Risk Aversion
Pay-Performance	 Median Cash Payout after 5 years from a Final
Sensitivity (%)	 Stock Price Determined as a Percentage of
Opening Stock Price (000)
Average	 Median	 100%	 150%	 200%	 250%
2.135%	 0.053%
	
£366
	
£549
	
£732	 £915
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
2.161%
2.436%
2.696%
2.941%
3. 170%
3 .3 84%
0.079%
0.090%
0. 102%
0. 109%
0.118%
0. 126%
£1,425
£1,540
£1,458
£1,411
£995
£0
£2,137
£2,502
£2,673
£3,174
£3,344
£3,313
Table 7.4: Share Option Leverage Effects, Pay-Performance Sensitivities, and
CEO Compensation Payouts.
Rows 3 to 7 consider the issuing of premium options. By illustration
consider a premium option issued with an exercise price of 160% of the current
share price. In this case the mean (median) pay performance term is 2.94%
(0.11%). The payoff in this case is zero when the stock price is increased by only
100% or 150%. With performance at 200% of the original stock price, then the
payoff reaches £1,411,000.
In general Table 7.4 illustrates the following. First, the pay performance
sensitivity increases in line with the exercise price of the option being granted. In
this respect premium options are (a) preferred to incentives from holding equity
and (b) preferred relative to issuing at the money options. That is premium
options deliver better share option incentives. Second, the level of performance
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necessary to trigger any payout is increasing in the level of the premium, as is the
rate of increase in the payoff once it has been triggered. In this way, premium
options have intrinsic performance criteria built in and remove the need for
additional performance criteria such as earnings per share growth targets, to be
attached.
Given the way the aggregate value of options is calculated, i.e. the sum
over all tranches of the exercise price times the number of options per tranche, if
the ABI guideline is to be adhered to then the higher the option price at the date of
grant, the smaller the number of options that can be granted. Exactly the opposite
of that proposed above. Increasing the exercise price of course also reduces the
delta of each option, thus if companies continue to abide by the ABI guideline,
granting out of the money options would result in the CEO being granted fewer
options, each with a smaller sensitivity and consequently having a lower total PPS.
Indeed, to maximise the PPS while abiding by the four times rule,
companies should instead grant deep in the money options, this would enable large
numbers to be granted. The Greenbury recommendations of course now preclude
the granting of discounted options, the minimum price at which options can be
granted is the current share price and this is what is observed in practice.
Summarising to date, this chapter has illustrated the leverage effect from
share options in the data. It has shown that the pay-performance sensitivity
increases by about 60% as one moves from an at the money option to a premium
option whose exercise price is set at twice the at the money option. It has also
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demonstrated that premium options imply larger payouts for good performance but
no payouts for average or minimal stock price appreciation. Remuneration
committees of company boards that want to increase the sensitivity of executive
reward plans can do so by (a) transferring the same ex ante value of stock to share
options for the executive and (b) considering issuing these as out of the money
options rather than at the money options.
Secondly, UK regulations impose a "four times" remuneration constraint
on the award of executive options. This constraint is adhered to by the majority of
CEOs in the data. Effectively, this places a practical limit on the number of
options that can be awarded. Furthermore, because the value of the option is taken
to be the exercise price, the higher this exercise price is set, the lower the number
of options granted must be in order to remain within the four times limit. The
implication is that for companies wishing to grant large numbers of options they
would have to issue them at the minimum acceptable exercise price (i.e. at the
money options). Since the pay-performance sensitivity is increasing in the
exercise price, accordingly, the "four time" rule blunts UK executive incentives.
7.4 Risk Averse CEOs
A lifting of the four times rule is thus in the interests of shareholders, it
would enable companies to grant greater numbers of out of the money options
which would increase the pay to performance sensitivity of the CEOs and other
executive directors. If this step is taken (as seems likely under current reforms),
the problem becomes where to set the exercise price? For a given cost to the
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company, is there an optimal, realistic exercise price that companies should
choose in order to maximise the pay to performance sensitivity?
It is important to fully appreciate the nature of the problem. The analysis
here does not seek to determine the optimal value or cost to the company of the
option grant, that is should the company grant options at a cost to itself of
£100000, £200000 or £300000? Instead, the problem addressed is, for some
predetermined fixed cost to the company, what is the optimal exercise price of the
option grant. As far as the company is concerned, the optimal exercise price is
one that maximises shareholder wealth. For the principal agent model presented
in Chapter Two, if costs are fixed, this occurs when the effort of the agent is
maximised. The only assumption here is that effort is maximised when the
incentives are maximised. Such an assumption is supported by Kahn and Sherer
(1990) who demonstrated that managers with high sensitivities to bonus payments
tended to have higher subsequent evaluations.
With a current share price of £4, granting options at £6 with a life of ten
years seems fairly reasonable. The CEO only has to achieve growth rates of 10%
and the option will move into the money within 5 years. However, the pay to
performance sensitivity can theoretically be increased still further, by granting the
options at £7 instead of £6. From Table 7.2 this would increase the sensitivity by
another £3000. But why stop there? Issuing deep out of the money options with
an exercise price of £20, increases the pay to performance incentive to £80,000
and with an exercise price of50, it jumps to well over £100,000.
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Indeed, for the average company, the further out of the money the option
goes, the greater the total sensitivity will be for a given value transfer to the CEO.
However, while most CEOs would probably be confident of achieving a 50% rise
in their share price over ten years, very few would be willing to gamble on the
kind of rises required to make the latter options have any intrinsic value. The
answer lies in the risk aversion of the CEOs.
Black-Scholes valuations are based on a risk neutral framework stemming
from the fact that the holder of an option can hedge away all the risk. This is of
course not the case for the CEO. He is precluded from hedging the risk of holding
the option and therefore a risk neutral valuation is not appropriate. The value he
places on the option will thus depend on how risk averse he is.
It therefore becomes necessary to value the option from the perspective of
a risk averse CEO. This can be done in a general sense but the following analysis
considers results based on a typical UK CEO. From Chapter Two, the typical
CEO26
 holds approximately 105,000 equity shares, (call this Q) holds 320,000
options (N) that are approximately £1.50 in the money (let X 1 denote the exercise
price of these options. Although the options currently held by CEOs typically
have 7 years left to run, to ease the analysis assume that all existing options, like a
newly issued options will expire in 10 years. The values for volatility, dividend
yield and share price are as used above, namely 26%, 3.25% and £4 respectively.
Finally assume the same CEO has a personal safe wealth of £3 million.
26 Figures represent median values from the data set
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Suppose a company wants to reward its executive at a cost to itself of
£100,000. The question then is how should the company transfer this wealth to
the CEO in order to maximise the incentive of the director to pursue the goal of
increasing shareholder wealth?
The company can largely hedge the risk of the options it writes. Thus the
Black-Scholes valuations are a reasonable approximation of the cost of the options
to the company. Therefore, still working the options depicted in Table 7.1, if the
company chooses to set the exercise price of the options it issues at £4, it can grant
70,922 options to the CEO. If it increases the option exercise price to £6, it can
issue 101,010 options for the same cost. Let X2 denote the exercise price of the
new options the company chooses to issue and P the number of options issued.
To value the options from the CEOs point of view requires some
assumptions about his utility preferences. The following analysis explores the
case where the CEO has a power utility function (U), although of course it can be
extended to any utility preference framework that is deemed suitable. The utility
from a given level of wealth W, is thus given as;
WI-i
u(w) =___
1—y
where gamma is the coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion:
U,,
U,
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The mechanism used to determine the value the CEO places on the options
is based on that used by Murphy (1999)27. The idea is to determine how many of a
particular option the CEO needs to receive before he is indifferent between
receiving that bundle of options and £100,000 cash. This is done as follows.
If the CEO receives the £100,000 as cash, his personal safe wealth (C) now
stands at £3.1 million. The expected utility of the CEOs wealth is then calculated
at the end of the ten years. The safe wealth is assumed to earn the risk-less rate
(8%) over the period. The remaining elements that determine the CEOs total
wealth, his equity, old options and newly granted options (of which there are none
at present, i.e. P=0) are all dependent on the final company share price. If the final
share price is equal to S 10 then the final level of wealth is given by:
W= C(1+r)'°+Qxs 10 +Nxmax(0, (S10_ X 1 ))+Pxmax(0, (s10_X2))
Assuming the share price has a log normal distribution it is possible to
estimate the share price in ten years, this enables the final level of wealth to be
calculated and hence the total utility estimated.
It is of course the expected utility that is of interest and thus it is the
distribution of the final share price and not the expected final share price that is
critical.	 The expected utility can be estimated by creating a discrete
27 My thanks to Kevin Murphy for supplying the algorithm for pricing options in this manner.
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approximation to the distribution of the final share price, which is the approach
taken below.
Assuming the share price follows a geometric Brownian motion process
then its rate of return can be described as;
=	 + cidz
where
= the instantaneous expected rate of return
= the instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return
dt = a small increment in time
dz = a Wiener process
In this case the returns to the share R defined as ln (S/S), are normally
distributed with a mean and standard deviation as follows:
R, N[ln(So)+[u__Jt72tJ
where
So is the share price at time zero.
The approximation to the normal is made by dividing the distribution into
12000 separate bands. This is done for the standard normal distribution by taking
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bands from -6 to +6 through increments of 0.001. The probability associated with
each band is calculated by reference to standard normal tables. Finally a share
price is allocated to each band equal to the median share price over the increment.
This generates 12000 final share prices each with an individual probability
of occurring. The expected utility can then be calculated as:
E[U] =	 p1U(14)
where p1 (i =1 to 12000) is the probability of share price S 1 occurring and W1 is the
final level of wealth calculated from a final share price of Si.
This gives the amount of utility the CEO receives from being granted
£100,000 cash and no new options. The analysis is now repeated assuming that
instead of receiving the cash, the CEO receives P options, each with an exercise
price of X2 That is, his safe wealth is once again £3m and P is now non-zero.
The value of P, the number of options granted to the CEO, is then adjusted
until the two utilities, that from having options and that from having no options
are equal. This P represents the number of options that the CEO values as
equivalent to having the £100,000 in cash. Accordingly the value of each
individual option can be determined as £100,000/P.
203
Chapter Seven - Option Incentives & Risk Aversion
The final step is to determine the incentive effect from holding P options.
This is given by the number of options multiplied by the delta of the option. The
delta represents the derivative of the call value with respect to a change in share
price. Usually this term is immediately available from the Black-Scholes pricing
formula, however in this case the delta has to be approximated as;
AS
Thus having determined the number and price of options that equalises the
utilities, the price of the options is recalculated for a small increase in the initial
share price AS. The resulting change in the option value can then be used to
estimate the delta of the option. Having determined the overall incentive effects
of the option package, the whole process can then be repeated for a different
exercise price and the new incentive calculated.
7.4.1 Utility Results
In addition to the variables relating to the option characteristics and the
CEOs general level of wealth, there are two further inputs to determine before the
simulation can be run. They are the levels of risk aversion of the CEO and the
market in general. The risk aversion of the CEO is determined by the Relative
Risk Aversion (RRA) coefficient. The higher the value of RRA the more risk
averse the individual is. The risk aversion of the market in general is represented
by the market risk premium, again the higher the market premium, the more risk
averse the market.
204
chapter Seven - Option incentives & Risk Aversion
As a simple example, assume both the market and the CEO are risk
neutral, the RRA becomes zero as does the market premium. In this case the
utility model produces values equivalent to the Black-Scholes option values, as
one would expect.
Typical estimates of the RRA place it about 2 (Friend & Blume, 1975),
while historical estimates of the equity premium place it at about 8%.
Unfortunately, research has shown that these two figures seem theoretically
inconsistent with each other. Mehra and Prescott (1985) were the first to identify
this paradox which in light of their paper has come to be known as the "Equity
Premium Puzzle". A thorough analysis of the problem is provided by
Kocherlakota (1996) and Siegel and Thaler (1997), while Freeman and Davidson
(1999) provide a UK perspective. In short however, the problem is that observed
market premia imply levels of RRA well in excess of the observed values of 2,
indeed the implied figure is much nearer 20 than 2.
Needless to say, it is not within the scope of this thesis to address this
paradox, suffice to say applying a market premium of % wlle us
	 RRA of 2
is not appropriate. Instead, to produce a balanced framework, once the RRA is
set, the market premium is estimated, by setting it to a value such that the utility
model prices a deep in the money option (exercise price just above zero) at a
Black-Scholes price. This represents an upper limit on the value of the market
premium, since any premium above this would result in the utility model
calculating a risk averse price higher than the Black-Scholes risk neutral price for
some option. This method will of course slightly over estimate the risk premium,
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but will provide a significantly better estimate of the market premium consistent
with a particular level of RRA than will the historical estimate.
The results based on the typical CEO figures detailed above are illustrated
in Table 7.5. The figures in this table assume the CEO has a RRA of 2. Based on
the procedure outlined above, this is reflected in a market premium of 4.46%. As
expected the risk averse values are lower than those provided by the Black-
Scholes formula. The important feature however is that the risk averse values
decrease more quickly than the Black-Scholes values as the exercise price of the
option is increased. For an exercise price of £1, the risk averse value represents
99% of the Black-Scholes value. However, for an exercise price of £13 this has
fallen to 50% and at an exercise price of £22, the risk averse valuation is now just
11% of the Black-Scholes value.
Exercise	 Black-	 Black-
Price	 Scholes	 Scholes
Value	 Delta
Risk Averse	 Risk Averse	 Total
	
Total
Value	 Delta	 Incentive	 Incentive
Black- 	 Risk Averse
Scholes
1.00
4.00
7.00
10.00
13.00
16.00
19.00
22.00
	
2.444
	
0.720	 2.423	 0.555	 29449
	
1.406	 0.606
	
1.27 1
	
0.466	 43092
	
0.840
	
0.449	 0.650
	
0.322	 53427
	
0.529	 0.325	 0.337
	
0.2 11	 61407
	
0.349
	
0.237
	
0.175
	
0.137
	
67874
	
0.239
	
0.175	 0.088	 0.088
	
73304
	
0.169	 0.132	 0.039	 0.056	 77985
	
0.122
	
0.100
	
0.013
	
0.033
	
82097
Table 7.5: Analysis of Biack-Scholes and Utility Based Option
Values and Incentives
22720
33160
38348
39839
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36893
32991
26737
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A similar pattern is observed across the option deltas. Again, deltas
calculated under the utility framework are always less than those supplied by the
Black-Scholes formula. Furthermore, as the exercise price of the option increases
the risk averse delta falls from 77% of the Black Scholes delta (X=1) to 33% of
the Black-Scholes delta (X=22). It is this rapid decline in the option delta that is
of crucial importance in the provision of CEO incentives.
Figure 7.2: Total Incentive Based On Utility Valuation
(RRA=2, Market Premium =4.46%)
The final two columns of Table 7.5 show the total incentive (represented
as the increase in the value of the options from a £1 increase in the share price)
derived from an option grant costing the company £100,000. The Black-Scholes
total incentive, replicates the result depicted in Figure 7.1. here the further the
options are granted out of the money, the increased number of options that can be
granted more than off sets the fall in the option delta resulting in a greater total
incentive. This is not the case in the utility model. The figures in the final column
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are graphed in Figure 7.2 and clearly show that the total incentive is no longer an
increasing function in the exercise price.
In this case, the risk averse CEO places very little value on deep out of the
money options. The result is that as the exercise price increases, the drop in the
delta is no longer offset by the increased number of options that can be granted
and the total incentive falls. Based on the above figure, CEO incentives would be
maximised by granting options with an exercise price of about £10.5. With an
initial share price of £4, an annual growth rate of 15%, which is certainly an
achievable target, would put the option into the money in approximately 7 years,
well inside the 10 year life of the option.
Figure 7.3: Total Incentive Based On Utility Valuation
(RRA=3, Market Premium = 6.87%)
Choosing a RRA of 3 instead of 2 produces similar results. In this case,
the market premium is estimated at 6.87% and the resulting incentives are graphed
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in Figure 7.3. Again, the total incentive is seen to be concave, this time reaching a
peak at about £8.1. That is, as the CEO becomes more risk averse, the optimum
exercise price reduces.
It could of course be argued that CEOs may be more risk averse than the
market in general since they are investing their labour as well as their wealth in the
company. In this case, the market premium is set at 4.46%, a level consistent with
a RRA of 2, while the RRA of the CEO is raised to 3. These results are graphed
in Figure 7.4. Once again the same concave relationship is observed, with the
maximum incentive now achieved at a much lower exercise price of just £5.6.
26
24
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Figure 7.4: Total Incentive Based On Utility Valuation
(RRA=3, Market Premium = 4.46%)
The results presented here suggest that if remuneration committees
continue the trend of issuing ten-year options, than granting premium options with
an exercise price set at between twice and three times the current share price will
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optimise the incentives faced by executives. The results are reasonably robust to
changes in the underlying variables. For example, increasing the safe wealth of
the CEO to £5 million in the initial analysis yields an optimum exercise price of
£11.1 compared to £10.5 for a safe wealth of £3 million. Increasing the safe
wealth still further to £10 million results in an optimum exercise price of £13.2.
Alternatively, doubling the CEOs holding of equity in the initial analysis (i.e. safe
wealth of £3 million) to 210,000 shares only results in an increase of £0.1 in the
optimum exercise price.
7.5 Creating Better Incentives
This final section draws together the results of the chapter to date and
makes some recommendations to improve the current best practices in the UK.
The previous analysis has clearly shown how options can be used to increase the
incentives faced by the CEO to maximise shareholder wealth. For this to work
however, CEOs must be fully aware of the size of their option holdings and how
these derivatives are valued.
There seems to be little evidence of this in practice. Indeed, in some cases,
it seems that CEOs have no idea how much their options are worth. More
importantly, they do not understand how much their option packages change with
changes in the value of their companies.
Hall (1998) suggests that in an attempt to 'educate' the CEOs, boards
should adopt a formal practice of valuing their executive's options each quarter.
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He proposes this quarterly 'scoring' could be coupled with a straightforward
sensitivity analysis, which shows the executive how much his or her option
package changes with various changes, upwards and downwards, in the
company's share price. This scoring system would provide clear benefits in terms
of making the incentives work,
Of course making CEOs fully aware of the value of their equity and option
holdings and how closely they are linked to company performance will
unavoidably give rise to a new conflict. The goal of any incentive-based pay is to
align the incentives of managers with the goals of owners. Such alignment often
conflicts with the preferences of risk averse CEOs. A good incentive contract will
generally have the feature that the CEO will want to shed some of the company's
risk. There is no escaping the problem that high-powered incentives put some
CEO wealth at risk, which is undesirable for risk-averse CEOs who want their
portfolios to be better diversified.
Ofek and Yermack (1997) argue that CEOs can, and do, hedge some of
their risk by selling their shares and exercising their options. This is of course
counter-productive to the goal of equity-based pay. Thus CEOs must be
encouraged or forced to hold on to their equity and options.
7.5.1 Vesting Periods
In light of the above problem Hall (1998) proposes increasing the vesting
periods of options in an attempt to prolong the period options are held for. This
however is a double-edged sword. While it may force CEOs to retain their options
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for longer, it would reduce their effectiveness as incentive tools. Consider again
the standard at the money option.
Time to
	 Value of One	 Delta	 Number of Options
maturity	 Option	 Equivalent to £100,000
4
	 £1.00	 0.645	 100,000
6
	 £1.20	 0.640	 83,333
8
	
£1.32
	
0.626
	
75,758
10	 £1.41
	
0.606	 70,922
12
	
£1.45
	
0.583	 68,966
14
	
£1.48	 0.55 8	 67,751
16	 £1.48	 0.532	 67,659
Total Pay to
Performance
Sensitivity
£64,500
£53,333
£47,424
£42,979
£40,207
£37,805
£35,995
Table 7.6: Sensitivity of Options With Respect to Time
The analysis is based on the Black-Scholes valuations but an equivalent
pattern emerges under the utility pricing method detailed in Section 7.4. Table 7.6
illustrates that increasing the time to maturity of this option increases its value but
reduces its delta and consequently the net incentive produced for a fixed value
grant of options declines as the time to maturity increases. While this will not
always be the case since it is possible for the delta to rise as the time to maturity
increases, (see Figure 2.3, page 50) it is the likely scenario in the majority of cases.
Consequently, simply increasing the life span or vesting period of executive
options is not conducive to increasing the pay to performance sensitivity.
A second alternative is to establish guidelines or goals for the minimum
overall numbers of shares and share options that CEOs must hold. Many
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companies have established ownership guidelines in recent years, for example,
many CEOs are expected to hold shares that are valued at four or five times their
salary and bonus. However target share ownership alone is not enough, since it
can encourage CEOs to exercise their share options and use the profits to buy
shares to meet such targets. This essentially deleverages their position in the
company, which reduces the alignment of their incentives with those of
shareholders. The policy implication of this is obvious, ownership guidelines
should include share options as well as shares and be structured so that options
become the preferred asset for CEOs to hold. Furthermore, guidelines should
stress that such targets are minimum requirements, with no upper limit being
placed on CEO equity and option ownership.
7.5.2 Indexed Options
The analysis to date has supported the policy of granting options with a
fixed exercise price set above the current market share price. Indexed options can
provide similar advantages. Because the (expected) exercise price is higher than
the current share price, indexed options are leveraged in a similar way to premium
options. Therefore, greater incentives can be provided for the same transfer of
wealth than issuing standard at the money options. However, they have the
obvious advantage that CEOs are not rewarded or punished for overall movements
in the share market.
On the downside though, with indexed options it does become possible for
executives to receive a payout from a negative share price performance. For
indexed options to have value, the company's share price only has to outperform
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the group of companies that the exercise price is indexed to. If the index falls
10%, the CEO will be rewarded for any performance better than that - even a
negative return of say 5%. It is of course a questionable point as to whether
executives should ever be rewarded - in addition to their salary and any bonus
payments, for achieving negative absolute growth, even if that growth represents a
relatively good performance. The shareholders themselves have made a real lose
and perhaps in these circumstances the CEO should not be seen to be making
additional gains. A simple remedy to this would be to set the market price at the
date of issue as a minimum, below which the exercise price is not allowed to fall.
Given the above, premium and indexed options are likely to be popular
with both shareholders and the public. With premium options, it is clear that
CEOs have to substantially raise the share price before they receive any payoff.
With indexed options, CEOs only make a profit if their company's share price
performance beats the comparator group the exercise price is linked to. Both types
of options make it more difficult for the CEO to make any gains unless the
company has performed well, in a sense both have implicit performance criteria
attached that need to be met before the options can be exercised.
7.6 Conclusions
The chapter began by illustrating the leverage effect of options and
demonstrating how the ABI "four times" guideline impacts on the provision of
incentives in the UK. This constraint is adhered to by the majority of CEOs in the
data effectively placing a practical limit on the number of options that can be
214
Chapter Seven - Option incentives & Risk Aversion
awarded. Furthermore, because the value of the option is taken to be the exercise
price, the higher this exercise price is set, the lower the number of options granted
must be in order to remain within the four times limit. The implication is that for
companies wishing to grant large numbers of options they would have to issue
them at the minimum acceptable exercise price (i.e. at the money options). The
analysis showed that the pay-performance sensitivity derived from the Black-
Scholes formula were increasing in the exercise price and according, the "four
time" rule blunts UK executive incentives.
Secondly, the chapter addressed the issue of risk aversion amongst CEOs.
The results demonstrated that for a typical CEO, relaxing the inappropriate
assumption that option risk can be hedged has important consequences in the
provision of incentives. Incentives are no longer an increasing function in the
option grant exercise price, instead there is an optimal and economically sensible
exercise price for companies to set to maximise the immediate incentive created
for their CEO. This optimal exercise price is negatively correlated with the level
of risk aversion of the CEO.
Finally, the chapter made some recommendations for remuneration
committees to consider in the granting of further options. While the explosion in
CEO share option awards during the past 15 years has had the desired effect of
creating a stronger link between CEO pay and firm performance, there are still a
variety of ways in which current compensation practices can be improved. In
particular, both premium options and indexed options have significant advantages
over the current practice of issuing only at the money options. Indeed, given the
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leverage benefits of premium and indexed options together with their appeal to
shareholders, their almost complete absence as a compensation tool for top
executives is puzzling.
In addition, incentives would be improved significantly if boards adopted
the practice of valuing or 'scoring' the CEO's option packages on a regular basis.
Pay to performance incentives are undermined to the extent that the executives
they are meant to motivate do not understand them. Finally shortening share
option vesting periods while creating ownership guidelines that recommend
minimum holdings of equity and in particular options, represent two
straightforward ways of increasing the pay to performance sensitivity and
sustaining such increases into the future.
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Conclusions
Chapter Eight - Conclusions
8.1 Summary Of Findings
The main objective of this thesis has been to shed light on the extent and
the purpose of the large option portfolios typically held by the CEOs of large UK
publicly quoted companies. The data necessary to do this has only become
available in the last few years since the implementation of the recommendations
made in the Greenbury report in 1995. The general level of option disclosure now
available in the UK is unparalleled both historically in this country and to that
currently available in the United States.
Chapter Two provided the theoretical foundations for the thesis by
reviewing the principal-agent model and basic option theory. It further reviewed
the relevant literature and identified the gaps in current research that this thesis
addresses.
Chapter Three detailed the construction of the main data set of 510 of the
largest UK quoted companies, representing 97% of the London Stock Market at
the date the sample was taken. The unique feature of the main data set is, as
mentioned above, the richness of the option information obtained. It enables, for
the first time, a full examination of the complete compensation packages that are
currently being offered to the UK's leading executives.
Chapter Four considered the information disclosed about directors share
options in a sample of UK companies in 1994 and 1995. The results presented
here add to the recent UK corporate governance literature. The chapter first
provided a benchmark for the level of share option disclosure in UK companies
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prior to the introduction and acceptance of the Greenbury recommendations. It
demonstrated that even at this time, for a majority of companies there was
sufficient information to value directors' options, a result which contrasts with
earlier academic findings (e.g. Forker, 1992).
Secondly, it modelled the decision to disclose share option information as
a function of the proprietary costs of disclosing the information. Two substantive
results were established here. Firstly, that the level of information disclosed about
share options is a positive function of the presence of non-executive directors.
This is evidence in favour of the monitoring function of non-executives and adds
to the growing evidence concerning the effects of board structure on firm
performance. Secondly, it documented a negative correlation between option
information disclosed and corporate size. This is consistent with earlier findings
that suggest that larger firms suffer propriety and political costs from information
disclosure.
Chapter Five considered the provision of share options in the UK. Using
the main data set it demonstrated a number of key features relating to the valuation
and incentives arising from share options. It highlighted the differing levels of the
disclosure of option information in the UK and the US. It demonstrated that when
looking at all companies together, neither the US nor the concise UK reporting
system economically affected the valuation of the stock of share options or the
calculated option pay-performance parameter. However, it goes on to demonstrate
that with regard to US disclosure, there are in fact two areas of mispricing, both of
which are significant in their own right, but opposite directions, which at this
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moment in time happen to cancel each other out. The mispricing with respect to
the restricted information provided in the UK is less marked, and although there is
significant mispricing of out of the money options, there is no reason to suggest
that the level of the bias should change in the future.
Chapter Six moved beyond the standard empirical linear pay-performance
models and considered the notions predicted by tournament theory. Past inability
to establish any significant pay-performance relationship encouraged some
commentators to seek alternative theoretical explanations of executive pay
outcomes. This chapter tested three distinct hypothesis associated with tournament
theory predictions. The empirical findings were consistent with tournament theory
in that they did find both a convex relationship between executive compensation
and organisational level and that the tournament prize (gap) and the number of
contestants are positively correlated. However, little evidence was found in
support of hypothesis three that corporate performance is positively correlated
with executive wage dispersion. The results however provide further non-US
evidence that incentives generated by tournament mechanisms may be important
for the operation of European managerial labour markets.
The final section considered the within firm variation of pay-performance
sensitivities. The results indicate that CEOs do have a pay-performance premium
over other executive directors which is consistent with tournament theory. It also
demonstrated how and why pay-performance sensitivities are seen to decline as
executives approach retirement.
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Chapter Seven demonstrated the leverage effect of options and the
implications of the UK regulation that imposes a "four times" remuneration
constraint on the award of executive options. This constraint is adhered to by the
majority of CEOs in the data. The analysis showed that the pay-performance
sensitivity could be increased by granting greater numbers of executive options
and as such the AIBI four-times limit blunts UK executive incentives.
Having established that companies can increase the pay-performance
sensitivity by granting out of the money options, Chapter Seven then attempted to
determine exactly how far out of the money options should be granted. Results
based on the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula implied that the final
incentive could be increased indefinitely by granting the options further and
further out of the money.	 Black-Scholes valuations however, although
predominately used in the literature are not perfectly applicable to executive
options. The inability of executives to hedge their option holdings means the risk
neutral Black-Scholes valuations over state the value of the options to the risk
averse executives, a result that is exaggerated for high risk, deep out of the money
options.
The utility model approach to valuing the options, demonstrated that there
is in fact an optimal exercise price at which to maximise the incentive of the
executive. Based on a 'typical' CEO it demonstrated how premium options, with
a realistic and achievable exercise price can be optimal.
Finally Chapter Seven concluded by making a number of policy
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recommendations to improve the provision of incentives in UK firms.
Specifically, the ABI four times limit should be replaced with guidelines on
minimum target equity and option holdings for CEOs and executive directors.
Secondly, premium and indexed options should be issued in place of the currently
issued at the money options. Finally, the time to maturity of options should be
reduced to increase their sensitivity.
8.2 Conclusions
This thesis has made several new contributions to the executive
compensation literature. Many of the advances are a direct result of the utilisation
of previously unavailable data. The increased levels of disclosure in modern day
remuneration reports have provided the opportunity to fully investigate the state
and impact of executive option holdings in the UK. The results presented here
demonstrate how options are now an important element in almost every executive
remuneration package. While their use has already begun to strengthen the pay to
performance link in the UK, this thesis has also illustrated on a theoretical level
how options could be better used to further align the goals of managers and
shareholders. Indexed and premium options are undoubtedly the remuneration
tools of the future, it will be interesting to see how quickly their use becomes the
norm rather than the exception.
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Appendix One: Full List of Companies in Main Data Set.
Company
1 Abbey National
2 Abbot Group
3 Abbott Mead Vickers
4 Aberdeen Asset Management
5 Admiral
6 Aea Technology
7 Aegis Group
8 Aggregate Industries
9 Air tours
10 Aibright & Wilson
11 Alfred McAlpine
12 Ailders
13 Allen
14 Alliance & Leicester
15 Alliance Unichein
16 Allied Domecq
17 Alpha Airports
18 Amec
19 Amey
20 Amves cap
21 Andrews Sykes
22 Ange. Undwrt. Tst.
23 Anglian Group
24 Anglian Water
25 Anite Group
26 Antofagasta Hdg.
27 API Group
28 Argos
29 Arjo Wiggins Appleton
30 Arriva
31 Ascot
32 Asda
33 Ash teed Group
34 Associated British Foods
35 Associated British Ports
36 Astec (BSR)
37 Atkins WS
38 Avis Europe
39 Avon Rubber
40 BAA
41 Baird (William)
42 Bank of Scotland
43 Barclays
44 Barra t t Developments
45 Bass
46 BAT
47 BBA
48 Beazer Group
49 Bell way
50 Bemrose Corpora ti on
51 Benchmark Group
Company
52 Ben sford
53 Berkeley Group
54 Bespak
55 BG
56 BICC
57 Bil ton
58 Black (Peter)
59 Blue Circle
60 BOC
61 Body Shop Intl.
62 Bodycote
63 Booker
64 Boots
65 Bowthorpe
66 Boxmore Intl.
67 BP
68 BPB
69 BPP Holdings
70 Bradford Pr.
71 Brake Brothers
72 Bremnmer
73 Britannic Assurance
74 Bnitax International
75 British Aerospace
76 British Airways
77 British Biotech
78 British Energy
79 British Land Company
80 British Polythene Industries
81 British Sky Broadcasting Group
82 British Steel
83 British Telecom
84 British Vita
85 British-Borneo Pet. Syn.
Brixton Estate
87 Brown (N) Group
88 Bryant Group
89 BTG
90 BTP
91 BTR
92 Bulmer (Hp)
93 Bunzl
94 Burford Holdings
95 Burmah Castrol
96 Burton Group
97 Business Post
98 Cable & Wireless
99 Cadbury Schweppes
100 Cairn Energy
101 Caledonia Investments
102 Cap. &Regl . Pr.
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103 Cap.Shop.Cents.
104 Capita Group
105 Capital Radio
106 Caradon
107 Canton Communication
108 Carpetright
109 Cattles
110 Celltech
111 Centrica
112 Charter
113 Chelsfield
114 Chiroscience Group
115 Christie's International
116 Chrysalis Group
117 City Centre Restaurants
118 Close Brothers
119 Cls Holdings
120 CMG
121 Coats Viyella
122 Cobham
123 Colt Telecom
124 Commercial Union
125 Community Hospitals
126 Compass Group
127 Cookson
128 Cordiant Comms.Gp.
129 Corporate Services Group
130 Courtaulds
131 Courtaulds Text.
132 Courts
133 Cox Insurance
134 Croda Intl.
135 CRT
136 Daejan Holdings
137 Daily Mail'A'
138 Dairy Crest
139 Danka Business Systems
140 Davis Service Group
141 De La Rue
142 Delphi
143 Delta
144 Dennis Group
145 Derwent Valley
146 Devro
147 Dewhirst Group
148 DFS Furniture Co.
149 Diageo
150 Diagonal
151 Dialog Corporation
152 Dixons Group
153 Domestic & General
154 Dorling Kinder.
155 Druid
156 Edin.Fund Mgrs.Group
157 EidoS
158 Eis Group
159 ElectrocompOnents
160 Elementis
161 Ellis & Everard
162 Emap
163 EMI Group
164 Eng.China Clays
165 Enterprise Inns
166 Enterprise Oil
167 Euromoney Pubs.
168 Eurotherm
169 Eurotunnel Units
170 Evans of Leeds
171 Expro Intl.
172 Fairey Group
173 Fenner
174 Fi Group
175 Fibernet Group
176 Field Group
177 Filtronic
178 Fine Art Developments
179 Finelist
180 First Choice Hols.
181 First Group
182 First Leisure
183 First Technology
184 Firth Rixson
185 FKI
186 Flextech
187 Forth Ports
188 Freepages Gp.
189 Friends Ivory & Sime
190 Frogmore Estates
191 Gallaher Group
192 Games Workshop
193 GEC
194 Geest
195 General Accident
196 General Cable
197 George Wimpey
198 Gerrard
199 GK1'T
200 GlaxoWellcome
201 Glynwed
202 Go-Ahead Group
203 Goode Durrant
204 Graham Group
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205 Granada Group
206 Grantchester Holdings
207 GRE
208 Great Portland Estates
209 Great Universal Stores
210 Greenalls Gp.
211 Greene King
212 Greggs
213 Greycoat
214 Guinness Peat Gp.
215 GWR Group
216 Halifax
217 Halma
218 Harnbro Countrywide
219 Hamrnerson
220 Hanson
221 Hardy Oil & Gs
222 Harveys Furnishings
223 Hays
224 Hazlewood Foods
225 Headlairi
226 Henlys
227 Hepworth
228 Hewden Stuart
229 Heywood Williams
230 Highland Distillers
231 Hillsdown
232 Hiscox
233 Hogg Robinson
234 House of Fraser
235 HSBC
236 Hunting
237 Hyder
238 IBC Group
239 Ibstock
240 Iceland Group
241 ICI
242 IMI
243 Imperial Tobacco
244 Inchcape
245 Independent Insurance Group
246 Inspec
247 Intermediate Capital Group
248 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group
249 Jarvis
250 Jarvis Hotels
251 JBA
252 JJB Sports
253 Johnson Matthey
254 Johnson Service Group
255 Johnston Press
256 Kalon
257 Kingfisher
258 Kwik-Fit Hdg.
259 Ladbroke Group
260 Laing (John)
261 Laird Group
262 Land Securities
263 Laporte
264 Lasmo
265 Ldn.&Manc.Gp.
266 Ldn.Mer.Secs.
267 Legal & General
268 Lex Service
269 Liberty Intl.
270 LIMIT
271 Lloyds TSB
272 Logica
273 London Bridge Software
274 London Clubs International
275 London Forfaiting
276 London Intl.Gp.
277 London Scottish Bank
278 Lonrho
279 Low & Bonar
280 LucasVarity
281 Luminar
282 Lynx
283 M&G Group
284 Macfarlane Group
285 Maiden
286 Man (E D & F) Group
287 Manchester Utd.
288 Mansfield Brew.
289 Marks & Spencer
290 Marley
291 Marshalls
292 Marston Thompson
293 Matthew Clark
294 Matthews (Bernard)
295 Mayflower Corporation
296 McBride
297 McCarthy & Stone
298 McKechnie
299 Mdis
300 Medeva
301 Meggitt
302 Menzies (John)
303 Mepc
304 Mersey Docks & Harbour Company
305 Meyer
306 MFI Furniture
239
Appendix One - Cont.
307 Micro Focus Gp.
308 Millennium & Copthorne Hotels
309 Minerva
310 Mirror Gp.
311 Misys
312 Mitie
313 Monument Oil & Gas
314 More Group
315 Morgan Crucible
316 Morrison Construction
317 Morrison(Wm)Spmkts.
318 Moss Bros.Gp.
319 Mowlem (John)
320 MSB International
321 Mucklow(A.&J)Gp.
322 National Express
323 National Grid
324 National Power
325 Nat West
326 Nestor Healthcare
327 Next
328 Nfc
329 Northern Foods
330 Northern Leisure
331 Nycomed Amersharn
332 Ocean Group
333 Orange
334 Oxford Insts.
335 P&O
336 paragon Group
337 parity
338 Partco
339 pearson
340 peel Holdings
341 pentland Group
342 perkins Foods
343 perpetual
344 Persimmon
345 photo-Me Intl.
346 photobition
347 PlC International
348 Pilkington
349 pillar Property
350 Pizzaexpress
351 polypipe
352 ports. & Sunderland Newspapers
353 powell Duffryn
354 Powergen
355 premier Farnell
356 premier Oil
357 provident Financial
358 Prudential Corporation
359 Psion
360 Racal Electronic
361 Railtrack
362 Ramco Energy
363 Rank Group
364 Rathbones
365 Reckitt & Colman
366 Redrow Gp.
367 Reed International
368 Regent Inns
369 Renishaw
370 Renold
371 Rentokil
372 Reuters
373 Rexam
374 Rio Tinto
375 RJB Mining
376 RN
377 RMC
378 Robert Wsm.Drs.
379 Rolls-Royce
380 Rotork
381 Royal & Sun Alliance
382 Royal Bank of Scotland
383 RPC Group
384 Rubicon Gp.
385 Rugby Group
386 Rutland Trust
387 Safeway
388 Sage Group(The)
389 Sainsbury (J)
390 Salvesen(Chris.)
391 Scapa Group
392 Scholl
393 Schroders
394 Scot.Radio Hdg.
395 Scotia Holdings
396 Scottish & Newcastle
397 Scottish Hydro-Electric
398 Scottish Media
399 Scottish Power
400 Sears
401 Securicor
402 Sedgwick Group
403 Select Appointments
404 Sema Group
405 Senior Engr.
406 Serco
407 Seton Healthcare Group
408 Severn Trent
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409 Shaftesbury
410 Shanks & Mcewan
411 Shell
412 Shire Pharmaceuticals Group
413 Siebe
414 SIG
415 Signet Group
416 Singer & Fri edlander Group
417 Skills group
418 Skyepharma
419 Slough Estates
420 Smith & Nephew
421 Smith (David 5)
422 Smith(WH) Group
423 SniithKline Beecham
424 Smiths Industries
425 Somerfield
426 South Staffordshire Water
427 South West Water
428 Southern Electric
429 Southern Newspapers
430 Spirax Sarco
431 St Ives
432 St James's Place Capital
433 Stagecoach
434 Stakis
435 Standard Chartered
436 Stanley Leisure
437 Storehouse
438 Streamline Holdings
439 Sun Life & Provincial
440 T&S Stores
441 Tarmac
442 Tate & Lyle
443 Taylor Nelson AGB
444 Taylor Woodrow
445 Tbi
446 Telewest
447 Tempus Group
448 Tesco
449 Thames Water
450 The Electronics Boutique
451 Thistle Hotels
452 Thorn
453 Thorn tons
454 TI Group
455 Tibbett & Britten
456 Tilbury Douglas
457 TLG
458 TomkinS
459 Trafficmaster
460 Transport Development Group
461 Travis Perkins
462 Triad Group
463 Trinity
464 TT Group
465 Ultra Electronics
466 Uni gate
467 Unilever
468 United Assurance
469 United Biscuits
470 United News & Media
471 United Utilities
472 Vardon
473 Vaux Group
474 Verity Group
475 Versailles Group
476 Vickers
477 Victrex
478 Viridian Group
479 Vitec Group
480 Vodafone
481 Volex Group
482 Vosper Thncft.
483 Waddington
484 Wagon Industrial Holdings
485 WassaIl
486 Waste Management International
487 Waste Recycling
488 Wates City of London
489 Watson & Philip
490 Weir Group
491 Wellington Underwriting
492 Wembley Gp.
493 Wessex Water
494 Westbury
495 Wetherspoon (Jd)
496 Whatrnan
497 Whitbread
498 Wickes
499 Williams
500 Willis Corroon Group
501 Wilson Bowden
502 Wilson Connolly
503 Wolseley
504 Wolv.&Dudley
505 WPP Group
506 Wstm.Hlth.Care
507 Yates Brothers Wine Lodge
508 Yorkshire Water
509 Yule Catto
510 Zeneca
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Variable
BENEFITS
BENEND
BENSTART
BONUS
CHANGE
COMBINE
COMPANY
DFORMAT
DIRECTOR
DIRMTH
DSCODE
DYAVE1
DYAVE2
DYDAYS
EDATE
EMPLOYEE
EPS
EQEND
EQST
EXFIRST
EXLAST
GDATE
ICODE1
ICODE3
IORW
ITYPE
MARKER
MKTPRICE
Description
Benefits in kind received during the year
Beneficial share holding at end of year
Beneficial share holding at beginning of year
Bonus received during year
Change in the directors option holding during the year (Yes or No)
1 = Roles of CEO and Chairman combined, 0 = Roles of CEO and
Chairman separate
Company Name
Format of dates reported D=Exact Day, M=Month, Y=Year
Name of leading executive
Number of months during the year for which named executive was a
director
Datastream code of company
Average dividend yield over financial year (Datastream DY)
Average dividend yield over 4 years (Datastream DY)
Number of dividend observations during year
Event Date for changes in holding i.e date options were exercised, granted,
or lapsed
Total number of employees (Datastream 219)
Earnings per share - net adjusted (Datastream 211)
Number of shares in issue at end of financial year
Number of shares in issue at beginning of financial year
First day or which options can be exercised
Last day on which options can be exercised
Grant Date - date options were initially granted
1-digit FTSE industrial classification code.
3-digit FTSE industrial classification code.
1= Individual tranche exercise price, W=Weighted average exercise price
Description of industry of company
H=Holding at year end, G=Granted in year, E=Exercised in year,
L=Lapsed in year
Market price of shares on option event day where applicable
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MV	 Market value on 15/7/98
NBENEND	 Non-beneficial share holding at end of year
NBENSTART Non-beneficial share holding at beginning of year
NTRANCHES Number of individual tranches held by director
NUMBER	 Number of options in particular tranche
OPDATA	 YES = Options were either held at the start or at the end of the year, NO -
otherwise
OPYE	 YES = Options are held at the end of the year, NO - otherwise
OTHER	 Other payments (e.g. compensation, cash pension supplements, etc.)
ROLE	 Executive Title (e.g. CEO, Chairman, MD)
ROLE1\'ITH	 Number of months during the year for which iiamed executive held stated
role
SALARY	 Basic salary received during the year
SALES	 Total sales figure (or equivalent)
SALESIND	 Indicator for appropriate sales figure: S=Sales, TI= Total Income, NII=Net
Interest Income
SCHEME	 Scheme under which options granted : E=Executive, S=SAYE, SAR=Stock
appreciation rights
SEDOL	 Sedol number of company
SPRICE	 Share price at financial year end from annual report
TBRATE	 Treasury bill rate on financial year end date
TMAT	 Remaining length (in years) of option tranche
TOTAL	 Total direct compensation (=Salary+Benefits+Bonus+Other)
TOTALCAP Total Capital Employed (Datastream 322)
TOTPY	 Total direct compensation in previous year
TSR	 TSR during year (=log [return index at end/return index at start])
TSTEND	 Number of shares held under LTIP at end of year
TSTGRANT Number of shares granted under LTJPs during year
TSTSTART	 Number of shares held under LTIP at beginning of year
VOLt	 Volatility of company - taken from LBS Risk Management
VOL2	 Volatility of company - calculated from 4 years of returns data
XPRICE	 Exercise price of options
YREND	 Financial year end date
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